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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Background 
This research attempts to resolve a recurring empirical problem in world politics literature 
concerning the association between international relationships and economic sanctions. 
International relations (IR) scholars' assessments of economic sanctions outcomes have suggested 
contrasting views on the role of international organizations’ (IO) involvement in sanctions 
regimes. Results from empirical studies have concluded that unilateral sanctions are more 
successful than multilateral sanctions (Drezner, 2000; Miers & Morgan, 2002). Drezner (2000) 
argued that despite the intuition that seeking more partners benefits sanctions regimes, problems 
of bargaining, enforcement, and coordination are more plentiful and can result in sanctions being 
less effective. Conversely, recent empirical analyses using new data suggested that multilateral 
sanctions, smart sanctions, especially those under the auspices of international institutions, can be 
effective (Cortright & Lopez, 2002). The costs of sanctions are distributed on a number of actors 
and the cooperative framework exerts stronger political pressure on the target (Mansfield, 1995; 
Drezner, 2000; Thompson, 2006). This study explores the role of political agreement in unilateral 
and coalition (multilateral) economic sanctions.  
Economic sanctions are measures intended to alter the behavior of a given state. They are 
“economic measures directed to political objective” (Barber, 1979, p. 376). Therefore, the level of 
political agreement (LPA) among sanctioning states influences sanctions’ levels of effectiveness. 
Higher levels of political agreement among sanctioning states has been associated with more 
successful sanctions regimes, including greater cooperation, coordination and enforcement among 
sender states, resulting in higher disutility on the target. Further, multilateral sanctions featuring 
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greater LPA constitute a higher degree of moral legitimacy, making the target more likely to 
change its behavior consistent with the demands of the sanctioning coalition.  
According to Bapat and Morgan (2009), central to the contemporary debate regarding the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions is controversy regarding the role of variables such as the view 
of international institutions’ toward their involvement. Bapat and Morgan (2009) proposed three 
different explanations underlying this controversy (i.e., selection effects, public goods, and spatial 
theory), and conclude that unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral ones. First, they 
argued that the vast majority of multilateral sanctions concerned high stake political issues. Despite 
the high costs of sanctions paid by the target, such costs do not overweigh the value of the issue at 
hand, producing a less effective sanctions regime. Second, coalition sanctions present a classical 
collective action problem. In a coalition of sender states, individual states have the incentive to 
free ride on the public goods furnished by other coalition members. Therefore, a coalition member 
or sender state may not enforce the sanctions by allowing business transactions with the target 
state, thus reducing the disutility of the sanctions and jeopardizing the effectiveness of the 
sanctions’ regime. Third, and most important to the present study, is the level of agreement over 
demands among sender states (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1999). The principal sender’s political 
priorities may differ significantly from secondary senders, resulting in ineffective pressure over 
the target and rendering sanctions less successful.  
Coalition sanctions especially entail a bargain between the principal sender and the target 
states. Drezner (2000) argued that if the principal sender and the target perceive no benefit from 
resolving the political deadlock caused by economic sanctions, multilateral sanctions can be 
expected to fail. This conclusion indicates that cooperation in economic sanctions may not 
necessarily lead to effective sanctions. Lektzian and Patterson (2015) also noted the existence of a 
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bargaining dilemma among participating states in sanctions coalitions. States must find common 
grounds to foster cooperation, which can be difficult, as well as facilitate the enforcement and 
effectiveness of sanctions. The multiplicity of actors’ differences in motivations among them, and 
different levels of involvement of each actor, as well as target resolve make it more difficult for 
coalition sanctions to be effective.  
 Many scholars have pointed to the credible commitment problem, the difficulty in 
enforcing coalition sanctions given the benefits of unilateral defection (Martin, 1992; Martin 
1993b; Pollack, 2003; Posner & Sykes 2013). Sanctioning states generally are better off if all states 
comply with enforcing sanctions. However, states may realize economic benefits by defecting and 
conducting economic transactions with the target, while other states incur the enforcement costs. 
Larger sanction coalitions generate higher economic rents because each sender has a choice 
between continuing to cooperate or defecting. This classic institutional enforcement problem 
challenges the success of coalition sanctions and makes them less effective than unilateral 
sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 2009).  
 Recent empirical investigations on economic sanction outcomes noted the importance of 
international organizations’ involvement in determining the effectiveness of sanctions (Mansfield, 
1995; Martin, 1993b; Mastanduno, 1992). Higher levels of international cooperation generate 
more cooperation, equipping a coalition with better bargaining and enforcement means (Mansfield, 
1995). Institutional support provides actors with mechanisms that prevent member states or private 
agents from free riding. Therefore, analysts recommended that policymakers seek the approval of 
international organizations to guarantee an effective outcome for economic sanctions.  
 Advocates of multilateral sanctions argued that participating within a sender states 
coalition increases its bargaining power and can result in higher economic costs for the target, 
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prompting changes in its behavior. The sanction possesses greater political pressure and legitimacy 
when more actors are involved in a given sanctions episode, making it more effective (Drury, 
1998). Statistical tests have furnished evidence to support this argument that multilateral sanctions 
work better than unilateral ones.  
 This research focuses on the unilateral versus multilateral sanctions effectiveness debate 
by introducing a new theoretical argument linking the level of political agreement among sanction 
actors with the likelihood of sanctions success. Higher levels of political agreement among 
sanction actors increase their effectiveness. The literature noted that problems of cooperation, 
coordination, bargaining, and enforcement have reduced the effectiveness of multilateral 
sanctions. The degree of political agreement among sanctioning actors on the demands sought by 
the principal sender can be used to determine the level of effectiveness of economic sanctions.  
Galtung (1967) noted that domestic politics influenced the likelihood of sanctioning states 
bearing high costs when threatening or imposing sanctions. The effectiveness of economic 
sanctions also depends on the level of disutility experienced by the target state. Thus, the level of 
economic sanctions effectiveness is associated with the greater economic and political disutility 
for the target state. The threat or imposition of economic sanctions entails self-imposed costs by 
sanctioning states. Mansfield (1995) stated that “The ability of policymakers to assume high costs 
associated with sanctions depends in large measure on whether the interests of societal actors 
converge with the national interest” (p. 591). In other words, the level of political agreement among 
domestic actors affects the decisions of public officials when considering sanctions. Governments 
are more likely to bear high costs if the main opposition, interest groups and their lobbyists are in 
favor of its decision of imposing sanctions. Widespread support can increase the effectiveness of 
sanctions, as sanctioning states are willing to bear more costs for longer periods. Conversely, if 
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domestic political actors are opposed to economic sanctions, the levels of governmental 
commitment and enforcement may be reduced, resulting in less effective sanctions regimes. 
 In Coercive Cooperation, Martin (1993a) noted the importance of cooperation in making 
economic sanctions more effective. Her analysis concluded that higher levels of agreement among 
domestic political actors were associated with greater credibility and commitment to other states, 
as well as the willingness of the principal sanctioning state to uphold its demands and bear high 
costs through imposing sanctions (Martin, 1993a). One important function of international 
institutions in coalition sanctions is the pronouncement of issue linkage among participating states. 
International institutions help sanctioning states disseminate, share, and exchange information, 
resources, and strategies to bolster their efforts in making the target comply with their demands. If 
the members of international organizations are affected by the same issues prompting the 
sanctions, their commitment to the initiation, imposition, and enforcement of sanctions is more 
likely.   
 Despite the intuitive appeal of the argument that arduous coordination and enforcement 
problems reduce the effectiveness of economic sanctions (Miers & Morgan, 2002), international 
political economy scholars have not tested the effect of political agreement level on the outcomes 
of economic sanctions. My research contributes to scholarship on the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions by filling this gap in the literature. A new variable, the level of political agreement among 
crucial actors in sanctions episodes, is proposed, and a measure of it constructed.  The level of 
political agreement (LPA) within the sender state, international system, and the target state is 
considered. This information to constitute the LPA scale, summarizes the level of agreement per 




Overview of Methodology 
This dissertation combined level of political agreement dataset with two comprehensive 
datasets on economic sanctions, the HSE (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 2009) dataset and the 
Threats and Imposed Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat, & Kobayashi, 2014). 
Hufbauer et al. (2009) primarily collected information on 174 imposed economic sanction episodes 
from 1914 to 2000. HSE considered sanctions with multiple goals, phases, and targets as separate 
observations, thus increasing their cases to 204. They considered cases of multilateral sanctions 
by more than one sender, as well as unilateral ones. However, Morgan et al. (2014) examined 
sanctions both threatened and imposed. Therefore, the TIES data set includes 1,412 cases from 
1945 to 2005. 
The present study used both game theoretical models and empirical models. The TIES data 
set was used for contingency probabilities, such as the probability of imposing economic sanctions 
given sanctions were threatened or not threatened, for game theoretical models. For the empirical 
models, this study analyzed cross-sectional dataset of sanction episodes threatened and/or 
imposed. Observations were obtained by matching HSE dataset with the TIES dataset. Cases were 
analyzed by utilizing ordinal regression models. Overall, there are 125 cases matched between 
HSE and TIES with a time frame from 1946 to 1999. 
The main dependent variable in this study is the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The 
degree of effectiveness is the extent to which the sanctions have achieved the stated goals of the 
sanctioning states. The main independent variable, the level of political agreement (LPA), is not 
found within any existing economic sanctions dataset. HSE data were mainly used to construct the 
political agreement level index in this study. Political agreement is calculated for each economic 
sanction episode. Other independent variables, including relative power, regime types, signaling, 
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sanctions cost, and others, were also included in the regression models as control variables. The 
unit of analysis is the economic sanction episode based upon the dyadic relationship between the 
sender and the target. For coalitional sanctions, main sender state is assumed to be the sender state. 
A high agreement denotes higher levels of political agreement within the sender, lower levels of 
agreement within the target, and higher levels of political agreement in the international system. 
Conversely, a low political agreement score denotes lower levels of political agreement within the 
sender, higher agreement levels within the target, and lower agreement levels within the 
international system.  
To illustrate the theoretical argument, three case studies are introduced. These are: (a) The 
United States v. Turkey, from 1974 to 1976, (b) The United States and Canada v. South Korea, 
from 1975 to 1976, and (c) The Unites States v. Brazil, from 1977 to 1984. In the first case, because 
of the moderate levels of political agreement in the United States as a sender state (LPA1) and 
higher levels of political agreement in Turkey as a target state (LPA2), the sanction regime was 
partially effective. In the second case, however, the sanction episode was effective because of the 
higher levels of political agreement in the United States as a main sender state (LPA1) and lower 
levels of political agreement in South Korea as a target state (LPA2) and higher levels of 
international political agreement (LPA3). In the third case, the sanction’s effectiveness was low 
since level of political agreement in the United States as a sender state (LPA1) was at lower levels, 
and level of political agreement in Brazil as a target state (LPA2) was at moderate levels. I discuss 
below the measures for the variables. I also describe the measures and their distributions.  
Outline for the Remainder of the Study 
This dissertation assessed the influence of political agreement on the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. The first chapter introduces the problem and presents the underlying logic 
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behind the proposed explanation for making economic sanctions more effective. It outlines the 
theoretical and empirical bases of the influence of political agreement on the outcomes of 
economic sanctions. It also describes the content of subsequent chapters in the dissertation.  
 The second chapter reviews the literature on economic sanctions and their effectiveness. 
First, I introduce the concept of economic sanctions and define it. Second, a discussion on the 
various types and purposes of economic sanctions is presented. Third, a comprehensive review of 
the empirical literature of the determinants of economic sanctions outcomes is presented. Finally, 
the chapter provides a discussion on the few attempts found in this scholarship that point out the 
potential effects of political agreement.  
 The third chapter describes the methods used to collect the data, variables in the study, and 
analyses used to test the hypotheses. A comprehensive discussion of the HSE data and its variables 
is provided. This section includes a detailed exploration of the dependent, independent and control 
variables considered in the study. Second, a section is devoted to explaining the use of multiple 
regression and its appropriateness for testing the hypotheses. This discussion also includes a 
detailed description of the model, its specification, and the coefficients and statistics used to 
evaluate its goodness of fit.  
 The fourth chapter presents and discusses the results of the data analysis. First, model 
checks are presented to evaluate if the results are robust or not. Second, the model fit is evaluated 
using conventional statistics—that is, the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained 
by the model. Third, a closer examination of individual coefficients and test statistics is conducted 
to ensure the results are trustworthy. This section shows results of the maximum likelihood 
estimates. In addition, this chapter includes a detailed discussion of the findings and their meaning. 
The findings lend support to a narrative that links the effectiveness of economic effectiveness to 
9 
 
the level of political agreement. It is a narrative that should be incorporated into the larger body of 
research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  There are also, recommendations for future 
research.  
 The fifth chapter applies my findings to case studies. Three cases are used to show how 
differing levels of political agreement lead to varying degrees of effectiveness for economic 
sanctions.  
Finally, the sixth chapter presents a summary of the findings, discusses how they lead to a 
better understanding of factors affecting the impact of economic sanctions, and provides 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 International relations experts have debated extensively the determinants of economic 
sanctions outcomes (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990). This immense scholarship has resulted in 
a number of controversies regarding whether economic sanctions are an effective foreign policy 
tool, and when they are, what are the conditions that make them more successful? (Pape, 1998). It 
is useful to review the work on the history, types and correlates of economic sanctions prior to 
discussing the connection between political agreement and sanctions outcomes.  
History of Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions have been used by states as foreign policy instruments to advance their 
interests throughout human history (Drury, 1998). In 432 B.C., Pericles issued the Megarian decree 
announcing a trade embargo with Athens. This move was a response to the Megarian territorial 
incursions into Athenian lands (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990). Despite the failure of this 
episode—it was followed by the Peloponnesian war—economic sanctions have become an 
increasingly popular way that states attempt to make other states comply with their demands. 
 Historically, economic sanctions have been comprehensive and have included a number of 
tools including trading restrictions, imposing embargoes, limiting international ties, and freezing 
target states assets. The advent of the scientific study of economic sanctions is associated with 
empirical analyses to assess the relative effectiveness of such tools (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, & 
Radcliff, 1997). States have incorporated these tools selectively into their foreign policy and over 
time have adopted smarter sanctions that also are referred to as targeted sanctions. The move from 
comprehensive to targeted sanctions is motivated by the belief that targeted sanctions are more 
effective and promote speedier compliance (Berejikian & Shagabutdinova, 2007). Regardless of 
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the type of sanctions, the conventional wisdom of political science has been that sanctions are not 
effective policy tools (Pape, 1998). 
Since the end of the Second World War, powerful countries as well as international 
institutions have increased their use of economic sanctions (Allen & Lektzian, 2013). The League 
of Nations, and later the United Nations (UN), imposed sanctions a few times prior to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The UN and other international actors, such as the European Union, 
increasingly have used economic sanctions as a coercive policy instrument aimed at engendering 
a change in the target state behavior. The United States has notably been the single greatest user 
of economic sanctions in recent history (Lowenberg, 2015). This increased use of sanctions 
became possible because of globalization and the wide political, economic, and cultural 
penetration of the U.S. in world politics. According to the HSE data set, despite the capacity of 
regional organizations including the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and countries signing on to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), these organizations have not widely utilized economic sanctions.   
The Three Phases of Economic Sanctions 
Political scientists have generated a large body of research that has debated the 
conceptualization, measurement, and effectiveness of economic sanctions. This scholarship 
occurred in three main phases. The first phase began in the 1970s, with scholars conducting 
qualitative in-depth evaluations of economic sanction episodes in Rhodesia and South Africa 
(Levy, 1999). These studies concluded that economic sanctions did not work. The second phase 
occurred between the early 1980s and late 1990s. The study of economic sanctions became more 
rigorous with quantitative analyses of a newly constructed dataset by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 
([HSE], 1990). During this phase, researchers concluded that economic sanctions worked under 
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certain political, economic, and institutional conditions. The third phase started in the late 1990s 
and is ongoing, with the study of economic sanctions becoming more diverse conceptually, as well 
as methodologically (Morgan, Bapat, & Krustev, 2009). This phase has produced new definitions, 
metrics, and approaches to the investigation of economic sanctions with mixed findings regarding 
their success. 
In his essay “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the 
Case of Rhodesia,” Galtung (1967) led the way for the systematic analysis of economic sanctions. 
He concluded that economic sanctions were ineffective in inducing policy change by a target state. 
His analysis refuted the popular theory of “naive sanctions.” This theory postulated that the 
economic costs of sanctions felt by the target state could lead to a policy change conforming to the 
sender institution/state demands.  In their work on South Africa, Hermele and Odén (1988) detailed 
the sanctions episode, its preconditions, its implementation, and successive regime change. Most 
studies in the first phase of the literature on economic sanctions featured detailed descriptions of 
events, domestic and international dynamics, key actors, and effects. This body of scholarship did 
not use social science theories or methods to guide its investigations or support its findings. 
Political scientists just recorded large numbers of facts and events to arrive at a qualitative 
explanation of sanctions’ episodes and their effectiveness.  
Building on this early phase, scholars of the second phase started to develop theory, 
construct models based on theory, and use data to test those models. In 1990, the celebrated work 
of the scholars HSE provided evidence that sanctions worked in a third of their cases. HSE have 
revived the economic logic of sanctions, arguing that the cost of sanctions episodes is the most 
significant factor determining the effectiveness of sanctions. HSE research motivated a large 
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number of economic and political analysts to study the effectiveness or success of economic 
sanctions.  
Drury’s (1998) economic model found that the argument based upon the cost of sanctions 
episodes is not supported given the ability of target states to foster alternative solutions to the 
economic problems in markets arising from the imposition of sanctions. Importantly, 
methodological controversies have dominated the field of economic sanctions since HSE (1990) 
produced their dataset. Many scholars have criticized HSE’s approach of selecting cases, arguing 
that there was selection bias—their cases are a non-random and unrepresentative group of 
economic sanctions cases (Morgan, Bapat, & Krustev, 2009). Their selection criteria resulted in 
the exclusion of many cases where economic sanctions had been threatened, but not imposed. 
Nevertheless, the work of HSE revived the use of quantitative methods to analyze economic 
sanctions and the factors impacting their relative effectiveness. 
Inspired by the second phase, the current phase involves better theory, the construction of 
new data sets, and the use of more appropriate methods for studying economic sanctions (Bapat & 
Morgan, 2009). Scholars have emphasized the importance of political, as well as institutional 
variables, along with economic factors in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
(Martin, 1993b). New datasets have been constructed including the International Threats and 
Imposed Sanctions (TIES; Morgan et al., 2009). Scholars have used deductive, as well as inductive 
techniques, to investigate the degree to which sanctions achieve their objectives (Carter, 2008). 
The major contribution of the third phase on economic sanctions is improvements in specifying 
and estimating the effects of various factors upon economic sanctions' outcomes. There has been 
increasing use of economic sanctions since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and scholars want 
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to know under which conditions economic sanctions are effective (Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi, & 
Morgan, 2013).  
Conceptualizing Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions have been used by states before and/or during wartime with the 
ultimate objective of weakening the target state. These sanctions come in many forms, including 
naval blockades, trade restrictions, and embargos. The disasters suffered by countries in the First 
World War prompted world leaders, especially Woodrow Wilson, to seek alternative dispute 
resolution methods. During this era, economic sanctions were applied by the League of Nations, 
and more recently by the United Nations as policy instruments to compel states that do not comply 
with the wishes of the international system. Other states, especially the United States, have used 
economic sanctions to achieve their interests without incurring the costs of war, and this 
opportunity has resulted in a rise in the use of economic sanctions (Elliott & Hufbauer, 1999). 
The understanding of economic sanctions has evolved over time from an internationally 
celebrated action taken against states committing humanitarian atrocities to a unilateral measure 
that any state may undertake to attain a given political goal (Baldwin & Pape, 1998). Within the 
first wave of economic sanctions studies, scholars focused on their international aspects. For 
example, Galtung (1967) referred to economic sanctions as:  
Actions initiated by one or more international actors (the ‘sender's’) against one or more 
others (the ‘receivers’) in order to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value 
and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important. (p. 
379) 
 
With more states, more particularly the United States, adopting economic sanctions as 
unilateral policy tools to achieve their political objectives, the literature has shifted its emphasis 
from the international to a more state-oriented view. Lindsay (1986) defined economic sanctions 
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as “measures in which one country [the initiator] publicly suspends a major portion of its trade 
with another country [the target] to attain political objectives” (p. 154).  
The research on economic sanctions has focused on particular types of economic sanctions 
that senders possess to induce target states to comply. In their seminal quantitative study on 
economic sanctions, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) referred to economic sanctions as 
“deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or 
financial relations” (p. 2). The recent outgrowth of quantitative research on economic sanctions 
has emphasized the various types and intensities of economic measures used in sanctions episodes. 
The specific features of economic sanctions have become more nuanced, evolving along with 
trends in globalization. 
The first two phases of economic sanctions studies focused on episodes where sanctions 
were actually imposed. Responding to the need to include also cases where sanctions were only 
threatened but not imposed, Doxey (1987) defined economic sanctions “as penalties threatened or 
imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or 
international obligations” (p. 4). Despite this definition that includes more sanctions episodes, it 
remains focused on the international level. Other definitions have included sanctions at the 
international, as well as the state level. Carter (2008) defined economic sanctions as “coercive 
economic measures taken against one or more countries to attempt to force a change in policies, 
or at least to demonstrate the sanctioning country’s opinion of another’s policies” (p. 2). 
 Therefore, to consider a particular episode as an economic sanctions event, one needs to 
assess the goals, types, and motives of the sender. If the sender has declared its goal to be changing 
the behavior of the target state and getting it to comply with international norms, then a 
requirement of Carter's definition is met. Besides, economic sanctions vary in type, and may 
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include trade restrictions, embargoes, or business banning. Not all foreign policy tools are 
considered economic sanctions. For instance, symbolic foreign policy gestures may not be 
classified as sanctions. Finally, the motive behind economic sanctions should be the intent to 
induce a change in the behavior of the target state. 
Types of Economic Sanctions 
Despite the variation in the types of economic sanctions, they can be classified into four 
categories as Doxey (1980) suggested. These types include first, trade controls, second, suspension 
of trade or assistance, and third, the freezing of assets and the blacklisting companies with bilateral 
business. Looking first at trade controls, these are numerous and varied and can include a partial 
or total embargo; a partial or complete boycott or both. They also can include restrictions on 
exports/imports via special tariff policies aimed to hurt specific sectors of the target’s economy. 
An example is canceling or terminating a bilateral trade agreement, such as fishing contracts. 
 Second, the sender can suspend or reduce aid or assistance of goods/services. These 
sanctions can include, but are not limited to, suspension or reduction of military, technical, or 
development aid. These sanctions also encompass measures aimed at reducing the target state’s 
ability to acquire loans, grants, or access to credit. They can include other measures that affect the 
ability of the target to borrow from international monetary institutions or investors. 
 Third, freezing assets is another form of economic sanctions and can vary in intensity and 
type. This category of sanctions includes the confiscation or expropriation of the target 
government's or officials’ assets. It also includes the suspension of any ongoing or scheduled joint 
projects, such as rescheduling debt payments. It includes freezing interest or any ongoing financial 
activity involving the target state government or its officials.  
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Fourth, economic sanctions can entail the blacklisting of businesses, wherever 
headquartered, that are engaged in business with the target state (Doxey 1980). This process 
involves a prohibition of such businesses conducting business either in the sender state or the target 
state. 
Purpose of Economic Sanctions 
International law scholars (deKieffer, 1983; Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988) have claimed 
that economic sanctions are aimed at inducing a given state to terminate its violations of 
international law. Based on this understanding, economic sanctions have the objective of 
upholding international norms and are largely exercised to protect human rights (Reisman & 
Stevick, 1998). Political scientists have expanded this view to include cases where a single state 
may use sanctions as a tool to attain its own goals. This understanding has dominated the recent 
scholarship on economic sanctions and their effectiveness. 
 Although senders' statements regarding economic sanctions may specify the senders' 
goal(s), it is nevertheless difficult to know exactly why a given sender has initiated an economic 
sanctions episode against a target state (Lam, 1990). However, HSE (1990) noted that the purposes 
of economic sanctions are similar to those of common law, namely: punishment, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. A more refined analysis of economic sanctions objectives conducted by Miyagawa 
(1992) noted that the goals of economic sanctions are fivefold: deterrence, coercion, 
destabilization, signaling, or symbolism.  
 Similar to criminal deterrence, economic sanctions punish a target state for a given 
violation of international laws and norms, and this acts to discourage other states in the 
international system from engaging in similar violations. International institutions or individual 
states punish other states for behaviors that they perceive to be a transgression. The sender through 
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sanctions sends a strong message to the target state and other states that it is willing capable, and 
determined to enforce its policy demands, now and in the future. The sender needs to give a 
persuasive signal to other states in the international system for successful results (Martin, 1993a). 
 Another goal of economic sanctions, although difficult to achieve, is senders’ desire to get 
targets to comply with its policy goals or international norms (George & Simons, 1994). In these 
cases, the target has already transgressed and senders' goal is to correct the target's behavior by 
encouraging compliance or punishing non-compliance. In these cases, the sender is reacting to and 
trying to change the target's behavior.  
 One of the most sought-after goals of economic sanctions is regime destabilization. The 
Soviet Union launched a series of trade restrictions with former Yugoslavia as a way to replace 
Tito with another communist sympathizer (Wood, 2008). Similarly, the United States imposed 
sanctions on Iraq, Iran, and Syria hoping to engender a change in the regime. With a change of 
regime, the United States would see more favorable policies aligned with its interests. Economic 
sanctions have been widely used by actors both unilaterally and multilaterally to subvert 
governments, to destabilize regimes, and generate a change of policy in line with the sanctioner’s 
objectives.  
 Despite the conventional wisdom in political science that economic sanctions are an 
ineffective tool of foreign policy, scholars have acknowledged its role in signaling (Bergeijk, 1989; 
Melby, 1998). First, the sanctioner sends a strong message to its allies and to other states that it 
validates its words with action. Second, the sanctioner signals that it is serious to the target state 
that more serious actions may follow, such as quasi or regular military action. The comprehensive 
economic sanctions used against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 1990 is an excellent example 
of a case where the United States along with the United Nations in addition accompanied or 
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followed these with  a host of military, diplomatic, and political measures, thereby signaling their 
strong commitment to uphold international norms (Alnasrawi, 2001).  
 Finally, sanctions are signals for the domestic, as well as the international community 
(Whang, 2011). First, political opponents within a state may exert political pressure on a 
government to take measures against another state. The government, wishing to avoid a military 
confrontation and wanting to mollify the opposition, may impose economic sanctions on the other 
state, if only for symbolic effect. The imposition of economic sanctions is an action that supports 
international norms. The international community will not be a silent actor in the face of egregious 
violations of international law and human rights (Klotz, 1995). Despite the possible failure of 
economic sanctions in bringing change in the policy of the target, they signal a commitment to 
support and defend domestic and international laws and norms.  
Linking Economic Sanctions to Political Outcomes 
 Hirschman (1980) argued that when a given actor sanctions another actor in the 
international system by interrupting or distorting trade, such action is used an inducement to get 
the other actor to change their policy. This argument assumes that if a state is engaged in trade 
with another state, and that state is dependent on this relationship, the state may threaten or try to 
alter this relationship to gain political concessions (Hirschman, 1980). This argument led to the 
development in political science of the conventional understanding of economic sanctions: the 
more economic pressures and disabilities that a target state experiences from trade restrictions 
imposed by a sender state or an international institution, the higher the probability the target will 
change its behavior in accordance to the senders’ policy interests.  
 This understanding is derived from an international trade theory (Zhang, 2008) suggesting 
that trade has positive effects on the incomes of nations. The less access that countries have to 
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international trade, the lower incomes they will experience. The extent of trade relations between 
states is the main link to political concessions, where senders usually possess a higher standing in 
the economic system than targets. It is assumed that targets depend more on the benefits of the 
trading relationships with senders. The expectation is that they will offer political concessions in 
exchange of economic utilities.  
 In his seminal work on economic sanctions in Rhodesia, Galtung (1967) called the above 
logic as naive. He argued that the degree of economic disutility experienced by target states may 
not necessarily lead to political change, rather imposing sanctions may lead to a rally around the 
flag effect, political integration, and thus counter the intended effect of sanctions. He also noted 
that sanctions may not eventually lead to policy or political change in the target state, as the target 
state may look for alternative routes to replace the losses from the trading relationship.  
 In their analysis of the international system, Keohane and Nye (1977) argued that 
interdependence constitutes an important variable in explaining economic, as well as political 
outcomes, from sanctions. Generally, international trade is a dimension of the globalized economy 
within which states operate. Power differentials, such as power preponderance or power parity, 
also play significant roles in determining economic and political affairs because relative power 
affects dyadic relations between states (Geller, 1993). The actual, as well as potential ability of 
states to alter the behavior of others in today’s international system, represents another explanation 
connecting economic sanctions to policy change. The more dependent that states are on each other 
economically, the more sensitive and vulnerable they become. Therefore, sanctioners dealing with 
more dependent states may be better able to use their power to alter the behavior of targets and 
compel them to conform to their interests.  
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Economic Sanctions Outcomes 
 Evaluating economic sanctions outcomes is not easy. First, scholars have differed widely 
on conceptualizing the goals of sanctions, and then disagreed on how to best measure sanction 
outcomes (Yang, Askari, Forrer, & Teegen, 2004). A few scholars have argued that sanctions 
exhibit multiple goals and therefore are difficult to quantify (Bapat & Kwon, 2015). Other 
researchers have acknowledged this problem; however, they favor focusing on stated goals of the 
sanctioner (HSE, 2009). HSE revolutionized the measurement of economic sanctions outcomes by 
assigning a success score and a measure of sanction’s contribution to the behavior change of the 
target state. Despite the innovative approach, political scientists have criticized this approach, 
calling it inaccurate, insufficient, and misleading (Baldwin & Pape, 1998; Drury, 1998). Others 
have indicated it was too complex, less transparent, and lacked robust properties (Pape, 1997).  
 To assess sanctions, their goals need to be identified. Early scholars of sanctions identified 
multiple goals of sanctions. For example, Galtung (1967) suggested two main criteria for assessing 
the success of sanctions: (a) the degree of punishment and (b) the extent to which the target has 
complied with the stated goals of the sender or international norms. The first criterion can be 
measured through various techniques of estimating costs or utilities associated with the episode. 
While the second criterion is harder to operationalize, the degree to which the behavior of the 
target state complied with the goals of the sender state can be assessed.  
Similarly, Barber (1979) identified three goal domains for economic sanctions: primary, 
secondary, and tertiary. Each set of goals is directed at specific audiences. For example, primary 
goals concern the coercion and compliance with the stated goals of the sanctioner. Conversely, 
secondary and tertiary goals relate to the international system and its accepted norms. Barber 
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suggested that focusing on primary goals in measuring economic sanction outcomes is an invalid 
approach, because many other intended goals are missed.  
 The quantitative study of economic sanctions has led to the emphasis on primary goals, the 
extent to which the target state complies with the publicly stated goals of the sanctioner. HSE data 
and later Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data assessed the outcomes of 
sanctions using categorical measures of whether the episodes fulfilled the primary goals of the 
sender and its publicly stated objectives. Those constructing the HSE and TIES data argued 
(Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990; Morgan, Bapat, & Kobayashi, 2014) that capturing all 
sanctions goals in one measure is extremely difficult. Therefore, to assess sanctions outcomes 
quantitatively, parsimonious measures need to be developed. Although this approach yields a 
numeric value on the degree of economic sanctions outcomes, the extent to which sanctions met 
the diverse goals of the sanctioner is not captured.  
One of the defining features of the third phase of the study of economic sanctions is the 
assessment of sanctions outcomes. Pape (1997) argued that HSE miscoded their data and that this 
increased the number of cases of success. Others suggested that assigning a score for an episode 
outcome was arbitrary and suffered from several reliability and validity issues (Dashti-Gibson, 
Davis, & Radcliff, 1997). A few scholars even argued that measuring the effectiveness of sanctions 
episodes by assessing the extent of target state compliance is an erroneous approach. They argued 
that scholars cannot know if the sanctions have generated a change in the targeted state behavior. 
Most studies evaluating sanctions outcomes have developed binary measures, reducing the range 
of variation in sanctions’ outcomes (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997). Despite this simple intuitive and 
straightforward approach, this method disregards the multiple goals of sanctions when assessing 
outcomes and does not distinguish between differing levels of effectiveness. Economic sanctions 
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may be evaluated ordinally as having no, limited, partial, major, or complete effectiveness. This 
range of variation is lost in the current approaches to the assessment of the outcomes for sanctions.  
Notwithstanding the wide range of criticisms offered regarding approaches for evaluating 
the success of economic sanctions, political scientists have extensively investigated the 
determinants of sanctions success. This literature has produced plethora of findings that seem to 
be contradictory. The investigation of determinants has found that economic and political variables 
matter most in influencing the likelihood of success of economic sanctions (Bapat, Heinrich, 
Kobayashi, & Morgan, 2013).  
Some scholars have argued that economic pressures exerted by sanctioners on targets can 
influence domestic political stability. For example, Galtung (1967) attributed this proposition to 
the naïve theory and pointed out that 
There is a limit to how much value-deprivation [a] system can stand and that once this limit 
is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then 
political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness 
to negotiate. (p. 388) 
 
Economic sanctions are expected to instigate economic losses on the part of the targets’ 
population. Rising costs are expected to exert increasing pressure especially on the target's elected 
political leaders to make changes in order to lessen economic hardships (Allen, 2008). However, 
Cortright and Lopez (1999) indicated that non-economic factors also possess equal if not more 
significance in linking sanctions to policy change. 
Determinants of Economic Sanctions 
An important argument within the economic sanctions’ literature is about the set of 
conditions that determine their effectiveness (Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi & Morgan; 2013). This 
body of literature has findings with many inconsistencies and disagreements about what leads to 
the effectiveness of sanctions and to what extent economic or political variables contribute to their 
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effectiveness (Bapat et al., 2013; HSE, 2009; Pape, 1997). In areas where relative consensus has 
been established, such as the effect of economic costs on the likelihood of sanctions’ effectiveness, 
scholars have disagreed on the magnitude of such an effect. 
Economic Explanations  
In a comprehensive empirical analysis on the determinants of the success of economic 
sanctions s, Bapat et al. (2013) ran a total of 262,143 logistic regression models and found that  
Senders are more likely to achieve their goals (1) when they threaten and/or impose 
sanctions under the auspices of international institutions (IO Involvement) and (2) when 
sanctions are anticipated to impose or actually impose severe economic costs on targets 
(Target Costs). In our analysis, these factors are found to be positively associated with 
success of sanction policies, which is consistent with the hypotheses in the literature, and 
these relationships are robust. (p. 89) 
 
Their sensitivity analysis confirmed the conventional wisdom about sanctions’ outcomes; 
the more economic losses a target state experiences, the higher the likelihood of economic 
sanctions being effective. Such logic has been challenged by other scholars (Galtung, 1967; 
Baldwin 1985; HSE, 2009). For instance, Pape’s (1997) and Cortright and Lopez’s (1999) analysis 
of sanctions concluded that high levels of economic losses do not necessarily lead to policy 
changes. The case of Iraq in 1990 is a prime example. Iraq's economy, when ruled by Saddam 
Hussein, suffered substantially from high inflation and a decline in the gross national product 
(GNP), but these occurred without any policy change. Therefore, the argument that the more 
disutility a target state experiences from economic sanctions, the greater the effectiveness of the 
sanctions might not necessarily true. This finding corroborated an earlier study conducted by 
Drezner (1999) who found that the suspension of aid for vulnerable targets that caused great 
economic losses but did not lead to compliance by the targets.  
Blanchard and Ripsman’s (2008) in depth qualitative analysis confirmed the relevance of 
factors other than economic costs. They argued that for economic sanctions to be effective, other 
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causal factors must be present, as well. They noted a number of political factors including regime 
type in their analyses. Consistent with this view, Allen (2005) found that domestic political 
stability and structure affected the likelihood of economic sanctions being effective. Internal 
political turmoil and instability appeared to be important covariates in explaining the rate at which 
economic sanctions work. 
Analyzing HSE data, Lam (1990) found that overall economic health, as well as political 
stability were important determinants of economic sanctions’ outcomes. Similarly, Elliott & 
Uimonen (1993) found that these variables were significant at the 0.01 significance level using 
probit regression. Using logistic regression, Drury (2005) found that economically healthier targets 
could withstand economic sanctions at a higher threshold compared to less well-off states. Drezner 
(1999) used probit analysis of HSE data and found that political stability also was found to be a 
significant variable at the 0.05 level.  
Martin argued that international and bilateral trade levels determine the success of 
economic sanctions. Countries that depend on international trade for imports and exports are likely 
to be affected more than states that are less dependent on international trade. Similarly, a country 
with more trade partners generally does not suffer as much as a country with a limited number of 
partners when exposed to international economic sanctions (Martin, 1993b). In this case, states 
with higher access to international markets will find more suppliers for their goods and services 
resulting in economic sanctions being less effective. Another economic indicator, foreign 
exchange reserve, was found to influence the degree of success for economic sanctions (Kirshner, 
1997). The ability of states to withstand international financial crises and pressures with the use of 
their foreign reserves lessen the impact of sanctions.  
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Lektzian & Patterson (2015) discussed the evolving nature of economic sanctions given 
growth of the global economy. They suggested that the availability of financial borrowing and 
access to international financial markets on the part of the target state influence the likelihood of 
economic sanctions' effectiveness. The less able a country is to access financial resources and 
international investors, the more likely it will concede to senders’ policy goals. In a related note, 
globalization was found to increase the target’s state ability to seek alternative options, thus 
resulting in the failure of economic sanctions. The link between globalization and effectiveness of 
economic sanctions has not been investigated sufficiently.  
Political Explanations 
A few scholars have argued that a key political variable determining the effectiveness of 
sanctions is the level of international organizations' involvement. The more multilateral an episode 
is the higher its probability of success (Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi, & Morgan, 2013). HSE’s 
(2009) research found that the level of cooperation in a sanction’s episode can negatively impact 
its effectiveness. They argued that unilateral episodes generally are more effective than multilateral 
ones. For example, the United States has been the most frequent unilateral user of economic 
sanctions, and sometimes it has achieved successful outcomes.  
The ability of the target state to mobilize its citizens in opposition to the sanction’s has 
been noticed as a key factor reducing sanction's effectiveness. Target states tend to incite their 
populations with nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric to boost their governments’ capacity to 
withstand sanctions (Tung, 2003). The target state's ability to incite a “rally around the flag” is 
thought to influence the likelihood of sanction’s success. Despite the extensive literature on this 
effect, no study has used data to determine if there is evidence for it.  
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Pape (1997) argued that target states could obtain political utility from economic sanctions. 
The regimes of target states may want to increase their power by weakening the strength of their 
political opponents and strengthening ties with their supporters. They are likely to redistribute rents 
obtained from lower supplies and higher prices to those who vehemently support their resistance 
to complying with the sanctioner. Given the difficulty in operationalizing the use by regimes of 
target states to favor political supporters and punish political opponents, researchers have not yet 
included this variable in their analyses.  
Nossal (1989) found that effective economic sanction episodes occur more in democracies 
than dictatorships. He argued that authoritarian governments solicit a rally around the flag effect 
where they manipulate media, security, and domestic order to garner more support and resistance 
to foreign interventions. Despite this plausible argument, Pape (1997) found that differences in 
regime types do not alter the probability of effectiveness. Therefore, the evidence on the 
relationship between regime type and economic sanction effectiveness is inconclusive.  
In their analysis of economic sanctions, HSE (2009) concluded that sanctions have a higher 
level of probability of success when a set of political and economic factors are met. These factors 
include: 
(1) When the goals of the sender are limited; (2) the target is already experiencing 
economic difficulties; (3) there are generally friendly relations between sender and target 
countries; (4) sanctions are forcefully implemented in a single step; (5) sanctions entail 
significant costs for the target; (6) the costs for sender countries are modest; (7) the 
sanctions are not accompanied by covert action or military operations; and (8) few 
countries are needed to implement the sanctions. (p. 81-91) 
 
This diagnosis for the conditions of effective sanctions highlights the importance of 
political forces, such as the scope of sanctions, alliance, absence of military action during the 
episode, and magnitude of the episode. The most debated political variables in the literature have 
included: sender-target interaction, and the alliance status between the sanctioner or the main 
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sender state in the sanctioning coalition and the target. Empirical evidence on alliance status have 
been mixed, with some scholars arguing that sanctions worked better if they involved political 
allies while other scholars disagreed (Drezner, 2000; Lektzian & Souva, 2007; McLean & Whang, 
2010).  
In a report submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the General 
Accountability Office (1992) noted the importance of culture in determining the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. The report concluded that effective sanction episodes would occur more 
frequently in target countries with a greater number of cultural ties with the sender. Drezner (1999) 
argued that the greater the adversity between the sender and the target, the more likely the episode 
can be expected to fail. The basis for this argument is that targets are more reluctant to acquiesce 
to a sender that is a perceived enemy or threat. Therefore, cultural ties and adversity are important 
in determining if sanctions are effective.  
Some scholars view economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy that is available to states 
to use in advancing their interests (Barber, 1979). Few scholars have argued, however, that if 
senders show intent to carry out military action along with economic sanctions, that economic 
sanctions will be more effective. Scholars have failed to analyze empirically the additional factor 
of a threat of military action adequately.  
Explanations of Sanction Effectiveness 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999) argued that the severity of an economic sanction episode 
determines its possible effectiveness. The more economically, politically, and symbolically severe 
are sanctions, the higher the probability of their effectiveness. Despite this expected outcome, they 
argued that internal pressures upon sanctioners from political and economic groups opposed to 
sanctions that are severe because they will result in high human costs might prevent sanctioners 
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from applying such damaging sanctions. This in turn would result in less severe sanctions that 
would not be as effective as damaging ones.  
Many scholars have argued that the more disutility experienced by political and economic 
elites in a target state, and the sectors that they control, the more effective that sanctions will be. 
Such sanctions are called targeted sanctions. Cortright and Lopez (2002) argued that when political 
and economic elites targeted by sanctions experience greater costs, the more likely they will be to 
acquiesce to the demands of the sanctioner and change their behavior. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of sanctions varies with the economic and political status of the individuals who are targeted. 
Although scholars have tried to measure this variable, they are unable to do so accurately because 
of the lack of information regarding the extent of economic, political, and symbolic losses that 
elites or the sectors they control have experienced as a result of sanctions (Shagabutdinova & 
Berejikian, 2007; Tostensen & Bull, 2002).  
One of the most commonly used measure of targeted sanctions is the type of sanction. 
Financial sanctions that are intended to hurt political, military, and economically allied individuals 
and institutions are thought to be more targeted and effective in bringing policy change. Trade-
wide restrictions or embargos have a wider effect. For example, the population at large may 
experience greater negative effects, thus giving the target government the ability to rally people 
around the flag using nationalist rhetoric. Therefore, researchers have found that financial 
sanctions for targeted groups are more effective than other types of sanctions (Torbat, 2005).  
Scholars have found that monitoring and enforcement levels are important in determining 
if economic sanctions are effective (Doxey, 1980). Costs associated with monitoring sanctions 
have to be less than the benefits perceived to be obtained from them. Black and Cooper (1989) 
argued that the type of economic system could influence the likelihood of economic sanctions to 
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being effective. Economic sanctions can be more effective if used against countries with market-
oriented economies. The literature on economic sanctions effectiveness has supported the 
importance of political, as well as institutional variables in explaining if sanctions work.   
 In their recent analysis of how economic sanctions succeed; Whang, Mclean, and Kuberski 
(2013) noted that economic sanctions could be effective through two mechanisms. First, sanctions 
work if they altered an existing dependency between the sanctioning and target states and the target 
perceived that such dependency would be affected severely if sanctions were imposed. This 
argument highlighted the importance of economic variables, such as costs associated with 
sanctions, trade linkages, economic alliances, and financial ties. Whang et al. (2013) also 
maintained that the level of determination, commitment, swiftness, and capability exhibited by the 
sanctioner signaled the truthfulness of the message to the target (costly signaling theory), leading 
to concessions by the target state. This analysis indicated the importance of economic, as well as 
political forces in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  
In a recent analysis of targeted sanctions, Drezner (2011) concluded that economic 
sanctions could be more effective at the threat stage when compared to imposition. Moreover, he 
found that imposed economic sanctions succeeded if the target state experienced substantial 
economic losses; if the sender and target states did not anticipate future conflict; if the episode 
involved a less political and salient issue; and if more actors participated in the episode. Drezner 
argued that the use of smart (targeted) sanctions that hurt the political elites of the targeted states 
rather than the population are more likely to succeed and should be recommended to policymakers.  
Finally, the duration of sanctions’ episodes is another characteristic affecting the 
effectiveness of sanctions (Bolks & Al-Sowayel, 2000). Scholars are not in agreement concerning 
the relative effectiveness of shorter or longer sanctions. Some researchers argued that shorter 
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sanctions are more effective (Drezner, 1999; Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990). Conversely, other 
scholars suggested that shorter sanctions might not inflict sufficient economic or political costs on 
target states and thus lead to their failure (Brady, 1987; Daudi & Dajani, 1983). An unexplored 
question is what is considered short for a sanction. Despite the mixed results found in the empirical 
literature, the duration of sanctions is believed to affect their success, with shorter sanctions being 
less effective than longer ones.  
Limitations of the Literature 
Ignoring the Level of Political Agreement 
 When investigating the effectiveness of economic sanctions, political scientists have 
ignored a potentially important explanatory variable, namely the level of political agreement 
among multiple sanctioning actors. The threat and imposition of economic sanctions by multiple 
actors are considered to be high profile international decisions. The level of agreement among 
leaders involved in the decision-making process at all levels can influence the effectiveness of 
sanctions regimes. On a political leadership level, Renshon and Renshon (2008) argued that world 
leaders incorporate their own psychological attitudes and assumptions when rendering a decision 
on how states should behave in the international system. This decision-making process arises from 
the idea that if the primary stakeholders in a sanction regime share the same attitudes and 
prescriptions, the political, logistical, and economic effectiveness of sanctions should be higher. 
This decision-making process can be described by using a game theoretical approach. 
Game Theory Approach to Sanctions Decision Making 
By using Bayesian probabilities and a two-level game theoretical approach first introduced 
by Putnam (1988), economic sanctions bring out relatively less effective outcomes when these 
conditions are satisfied: (a) if there is a domestic opposition within a sanctioning state, (b) the 
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domestic opposition does not support the government’s sanctions; compared with the case where 
the sanctioning state does not have a domestic opposition. However, sanctions are more effective 
when opposition supports the government’s sanctions policy when compared to the situation, 
where there is no opposition (i.e., authoritarian regimes). So, the least effective sanctions occur in 
settings where sanctions are not supported by domestic political opponents (e.g., main opposition 
party), whereas sanctions are moderately effective in settings where regimes do not have political 
opponents, and more effective sanction occur in settings where domestic political opponents 
support the government’s sanction policy. Two game theoretical models (model 1 in Figure 2.1 
and model 2 in Figure 2.2) are presented to depict the situation. Payoffs for sender and target state 
under the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) condition will be presented next in Figure 2.3. Note 
that this is a zero-sum game under incomplete information environment. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Extensive form of the game where there is no opposition in the sender (model 1) 
 
The sequence of moves for the first model 
 
a. The government of sender state moves first by choosing to either threaten economic 
sanctions to a target state or maintain the status quo. If sender state chooses the strategy 
of status quo, then the game ends. 
 
b. After observing the government’s actions, target state either obeys or challenges sender 




c. If the target state chooses to challenge, then sender state government either backs 




Figure 2.2: Extensive form of the game where there is opposition in the sender state (model 2) 
 
The sequence of moves for the second model 
 
a. The government of sender state moves first by choosing to either threaten economic 
sanctions to a target state or maintain the status quo.  
 
b. The opposition party in sender state moves next by choosing to either support or oppose 
the government’s economic sanctions policy.  
 
c. After observing the government’s and the opposition party’s strategies, target state 
either obeys or challenges sender state’s demands. If target state obeys, then the game 
ends.  
 
d. If the target state chooses to challenge, then sender state government, either backs down 






Figure 2.3: Payoffs for sender and target states under the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) 
condition (note that u1 denotes sender state’s payoffs, and u2 denotes target state’s payoffs) 
 
In the sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) condition, as seen in Figure 2.3, there are three 
different payoff outcomes for target state given that sender state payoffs are held constant at u1> -
a. Target state payoffs (u2) are: 
a. When opposition supports sender government, payoffs range for target state = [0, ∞]; 
b. When there is no opposition in sender state, payoffs range for target state = [-1.06, ∞]; 
c. When opposition opposes sender government, payoffs range for target state = [-2.2, ∞]. 
Comparing the utilities obtained by sender and target state under the case where there is 
domestic opposition and there is no domestic opposition in sender, target state gets more utility 
(higher magnitude of payoffs range) when the main opposition party does not support the 
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government’s sanctions policy (smaller payoffs range) in sender state, however, target state gets 
lesser utility (lower magnitude of payoffs range) given opposition supports government’s sanction 
policy.  
The model suggests that opposition party can serve to send credible signals to the rival 
state in a crisis by creating a second information source that effectively confirms the government's 
level of political agreement. Conversely, the opposition’s refusal to agree to the government’s 
decision on economic sanctions decreases the effectiveness of sanctions because now the target 
state is simply more uncertain about the government’s determination level, whether it is bluffing 
or not. Therefore, the target state is more likely to challenge with lower levels of political 
agreement in the sender state. Thus, in the equilibrium condition, the level of political agreement 
in the sender state is related to the effectiveness of economic sanctions outcomes (See Appendix 
A for payoff calculation details for formal models). 
 Domestic actors’ agreement on economic sanctions is thought to affect decisions on the 
use of foreign policy tools. When confronted with a decision on matters of war and peace, leaders 
are driven by their own preferences, as well as by domestic pressures. Mintz and DeRouen (2010) 
argued that many economic sanction episodes are created to appease domestic political pressures 
arising from demands by the public for political action, or by political opponents, or lobby groups. 
It is reasonable to believe that if all domestic actors agree on the demands, outcomes, and logistics 
of economic sanctions, sanctions are more likely to be effective.  
 
The degree of fit between sanctions goals and outcomes 
 In the 21st century, economic sanctions are rarely declared unilaterally. They are often 
initiated by an international organization or an ad hoc coalition. International cooperation has been 
found to be one of the most robust predictors of the effectiveness of economic sanctions (Hagan, 
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2001). When international actors, leaders, as well as decision-making bodies are in greater 
agreement, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is likely to increase.  
 Notwithstanding the difficulty of judging what institutions and processes conducive to 
effective decision making in foreign policy, international relations (IR) scholars have argued that 
the degree of fit among actors increases the efficiency of the process, as well as its outcomes 
(Adrian, Ang, & Peksen, 2007). The degree of fit refers to the level of agreement between goals 
and outcomes. To what extent is there consensus among actors’ goals or demands in a decision-
making body? For instance, one difference between the Reagan administration’s economic 
sanctions on Poland in 1981 and the Obama’s administration Iranian sanctions was the degree of 
fit in the declared goals by the senders. In the first episode, the Reagan staff wanted Europeans to 
cooperate and cut assistance to the Soviet oil pipeline development, which failed because European 
firms wanted to continue assistance, resulting in a poor fit that generated an ineffective sanctions 
regime. In the latter, the United States along with European powers (especially, the UN Security 
Council’s five permanent members and Germany, P5+1), wanted Iran to halt its nuclear 
development. Sanctions resulted in an agreement signed by the Iranian government and world 
powers, which restricted the Iranian state from developing its desired nuclear goals over time. As 
a result, the United Nations sanctions were lifted sanctions against Iran in early 2016. The degree 
of fit was substantially higher in the second episode, resulting in more effective sanctions.  
 Major differences in policy goals are likely to be associated with extremely high levels of 
political disagreement, hindering achievement of consensus for foreign policy decisions (Morgan 
& Schwebach, 1995). Political psychologists have recommended the use of multiple advocacy 
decision-making structures, systems where diverse views are voiced and encouraged. Such 
structures are used to manage inherent conflict features in decision-making bodies. Psychologists 
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warned about where there exist or there is promotion of different alternatives, worldviews, or 
preferences (McLean & Whang, 2010). On the other hand, if actors agree on the essential political 
ingredients of the foreign policy decision, the time and resources required to reach such a decision 
may be reduced, increasing the effectiveness of the decision-making structure, as well as its 
outcomes.  
Political scientists have suggested a number of indicators that influence the degree of fit 
among world political actors. Kratochwil (1991) suggested that issues of high stakes outcomes for 
international actors can make them more likely to incur greater costs and make expensive political 
decisions. If a foreign policy decision concerns a salient issue for a sufficient number of actors or 
a group of interested agents (i.e., nuclear weapons), actions or decisions made regarding the issue 
could reflect a higher degree of commitment on the part of actors. Such an issue could be expected 
to increase the fit of demands, goals, or plans of international actors, because it carries substantial 
leverage in the international system.  
 Another potential factor that can increase the degree of fit, or the level of political 
agreement, is economic interdependence. States that are involved in substantial bilateral economic 
exchange often share many common interests. Similarly, political and cultural links also are drivers 
of political agreement in the international order. Allies are more likely to advocate for each other 
to protect common interests. Simultaneously, shared cultural markers such as religion, language, 
or race also may increase the likelihood of states exhibiting similar goals in a given foreign policy 
body (Mazarr, 1996).  
 Despite much theorizing about political agreement in international relations, there is no 
quantitative research on the topic. The present study looks at the concept of political agreement in 
the context of economic sanctions. The effectiveness of economic sanctions is judged by whether 
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the target state has conceded to the demands of the sender state(s). The study investigates and tests 
the hypothesis that a greater degrees of political agreement among all of the members of 
multilateral sanctions episode with respect to the demands established by the principal sender is 
associated with a more effective sanction regime. The underlying rationale of this hypothesis is 
that if political agreement is high, the members of an economic sanctions coalition are more likely 
to reach decisions quickly on the type, scope, and enforcement of sanctions, when compared to 
episodes reflecting low levels of agreement. Moreover, higher levels of demand fit are expected 
to generate greater cooperation for sharing intelligence and increased levels of monitoring, along 
with institutional commitment to ensure that sanctions achieve the principal demander's set of 
demands.  
Measurement Limitations 
The study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions is limited by several methodological 
problems. First, most researchers analyze effectiveness as a binary outcome, success or failure of 
episodes (Carter, 2008; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, & Radcliff, 1997). A justification for using this 
measure is that dichotomizing the outcome results in simplicity and easy interpretation. A 
comparison between episodes that resulted in the target acquiescing to the sender stated goals and 
those where targets did not lead to simple interpretations for both descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis. Using a dichotomous variable also allows for an intuitive understanding of 
whether and why sanctions worked or not. For example, many of the variables used in both the 
HSE and TIES datasets are binary measures making it easy for the user to understand and 
comprehend the complex political, economic, and episodic factors. This simplicity however comes 
with costs.  
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 The problems of dichotomizing variables are well documented (Altman & Royston, 2006; 
Royston, Altman, & Sauerbrei, 2006). First, much of the variation and thus information contained 
within the outcome variable is lost. Effectiveness may be viewed as a continuous measure with 
varying degrees. With loss of information there is less of a chance of detecting a relationship 
between variables because the power of statistical tests is substantially reduced by categorization. 
The use of binary variables can be problematic especially when HSE and TIES datasets include 
effectiveness measures at the ordinal level. HSE’s measure is at the ordinal level, and thus includes 
information on effectiveness not found in a binary measure. Similarly, TIES datasets include both 
nominal and ordinal measures of success. When possible, it is best to work with the full 
information contained within a variable's measure rather than collapsing that variable's measure 
and losing information.  
 A more serious problem arises using a dichotomous measure of a sanction's outcome as 
successful or unsuccessful. International relations scholars judgments regarding the cut-point of 
success seem arbitrary (Altman & Royston, 2006). Therefore, when an analyst decides to code 
data into cases of success and failure, many cases would be placed according to the analyst’s own 
criteria or simply misplaced. Existing datasets on the effectiveness of economic sanctions are 
imperfect. Nevertheless, they include ordinal level measures that contain more valid information 
on sanctions outcomes than data that has been recoded into dichotomies.   
Modeling Shortcomings  
 The current empirical literature on the effectiveness of economic sanctions is limited by 
several methodological problems. Using binary measures of the success of economic sanctions, 
scholars used binary regression analysis techniques (logistic and probit regression). The use of 
such methods, however, has limitations.  
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 First, Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford, & Feinstein (1996) noted the importance of 
sample size when using dichotomous regression analysis. Although all statistical models are 
affected by the size of the sample used, binary regression models have specific limitations. Small 
sample sizes, generally less than 400 cases, as Nemes, Jonasson, Genell, & Steineck (2009) 
indicated, are more likely to results in biased estimates of the parameters of the model. As sample 
size decreases, the odds ratio become larger (Lemeshow & Hosmer, 1982). For the analysis of 
economic sanctions, many studies have been conducted using logit and/or probit regressions with 
small samples and large number of predictors, thereby exacerbating the problems of bias.  
 Second, most analyses of the effectiveness of economic sanctions rely on a single 
regression model with a number of explanatory variables (Bapat et al., 2013). Although such 
models produce valuable information regarding the effects of predictors, the confidence and 
validity of results may not be generalizable because of different model specifications (variables 
included or excluded), even using the same data sets. Many scholars attempt to solve this problem 
by varying the specification of their models, typically by including more independent variables. 
However, such efforts are insufficient. Adding more independent variables, while it may improve 
the fit of models, does so at the cost of parsimony. Changing the specification of models also 
results in changes in the coefficients and statistics, making it difficult to judge the quality of 
models.  
 Third, investigations of the effectiveness of economic sanction has led to model 
specifications that lack parsimony. To achieve acceptable levels of fit, scholars tend to include a 
large number of covariates that are likely to lead to the well-documented problem of over inclusion 
(Babyak, 2004). Researchers may be unable to account for specificity (the degree to which cases 
do not achieve an effective outcome) regarding the failure of economic sanctions, and sensitivity 
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(the degree to which cases achieve effective outcomes) of cases of economic sanctions 
effectiveness. The data sets do not have enough cases of failures and successes to allow researchers 
to discern small effects. Researchers need to consider the goal of parsimony and exercise caution 
and care in selecting independent variables.  
 A measure of the effectiveness of economic sanctions should not be collapsed into a 
dichotomy. Because sanctions have multiple goals; a better way to conceptualize and measure the 






CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter outlines the research methods that I used. The topics include, data sources, 
conceptualization and measurement, and data analysis techniques. It details the model of the 
relationships between political agreement and economic sanction outcomes.  
The population of cases includes both threatened and imposed economic sanctions episodes 
as defined by the Threats and Imposition of Sanctions dataset (TIES; Morgan, Bapat, Kobayashi, 
2014). The latest version of the dataset includes cases between 1945 and 2005. I use this version 
because the authors corrected the coding errors in previous versions. Sanctions cases before 1945 
were excluded from the analysis due to the lack of available data on many of the independent 
variables in this analysis. The HSE data set is the main source of data for each sanction episode 
when specifying the level of political agreement for three parties: principal sender, target, and 
international. For some cases, HSE does not have sufficient information to measure the level of 
political agreement. To solve this problem, I explored other available data sources, such as states’ 
official public statements and newspaper indexes (i.e., Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, Keesing’s 
Record of Contemporary Events).  
The unit of analysis in this research is the sanction episode. The population studied includes 
each case in the TIES dataset. Most research on the effectiveness or outcomes of economic 
sanctions uses sanction episodes as the units of analysis. This study does the same.  
Matching the TIES dataset cases to the HSE dataset resolves the recurring problem of 
selection bias in the economic sanctions’ literature (Drezner, 2003) and adds to the randomness. 
This is so because the TIES data set also includes threatened sanctions, as well. Economic 
sanctions are considered to be ineffective foreign policy tools because sanctions can “widen the 
conflict, add to its destructiveness, and sometimes prolong it” (Kreisberg, 2012, p.88). These 
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findings, however, are based on analyzing only imposed sanctions. This strategy neglects that 
threatened sanctions may also be effective and cause target states to alter their behavior in 
accordance with the wishes of sender states (Bapat et. al., 2013; Drezner, 2003).  Drezner (2003), 
relying on a game theoretical framework, argued that effective sanctions occur as a result of threats 
rather than because of their imposition. Therefore, the TIES dataset is a solution for the problem 
of selection bias since it is a more inclusive population compared to other datasets.  
Analytic Method 
 The analytic method used is a set of related models using ordered logit regression of cross-
sectional data. There are 125 cases of sanctions episodes in the data set (from 1946 to 1999). The 
dependent variable is sanctions effectiveness. Nine different models were fitted from general 
model of sanction effectiveness as seen in Figure 3.1. There are a total of 14 independent variables. 
The list follows: 
1. Political agreement in principal sender state (LPA1);  
2. Political agreement in target state (LPA2); 
3. Political agreement in international system (LPA3);  
4. Aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4);  
5. Principal sender’s cost (Cost1); 
6. Target’s cost (Cost2); 
7. Relations (degree of alliance between principal sender and target); 
8. Relations (number of senders); 
9. Relations (the United States involvement); 
10. Relative power; 
11. Inducements;  
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12. Principal sender regime type;  
13. Target regime type;  
14. Signaling; 
15. Bluntness scale. 
 
Level of Political Agreement Model 
General: 𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝛽9𝑋9 + 𝜀 
 
Detailed: 



























𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑋6 + 𝛽 7
(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖1)
(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖2)
𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼 𝑋7 + 𝛽8
𝐵𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑋8 + 𝛽9
𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑋9 + 𝜀 
 
Figure 3.1: General model of sanctions effectiveness 
 
Subsequent analysis estimated modified versions of the general model. First, the effects of 
the level of political agreement on the senders’ level, LPA1, was added to the model.  As shown 
on Figure 3.2, Group 1 Models include three models variable: one including LPA1 and the 
remaining eight independent variables, one without LPA1 and one without the cost variable. These 









𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴1𝑋11 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴1𝑋11 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋3 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 
(Both LPA1 and Cost included) 
 
Figure 3.2: LPA1 Model (first model) 
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 This strategy also is applied to evaluate the level of political agreement of the targets, as 
well as the international level. As shown in Group 2 Models (in Figure 3.3) and Group 3 Models 
(in Figure 3.4) respectively, a model with LPA2, on the target side, is estimated, accompanied by 
three additional other models, one without cost, one excluding LPA2, and one including both. The 
same steps are taken to evaluate LPA3, the level of political agreement on the international level. 








𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴2𝑋12 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 
(LPA2 excluded, Cost included) 
Model 2.c 
𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴2𝑋12 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 
(Both LPA2 and Cost included) 
 








𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴3𝑋13 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴3𝑋13 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 
(Both LPA3 and Cost included) 
 
Figure 3.4: LPA3 Model (third model) 
 
 Finally, the analysis estimates three models labeled Group 4 Models in Figure 3.5. These 
models estimate the effect of the aggregated level of political agreement variable, LPA4. The first 
model includes LPA4 and excludes cost. The second model includes cost, but LPA4. The third 
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includes both variables. Since the second sub-model of each the model excludes LPA variables, 









𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴4𝑋14 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀  




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀 




𝑌 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑃𝐴4𝑋14 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 + 𝛽8𝑋8 + 𝜀  
(LPA4, and Cost included) 
 
Figure 3.5: LPA4 Model (fourth model) 
Dataset Descriptions 
1. TIES dataset description. 
The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset was the one of the primary sources 
of information for this research. It uses the same country codes as those found in the Correlates of 
War (COW) project. TIES dataset provides information about economic sanctions including their 
length, intensity, actors and outcomes. TIES dataset includes 1,413 sanctions episodes from 1946 
to 2007. In addition to numerous secondary sources, the primary sources for TIES dataset are 
Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, and Keesing’s Record of Contemporary Events (Morgan, Bapat, & 
Kabayashi, 2014).  
The authors define a sanction case when it satisfies two conditions: (1) involves at least 
one sender state and a target state, and (2) is implemented by the sender state in order to change 
the behavior of the target state. Therefore, their cases include many kinds of actions, including 
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tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, freezing assets, cutting foreign aid, 
and/or blockades (Morgan et al., 2014).   
For each case, the dataset includes information about the duration (including starting day, 
month, year, and ending month day, year) of each sanctions episode. The dataset also provides 
information about the sanctions type:  whether the case involves a single state (unilateral), a group 
of up to five states (multilateral) or an international institution(s), such as the United Nations (UN) 
or European Union (EU). If it is a multilateral sanction, the dataset also provides the principal 
sender state, as well. The dataset specifies one target state, which is in accordance with their 
definition of sanctions. 
For issues, the dataset provides 15 different issue type codes, and includes three variables 
allowing for the coding of up to three types of issues: issue1, issue2, and issue3, as causes for the 
sanctions. These variables reflect their order of importance, and use the codes shown below. 
Morgan et al. (2014) includes issue types separately both for threatened and imposed sanctions. 
Therefore, the dataset includes up to three of the most relevant issues for cases of both threatened 
and imposed sanctions. These issue types together with their codes are below: 
1. Contain Political Influence; 
 
2.  Contain Military Behavior; 
3.  Destabilize Regime; 
4.  Release Citizens, Property, or Material; 
5.  Solve Territorial Dispute; 
6.  Deny Strategic Materials; 
7.  Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice; 
8.  Improve Human Rights; 
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9.  End Weapons/Materials Proliferation; 
10. Terminate Support of Non-State Actors; 
11. Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices; 
12. Improve Environmental Policies; 
13. Trade Practices; 
14. Implement Economic Reform; 
15. Other. 
 
Morgan et al. (2014) also provide information about how the threat was made by the sender. 
They identify the person(s) who threatened economic sanctions by the threat identity variable. The 
dataset provides for up to three variables for each case depending upon the number making the 
threat, using the codes below. Their categories include: 
1. The threat was made by a bureaucrat or a body of bureaucracy; 
2. Individual Legislator, the threat was made by legislation; 
3. Legislature, the threat was made from legislation structure; 
4. Executive staff member, when a threat was made by executive staff member; 
5. Executive, when executive, such as president, prime minister etc., make a threat; 
6. Government, when the government threatens using economic sanctions; 
7. Sanctions were threatened by the head of international institution; 
8. When an institution body adopt a resolution on sanctions. 
 
For the sanction types threatened, the dataset includes 11 categories; these are; (a) 
unspecific, (b) total economic embargo, (c) partial economic embargo, (d) import restriction, (e) 
export restriction, (f) blockade, (g) asset freeze, (h) termination of foreign aid, (i) travel ban, (j) 
suspension of economic agreement/protocol, and (k) other type of sanctions threatened. The first 
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10 categories (a) through (j) are coded using numbers 1 through 10; the last category (k) is 
alphabetic (a string variable). The sender's clarity regarding the offending behavior of the target 
state is coded as (1) ambiguous and (2) clear. If no threat was made before the imposition of 
sanctions, then variable is coded as missing. In addition, sender’s commitment levels when 
threatening the use of sanctions is coded as (1) weak, (2) moderate, and (3) strong. 
The specific target intended to bear the cost of sanctions threatened is coded as (1) general, 
(2) regime leadership, (3) a particular industry or industries, (4) a particular political group or 
groups, (5) military, and (6) other. Threats may focus on more than one target in a case, then two 
group codes are included in a cell. 
The diplomatic sanctions variable captures threatened or imposed restrictions on a 
diplomatic body or bodies. This variable disregards whether there was first a threat of sanctions or 
not. Categories include (1) expulsion of ambassador, (2) recall of ambassador, (3) temporary 
closing of embassies, (4) ending diplomatic contact. 
The carrots variable captures positive inducements when sanctions were threatened as (1) 
economic payments or aid, (2) trade concessions, (3) removal of previous sanctions, (4) military 
aid, and (5) political concessions, and other. There are 30 cases with positive inducements. 
The anticipated target economic cost variable captures the impact of sanctions imposition 
on the target state, but not anticipated cost when sanctions were only threatened. Here the focus is 
on imposition. Morgan et al. (2014) measured the cost with three codes: (1) minor, when there is 
no evidence that sanctions will hurt the target economy (2) major, when evidence show that 
sanctions may cause abnormal changes in the target economy, such as at least 5% expansion of 
inflation and/or unemployment rate, and significant reduction in trade relationships (3) severe, 
where an episode can cause significant decreases in critical supplies and increases mortality rate 
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(Morgan et. al., 2014). The same codes (minor, major, and severe) are also used for the anticipated 
costs for the sender state for sanctions imposition. 
The data set includes 10 codes for sanctions outcome. Codes specify whether sanctions were 
threatened and/or imposed. Below shows sanctions outcome codes. 
1. Partial acquiescence by target to threat; 
2. Complete acquiescence by target to threat; 
3. Capitulation by the sender(s) in threat stage; 
4. Stalemate in the threat stage; 
5. Negotiated settlement at the threat stage; 
6. Partial acquiescence by the target state following sanctions imposition; 
7. Total acquiescence by target state following sanctions imposition; 
8. Capitulation by sender after sanctions imposition; 
9. Stalemate after sanctions imposition; 
10. Negotiated settlement following sanctions imposition. 
2. HSE Dataset  
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (HSE) conducted the most extensive analysis of economic 
sanctions in their updated book entitled Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (HSE 2009). They 
constructed a database of 174 cases of imposed economic sanctions and provided details about 
each sanction case. They also considered cases with multiple goals, phases, and targets, increasing 
the number of cases to 204. If an episode involved multiple sanctioners, HSE only considered 
sanctions with up to 3 senders. The first sender is usually the principal or leading sender. The data 
also include a measure for multilateral targets; sanctions may be aimed at more than one state.  
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They classified cases based on world regions: (a) Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD); (b) Non-OECD Europe; (c) Latin America; (d) Middle East; (e) Asia; 
and (f) Africa. They developed several measures to quantify various attributes of economic 
sanctions. For example, they created two dummy variables regarding the United States’ 
involvement in sanction episodes. They looked at multilateral sanctions if the U.S. was one of the 
sender state(s) and the U.S. was imposing sanctions unilaterally.  
HSE also analyzed the goals of economic sanctions. They divided sanctions goals into five 
categories, these are:  
1. Modest policy changes;  
2. Regime change and democratization;  
3. Disruption of military adventures;  
4. Military impairment;  
5. Other major policy changes.  
HSE provided the start and end year for each sanction episode. They also considered 
sanction types. They attached a symbol for each type including “F” indicating the interruption of 
commercial finance, aid, and other official finance; “X” indicating the interruption of exports from 
the sender to the target; and “M” indicating the interruption of imports by the sender from the 
target” (HSE 2009). 
They created two variables for the sanction outcomes. The first is the sanction results 
variable that has four categories, including:  
1. Failed outcome;  
2. Unclear but possibly positive outcome;  
3. Positive outcome;  
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4. Successful outcome. 
 
The second outcome variable is sanction contribution variable that has four different 
categories:  
1.  Negative contribution;  
2.  Minor contribution;  
3.  Substantial contribution;  
4.  Decisive contribution. 
 
Multiplication of these two variables, sanction results (1 - 4) and sanctions contribution (1 
- 4) produces a third variable, called the success score index, which can range from 1 to 16. This 
index indicates the level of economic sanctions success for each individual episode.  
The HSE data specified international cooperation using three different variables. The first 
variable is the extent of international cooperation (C) with four categories: (1) no cooperation; (2) 
minor cooperation; (3) modest cooperation; and (4) significant cooperation. The second variable 
is international assistance (A) to the target variable and is coded as a 1 if present and left blank for 
others. The third variable is the international organization (IO) variable that indicates a cooperating 
international organization. Two more variables are added to explain the role of IO, the third 
variable. These is a dummy variable where 1 indicates IO as sender and, and there is a second 
dummy variable where a 1 indicates that an international organization (IO) is either a sender, 
imposes a sanction without being a sender, or otherwise cooperates in an episode, and that both 
senders and targets are members of the IO (HSE 2009). 
The relationship variable describes the overall degree of warmth between the sender and 
target before the sanction episode (HSE 2009). This variable is coded as: (1) antagonistic, (2) 
neutral, and (3) cordial. Regime type variables come from the Polity IV database. The health and 
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stability index measures target country’s overall stability and includes three codes: (1) distress, (2) 
significant problems, and (3) strong and stable. 
The variable sanctions’ cost to the target considers the condition where sanctions were 
imposed, not threatened. The first variable is a measure of the cost of sanctions on targets in 
millions of dollars. The second variable is a measure of the cost of sanctions on the target with 
respect to the gross national product percentage (GNP). The third variable is a measure of the cost 
to the target state’s per capita income, and the fourth variable is a measure of the trade linkage 
variable, which “equals the average of pre-sanction target-country exports to the sender country as 
a percentage of total target-country exports and imports from the sender country as a percentage 
of total target-country imports” (HSE, 2009, p 115). The sender’s cost is an index of these four 
variables, coded as: (1) net gain to sender; (2) little effect on sender; (3) modest welfare loss to 
sender; and (4) major loss to sender. Costs related to sanctions threats were coded as missing data 
for both sender and the target. 
They also provide a measure of the ratio of sender GNP to target GNP. The economic 
development variable was calculated as the average of the last five years’ development rate as a 
percentage before the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, they considered an average of three years 







1. Dependent Variable 
 Sanctions effectiveness is the dependent variable. Its level of measurement is ordinal. 
Political scientists have measured sanctions effectiveness in many ways. Despite this, analyses of 
sanctions effectiveness have collapsed this variable into a dichotomy, successful or unsuccessful. 
Such dichotomization leads to several problems. First, it reduces the range of variation within the 
outcome. Second, it lowers the capability of statistical tests of detecting relationships between 
covariates. Third, on a conceptual level, economic sanctions effectiveness may not be binary. On 
the contrary, effectiveness may be conceptualized as a continuous measure taking varying degrees 
of effectiveness, none, minor, major or complete, just to name few possibilities. 
 In the field of world politics, there have been heated debates among scholars regarding the 
measurement of economic sanctions effectiveness. Two main approaches emerged in the past three 
decades, the HSE approach and the International Threats and Imposed Sanctions’ dataset 
approach. In the first approach, HSE (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 2009) assigned each episode of 
imposed sanctions a success score. They derived this score by conducting an in-depth analysis of 
each case and considering whether the publicly stated goals of the sanctioner were met or not. The 
effectiveness score is calculated by multiplying two indices (contribution of sanctions x sanctions 
outcome). Several scholars have criticized this approach by arguing that it is arbitrary and lacks 
transparency (Baldwin & Pape, 1998; Drury, 1998; Pape, 1997, 1998). Further, others have 
criticized the HSE approach since it mostly excludes cases of threatened sanctions (Drezner, 1999, 
2003). To overcome this criticism, another approach was developed by Morgan et al. (2014 and 
became known as the TIES dataset.  
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 The creators of TIES measured economic effectiveness as an ordinal level variable where 
the outcome could take on 10 different values, measuring different levels of effectiveness and 
ineffectiveness. Five outcomes were assigned to cases of threatened sanctions and the five were 
assigned to cases of actual imposed sanctions. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate the coding scheme used 
by TIES authors. The coding of cases is done through a thorough examination of each case. 
Although this approach includes more cases, it is based upon the judgment of experts and thus 
raises questions concerning reliability.  
This research does not propose a new measure of economic sanction outcomes. It does, 
however, use a new analytic method that derives estimates of the effects of different independent 
variables upon the odds of effective economic sanctions (level 4) for different levels: partial 
effectiveness (level 3), negotiated effectiveness (level 2), un-negotiated effectiveness (level 1) and 
failure (level 0). The codes found in TIES are recoded into newer codes that are easier to 
understand.  
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also present the TIES coding scheme and the new proposed codes used 
in this study. The new measure records the 10 categories into five ordinal outcomes. Sanctions 
could be effective (level 4), partially effective negotiated (level 3), partially effective un-negotiated 
(level 2), stalemate (level 1) or ineffective (level 0). The partially effective category could result 
from the acquiescence of the target or the capitulation of the sender. Therefore, the new measure 
differentiates between negotiated and un-negotiated effectiveness. Although an interval or ratio 









Coding Outcome for Cases where Sanctions Threatened 
TIES 
Code 




3 Capitulation by the sender in threat stage 0 Effectiveness Level 0  
4 Stalemate in the threat stage 1 Effectiveness Level 1  
1 Partial acquiescence by target to threat 2 Effectiveness Level 2  
5 Negotiated settlement at the threat stage 3 Effectiveness Level 3  
2 Complete acquiescence by target to threat 4 Effectiveness Level 4  
 
Table 3.2 
Coding Outcome for Cases where Sanctions Imposed 
TIES 
Code 





Capitulation by sender following sanctions 
imposition 
0 Effectiveness Level 0  
9 
Stalemate between sender and target state after 
sanctions imposition 
1 Effectiveness Level 1  
6 
Partial acquiescence by the target state after 
imposition 
2 Effectiveness Level 2  
10 
Negotiated settlement following sanctions 
imposition 
3 Effectiveness Level 3 
7 
Total acquiescence by target state following 
sanctions imposition 
4 Effectiveness Level 4  
 
In this study, the dependent variable is ordinal and includes five ranked categories. No 
effectiveness is coded as 0, which indicates capitulation, by the sender. Stalemate is ranked higher 
than capitulation with a score of 1. Partial effectiveness as un-negotiated and negotiated partial 
effectiveness are coded as 2 and 3 respectively. The sender is more satisfied with the negotiated 
outcome than the un-negotiated outcome, since there is a consensus between principal sender and 
target. However, if the sanction is partially effective, this outcome can be volatile, and an 
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agreement is not noted between states. Therefore, negotiated partial effectiveness gets a higher 
rank than un-negotiated partial effectiveness. Conventional wisdom says that total acquiescence is 
effective and is coded as 4. Therefore, in this study, a sanction episode is ranked as entirely 
effective as long as the target state acquiesces completely to the sender state after the threat and/or 
imposition of economic sanctions.  
2. Independent variables (italicized variables are used in regression models)  
Eight different groups of independent variables were used in regression analyses. These 
variable groups included: (a) level of political agreement (LPA), (b) sanction cost, (c) sender-target 
relationships, (d) signaling, (e) relative power, (f) inducements, (g) regime types, and (h) sanction 
bluntness. 
1) Level of political agreement (LPA) is the main independent variable. It is an ordinal 
variable. It is not found within any existing economic sanctions dataset. HSE (2009) 
data were used to construct the political agreement level index. Political agreement 
levels were calculated per economic sanctions episode.  
(a) Level of political agreement within the sanctioning state (LPA1); 
(b) Level of political agreement within the target state (LPA2); 
 (c) Level of political agreement within international system (LPA3); 
 (d) Level of aggregated political agreement (LPA4). 
 To construct the level of political agreement variable, an in-depth-analysis of dataset case 
studies provided by HSE, as well as other datasets, was conducted by two researchers. Each 
researcher reviewed each case and assigned scores based on their criteria for LPA (See Appendix 
B). The ratings for the two reviewers were averaged to obtain a score for each LPA (LPA1, LPA2, 
and LPA3) score. Each economic sanction episode possessed different scores for political 
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agreement: senders, targets, and international involvement. The three political agreements indices 
were constructed as follows: 
A. To construct the level of political agreement on the senders’ level, LPA1, three actors 
were considered: the government, main opposition, and other (e.g., lobby groups, social 
factions, and influential entities). Each actor received a score of -2, -1, 0, 1 or 2. A score 
of -2 indicated the lack of political support for the economic actions for that particular 
actor. A 0 indicated an impartial or unclear position towards the sanctions. A score of 
2 reflected the support of the actor for the economic sanctions episode. After assigning 
an average score per actor, a mean was calculated and considered as the level of 
political agreement on the senders’ side for that particular economic sanction.  
B. The construction of the political agreement level index on the targets’ level, LPA2, was 
developed in the same way as the political agreement level on the senders’ side. Similar 
to the LPA1, three actors were considered: the government, the main opposition and 
other influential groups. The two reviewers each assigned a score (between -2 and 2) 
per actor and then averaged them to calculate a mean of the level of political agreement 
index on the targets’ side.  
C. To construct the level of political agreement index on the international level, LPA3, 
different set of actors were considered. The two reviewers considered international 
support (coalitional sanctions), and governments’ based international organizations, 
non-governmental based international organizations, and multinational corporations. 
To gauge each actors’ support for the sanction episode, the two reviewers assigned a 
number (-2, -1, 0, 1 or 2) to indicate the level of support as in the case of level of 
political agreement indices on the senders’ as well as the targets’ level.  
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D. Aggregate level of political agreement, LPA4, was calculated by summing LPA1 and 
LPA3 and then subtracting LPA2.  
𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 + 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 
This score represents the aggregated score for LPA for each sanction episode.  
2)  Sanction Cost: This variable measures the cost of sanction episodes separately for both 
principal sender and target: 
(a) Sender Cost: This ordinal variable has three levels, coded from “0” to “2.” A “0” 
indicates minor costs, where sanctions do not hurt the economy; “1” major costs, where sanctions 
cause unusual changes in the economy; and “2” severe costs, where sanctions influence peoples 
and decrease critical supplies substantially. The TIES dataset was used for this variable. 
(b) Target cost: This ordinal variable is similar to the sender cost, with three levels that 
coded from “0” to “2.” The codes are: “0” minor, “1” major, and “2” severe costs. The same logic 
and data source were used to rank the values.  
3)  Commitment Scale (Signaling): This ordinal variable indicates the level of 
commitment in principal sender’s credible signals. It was coded as a “0” when weak signals were 
sent by sender, “1” where they are moderate, and “2” where they are powerful. A “3” was assigned 
when a sanction imposed without threatening. The TIES dataset was used for commitment scale 
variable. 
4)  Sender-Target relations: To address the relationship between sender(s) and target, four 
different variables were used:  
 (a) Degree of alliance (alliance scale): This ordinal variable shows the level of alliance. 
This variable was coded as a “0” if the principal senders were enduring rivals. I used the definition 
and data from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) to rank this variable.  A“1” was used when neither 
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principal sender nor target is neither having alliance nor enduring rivalry relationship. In addition, 
the variable was coded as a “2” when the principle sender and target were formal allies as defined 
by Small and Singer (1966).  
 (b) Multiple Senders (collaboration scale): This interval variable indicated the number 
of senders. The variable was coded as a “0” when the sanctions are imposed unilaterally, “1” when 
there are two senders, “2” when there is a collaboration of three senders, “3” when there is a 
collaboration of four senders, and “4” when there are at least five senders engaged in the sanctions. 
The source for this data is TIES Dataset for this variable. 
 (c) The United States Involvement: This ordinal variable was coded “0” for sanction 
episodes where it was not imposed by the United States or with the collaboration of the United 
States. It was coded “1” where it is a multilateral sanction and the United States collaborated the 
sanctions episode; however, it was not the principal sender. It was coded “2” where the sanction 
is a multilateral episode and the United States is the principal sender. It was coded “3” where it 
was a unilateral sanction episode and the United States was the sender state. The TIES dataset was 
used for this variable. 
5)  Relative power: This continuous variable was obtained from the principal sender’s 
composite index of national capability (CINC) score relative to the target’s CINC score. Therefore, 
principal sender’s CINC score divided by the Target’s CINC score. Instead of a percentage ratio, 
I used the proportion. I did not divide principal sender’s CINC score with the sum of both states’ 
CINC scores because, in this way, I can address how many times sender state has more capability 
than target state. The data source for CINC scores was obtained from the COW (Correlates of War) 
Project National Material Capabilities Dataset v4.0 (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). 
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6)  Carrots (Inducements): This ordinal variable measures the level of positive 
inducements by the sender to the target. It was coded as a “0” if the sender offered no inducements. 
However, if inducements were offered, it was coded as a “1.” So, this is a dummy variable. TIES 
Dataset code carrots as “1” economic payments or aid, “2” trade concessions, “3” removal of 
previous sanctions, “4” military aid, and “5” political concessions. 
7)  Regime Types: This ordinal variable used the data provided by Polity IV. This dataset 
provided annual information about states on the level of democracy from 1800 through 2013. 
Polity scores ranged from -10 to +10 and had 21 categories in total. Scholars usually accept values 
between -10 to -6 as autocracies, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and 6 to 10 as democracies (Marshall, 
Jaggers, & Gurr, 2002). However, this approach tended to use all levels instead of dividing the 
information into 2 (democracy vs. non-democracy) or 3 (autocracy, anocracy, and democracy). In 
this way, the full information was used for the statistical results. Therefore, the data will be coded 
from 0 to 20, with showing “0” as full autocracy and “20” as full democracy. 
(a) Sender’s Regime Type: This ordinal variable showed the level of democracy 
ranging from “0” to “20.” I used the Polity IV database as the data source for this variable. 
(b) Target’s Regime Type: This ordinal variable indicated the level of democracy 
ranging from “0” to “20.” I used the Polity IV database as the data source for this variable. 
8)  Sanctions Intensity (bluntness scale): It is an ordinal variable that measures the severity 
of threatened or imposed sanctions. The worst sanctions are those that do not have selective 
objectives or can influence the population. This variable also showed the bluntness of imposed 
sanctions. I coded the intensity of sanctions from travel ban to blockade, with a “0” indicating 
travel ban, “1” asset freeze, “2” suspension of economic agreement/protocol, “3” import restriction 
62 
 
/ export restriction, “4” termination of foreign aid, “5” partial economic embargo, “6” total 
economic embargo, “7” blockade. The TIES dataset was used for this variable. 
 
Hypotheses:   
The followings are my hypotheses.   
H1: The higher the level of political agreement on the sender’s side, the more effective the 
economic sanctions. 
 
H2: The higher the level of political agreement on the sender’s side and the greater costs 
experienced by the target, the more effective the economic sanctions.  
 
H3: The higher the level of political agreement on the target’s side, the less effective the 
economic sanctions. 
 
H4: The higher the level of political agreement on the target's side and the less economic 
disutility, the less effective the economic sanctions.   
 
H5: The higher the level of political agreement on the international level, the more effectiveness 
of economic sanctions. 
 
H6: The higher the level of political agreement on the international level and the greater the costs 
to the target, the more effective the economic sanctions.  
 
H7: The higher the level of aggregate political agreement, the more effective are the economic 
sanctions. 
 
Using this newly constructed measures, level of political agreement variables (LPA1, 
LPA2, LPA3, and LPA4), I test seven hypotheses by using four different group of empirical 





CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the findings regarding the relationships between level of political 
agreement (LPA) variables and the target cost variable and sanctions effectiveness, controlling for 
other independent variables. First, I describe the distributions of key variables. Second, I present 
the results of the ordered logit regression models for each of the four LPA variables that test the 
seven hypotheses set out in chapter 3. Then, I estimate logit regression models to check the 
robustness of the results and to consider alternative explanations for the results. For reliability 
tests, I conduct ordered probit and standard probit regression models. Finally, I discuss and assess 
the findings with respect to the hypotheses. 
Statistical Description of the Key Variables 
Sanction effectiveness is an ordinal measure that varies from zero to four. Accordingly, I 
used ordered multivariate logit regression for assessing the effects of multiple independent 
variables on this ordinal variable. Model specifications are based on previous findings of the 
economic sanctions literature. Logistic regression models derive coefficients using maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) rather than derived using the assumption of constant variance or 
homoscedascity of ordinary least squares (OLS). The MLE coefficients are estimates of the effects 
of the independent variables on the logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable for each level 
of sanction effectiveness. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics and the frequency distribution of 







Descriptives and Frequency Distribution for  
Sanction Effectiveness 
 
Sanction Effectiveness Variable  
Number of observations:  125 
Range: [0-4] 
Unique Values:  5 
Units:  Ordinal 
Mean:  2.15 
SD:  1.48 
Sanction Effectiveness Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 28 22.4 22.4 
1 14 11.2 33.6 
2 24 19.2 52.8 
3 29 23.2 76.0 
4 30 24.0 100.0 





Figure 4.1: Frequency Distribution of Sanctions Effectiveness 
65 
 
Sanctions are foreign policy tools used to change target behaviors. Implementing these 
tools require at least some agreement between groups within the sender state and at the 
international level. Similarly, the target state’s leaders, opposition parties (if any), social factions, 
and other groups are unlikely to welcome sanctions threatened or carried out against their state. 
Therefore, all political agreement variables have skewed distribution (i.e., the agreement values 
tend to bunch towards the higher values in sender, target, and international levels). Likelihood 
ratio regression models produce consistent estimates even under skewed data distribution, while 
OLS regression does not. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show descriptive statistics and frequency 
distributions  for the LPA variables in sender state (LPA1), target state (LPA2), and international 
system (LPA3). 
 
Table 4.2  
Level of Political Agreement in Sender State (LPA1) 
LPA1 Variable Coding Information 
a) Number of observations                   125 
b) Range                                               [3, 4] 
c) Unique Values                                 12 
d) Units                                                 Continuous 
e) Mean                                                3.83 
f) Std. Dev.                                          0.27 
LPA1 Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent Cum. Value Freq. Percent Cum. 
3.000 4 3.2 3.2 3.502 1 0.8 23.2 
3.083 1 0.8 4.0 3.665 1 0.8 24.0 
3.250 2 1.6 5.6 3.667 2 1.6 25.6 
3.333 1 0.8 6.4 3.750 5 4.0 29.6 
3.415 1 0.8 7.2 3.833 1 0.8 30.4 
3.500 19 15.2 22.4 4.000 87 69.6 100.0 






Level of Political Agreement in Target State (LPA2) 
LPA2 Variable Information 
a) Number of observations                  125 
b) Range                                              [1.5, 4] 
c) Unique Values                                 16 
d) Units                                                Continuous 
e) Mean                                                3.41 
f) Std. Dev.                                          0.51 
LPA2 Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent Value Freq. Percent 
1.500 1 0.8 3.250 8 6.4 
1.750 1 0.8 3.333 1 0.8 
2.250 1 0.8 3.335 1 0.8 
2.500 5 4.0 3.417 1 0.8 
2.667 2 1.6 3.500 25 20.0 
2.750 4 3.2 3.583 1 0.8 
2.916 1 0.8 3.750 12 9.6 
3.000 26 20.8 4.000 35 28.0 




International level of political agreement (LPA3) 
LPA3 Variable Coding Information 
a) Number of Observations 125 
b) Range                               [2,4] 
c) Unique Values                 4 
d) Units                                Continuous 
e) Mean                                2.74 
f) Std. Dev.                          0.86 
LPA3 Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent 
2 68 54.4 
3 16 12.8 
3.5 11 8.8 
4 30 24.0 




In addition to developing measures of the LPA1, 2, 3 variables, an index measure was created 
for the aggregate level of political agreement variable [LPA4]). Tables 4.5 presents descriptive 
statistics and a frequency distribution for the LPA4 variable. Figure 4.2 displays a histogram of the 
LPA4 variable. Although the three level of agreement variables’ (LPA1, 2, 3) distributions are 




Aggregate Level of Political Agreement (LPA4) 
LPA4 Variable Coding Information 
a) Number of observations                  125 
b) Range                                               [1.5, 3.17] 
c) Unique Values                                 48 
d) Units                                                Continuous 
e) Mean                                                2.43 
f) Std. Dev.                                          0.37 
LPA4 Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent Cum. Value Freq. Percent Cum. 
1.500 1 0.8 0.8 2.541 1 0.8 59.2 
1.625 1 0.8 1.6 2.555 1 0.8 60.0 
1.660 1 0.8 2.4 2.583 1 0.8 60.8 
1.750 4 3.2 5.6 2.625 1 0.8 61.6 
1.874 1 0.8 6.4 2.664 1 0.8 62.4 
1.875 4 3.2 9.6 2.665 1 0.8 63.2 
1.986 1 0.8 10.4 2.666 15 12 75.2 
2.000 13 10.4 20.8 2.667 2 1.6 76.8 
2.083 1 0.8 21.6 2.694 1 0.8 77.6 
2.084 1 0.8 22.4 2.750 3 2.4 80.0 
2.125 3 2.4 24.8 2.751 3 2.4 82.4 
2.166 1 0.8 25.6 2.832 3 2.4 84.8 
2.208 1 0.8 26.4 2.833 2 1.6 86.4 
2.218 1 0.8 27.2 2.834 2 1.6 88.0 
2.222 1 0.8 28.0 2.861 1 0.8 88.8 
2.250 12 9.6 37.6 2.875 1 0.8 89.6 
2.333 2 1.6 39.2 2.916 2 1.6 91.2 
2.333 1 0.8 40.0 2.916 1 0.8 92.0 
2.334 1 0.8 40.8 3.000 5 4.0 96.0 
2.375 5 4.0 44.8 3.055 1 0.8 96.8 
2.416 1 0.8 45.6 3.083 1 0.8 97.6 
2.417 1 0.8 46.4 3.111 1 0.8 98.4 
2.499 1 0.8 47.2 3.125 1 0.8 99.2 
2.500 14 11.2 58.4 3.167 1 0.8 100.0 





Figure 4.2: Percentage histogram of aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4) variable 
 
Table 4.6 shows the joint distribution of cases with respect to higher and lower levels of 
each of the three political agreement variables: level of political agreement in sender state (LPA1), 
level of political agreement in target state (LPA2), and international level of political agreement 
(LPA3) variables. Note that higher levels of a political agreement variable indicate cases with LPA 
scores higher than average LPA scores for that variable (LPA > µLPA). Lower levels of a political 
agreement include cases whose LPA scores were lower than average LPA scores of that variable 
(LPA < µLPA). Figure 4.3 presents eight different classifications and average sanction effectiveness 












Classification of all Cases with regard to Higher and Lower Values of LPA1, 2, and 3 
LPA3: (→) 
(µLPA3 = 2.74) 
Lower Levels of  
International Political Agreement 
 (LPA3 < µLPA3) 
Higher Levels of  
International Political Agreement  




(µLPA1 = 3.83) 
 
LPA2: (↓),  
(µLPA2 = 3.41) 
Lower Levels of 
Political 
Agreement in 
Sender State  
 (LPA1 < µLPA1) 
Higher Levels of 
Political 
Agreement in 
Sender State   
(LPA1 > µLPA1) 
Lower Levels of 
Political 
Agreement in 
Sender State  
 (LPA1 < µLPA1) 
Higher Levels of 
Political 
Agreement in 
Sender State  
 (LPA1 > µLPA1) 
Totals: 



























































































Figure 4.3: Scattergram of sanction effectiveness and all LPA variables. 
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Table 4.7 presents descriptive statistics and the frequency distribution of the target cost 
variable. Although the primary focus of this study was on level of political agreement variables 
(LPA1, 2, 3, 4), the target cost variable is also analyzed in greater detail due to its importance in the 
economic sanctions literature. 
 
Table 4.7 
Information on Target Cost Variable 
Target Cost Variable Information 
a) Number of observations  125 
b) Range                               [0, 2] 
c) Unique Values                 3 
d) Units                                1 (ordinal) 
e) Mean                                0.72 
f) Std. Dev.                          0.80 
Sanction Effectiveness Variable Tabulation 
Value Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 63 50.40 50.40 
1 34 27.20 77.60 
2 28 22.40 100.00 
Total 125 100 - 
 
I calculated descriptive statistics for the other control variables. The signaling variable has 
a mean score of 2.04 (standard deviation [sd] = 0.84), with a distribution that is approximately 
normal. The mean score for the alliance scale variable is 1.16 (sd = 0.62) with a distribution that 
is approximately normal as well. The mean score for the collaboration scale variable is 1.66 (sd = 
1.91) and it has a distribution that is bimodal (modes 0, 4). The mean score for the US involvement 
variable is 1.88 (sd = 1.22) with a bimodal distribution (modes 0, 3).  
The relative power variable has a mean score is 81.06 (sd = 132.44) with a heavily right-
skewed distribution that includes outliers. This variable is continuous interval level variable; I use 
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the logarithm transformation to deal with the outlier problem. As a result, the mean score for the 
logged relative power variable is 2.97 (sd = 2.00) and its distribution is approximately normal.  
The mean score for the inducements variable is 0.07 (sd = 0.25), and the mean score for 
sanction bluntness variable is 4.48 (sd = 1.32). For the regime types variable; the mean score for 
the sender regime type variable is 16.45 (with discrete integer values ranging from 0 to 20) and its 
distribution has a left-skew; the mean score for the target regime variable is 8.16 (with discrete 
integer values ranging from 0 to 20) and its distribution has a right skew. The standard deviation 
for the sender regime type variable is 7.11; the standard deviation for target regime type is 7.02. 




Table 4.8  









































































































































































































































1) Effectiveness 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2) LPA1 0.14 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3) LPA2 -0.35 -0.07 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4) LPA3 0.23 0.21 0.09 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5) LPA4 0.40 0.49 -0.56 0.68 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - 
6) Sender Cost 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.10 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - 
7) Target Cost 0.22 -0.02 -0.09 0.28 0.25 0.20 1.00 - - - - - - - - - 
8) Signaling 0.15 0.02 -0.14 0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.02 1.00 - - - - - - - - 
9) Alliance  0.04 -0.04 -0.29 -0.19 0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 1.00 - - - - - - - 
10)Collaboration  0.10 0.21 0.07 0.78 0.56 0.09 0.31 -0.01 -0.21 1.00 - - - - - - 
11) US Invol. -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.29 -0.27 -0.25 -0.16 -0.02 0.09 -0.46 1.00 - - - - - 
12) Rel. Power 0.18 -0.12 -0.32 -0.11 0.06 -0.15 0.21 -0.05 0.29 -0.16 0.32 1.00 - - - - 
13) Inducements -0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.12 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.11 -0.02 -0.00 1.00 - - - 
14) Sender Reg. 0.11 0.17 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.30 -0.25 0.02 0.12 -0.31 0.73 0.21 -0.02 1.00 - - 
15) Target Reg. 0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 0.22 0.01 0.16 0.16 -0.08 -0.30 -0.25 -0.12 -0.23 1.00 - 
16) Bluntness 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.01 -0.09 0.30 -0.18 0.10 0.10 -0.28 0.00 1.00 
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The 16 variables that are used in this study are categorized into eight groups of independent 
variables. In these groups, 12 independent variables are used in regressions for sanctions 
effectiveness for the four model groups. Regression model specifications are different combination 
of these variables. Table 4.9 provides the list of the independent variables for the regressions 
analyses used in each of the models. Note that each model group (model group 1, 2, 3, and 4) has 
three sub-models (a, b, and c), and the third sub-model represents each model in general. 
Table 4.9 
List of All Independent Variables Used for Regression Analyses  
Variable Group Variable used in Regressions 
Model 1 
a, b, c 
Model 2 
a, b, c 
Model 3 
a, b, c 
Model 4 
a, b, c 
1) Level of Political 
Agreement Variables 
LPA in Sender State (LPA1) ,, ,, ,, ,, 
LPA in Target State (LPA2)  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
International LPA (LPA3)  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
Aggregated LPA (LPA4)  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
2) Sanction Cost 
Variables 
Sender Cost  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
Target Cost  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
3) Commitment Var. Signaling   ,, ,, ,, ,, 
4) Sender Target 
Relations Variables 
Alliance Scale  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
Collaboration Scale  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
The US Involvement  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
5) Rel. Pow. Variable Relative Power  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
6) Carrots Variable Inducements  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
7) Regime Type 
Variables 
Sender Regime Type  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
Target Regime Type  ,, ,, ,, ,, 
8) Intensity Variable Sanction Bluntness  ,, ,, ,, ,, 




A key concern in regression analysis is correct model specification. Specification errors 
occur when the analyst omits important independent variable(s) and includes irrelevant 
independent variables. Omitting an important independent variable if correlated with other 
independent variables results in biased coefficients; including an irrelevant independent variable 
can reduce the model's fit. However, in the absence of strong theory, knowing which independent 
variables to include or exclude in a model specification is difficult.  
Capturing the ceteris paribus effect when interpreting regression coefficients is important 
for unbiasedness. Omitting an important independent variable typically results in biased estimates 
of the coefficients and might result in Type 2 error (although the null hypothesis of the independent 
variable having no effect on the dependent variable is false, failing to reject it). Moreover, biased 
estimates generally do not disappear as the sample size increases.  
Omitting independent variables with effects on the dependent variable is a source of more 
harm to the analyses than including irrelevant variables. Thus, I include all of the independent 
variables that have been discussed and included in models from the sanctions literature. In the 
absence of strong theory that clearly distinguishes between independent variables that are relevant 
and those that are irrelevant, especially given my use of a better measure of the dependent variable 
(i.e., that includes more information about sanctions effectiveness), there is good reason to estimate 
a variety of models in order to compare their relative fit.  
This study estimates logit (logistic) regression models. Logistic regression models use the 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques rather than the least squares estimation 
techniques (LS). Thus, the coefficients in MLE models are used to interpret the likelihood ratios 
for each of the outcomes in the dependent variable, (i.e., sanctions effectiveness). The sign of the 
coefficients, whether positive or negative, between dependent and independent variables indicates 
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whether there is an increase or decrease in the logarithm of the odds of sanctions effectiveness 
(practically, an increase or a decrease in the odds or probability of sanctions effectiveness). Since 
likelihood estimation also uses information between variables, presenting correlation coefficients 
between variables is important. 
Ordered (Ordinal) Logit Regression Models 
The following regression models analyses economic sanctions effectiveness in terms of 
1. sender state’s level of political agreement on sanction threatening and/or imposition; 
2. target state’s level of political agreement against threatened and/or imposed sanctions; 
3. international level of political agreement on sanction threatening and/or imposition; 
4. aggregate level of political agreement on sanction threatening and/or imposition. 
Some sanctions were threatened and/or imposed unilaterally and some were threatened and/or 
imposed by a coalition of sanctioning states. If it is a unilateral episode, then it is a dyadic 
relationship between sender and target. In this case, international level of political agreement 
variable is coded as neutral. However, if there are multiple senders involved, then this study 
incorporates and examines the main sender in the coalition for LPA1 and also incorporates and 
examines the sanctioning coalition for LPA3. 
In addition to exploring the level of political agreement variables influence on economic 
sanctions outcomes, this study also investigates the target state’s economic disutility and sanctions 
effectiveness. The literature on economic sanctions indicates varying levels of statistical 
significance regarding costs for target states. However, the significance levels for the target cost 
variable in those studies are all less than 0.10 (Bapat et al., 2013). Other independent variables 
included in model specifications were selected according to well-known evidence from the 
economic sanctions literature.  
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The level of measurement for the dependent variable is ordinal. Independent variables are 
either ordinal or interval level. According to Long and Freese (2006), if there are clear-cut equal 
differences between the increments of ordinal level variables, they can be treated as interval level 
and OLS or WLS regressions used. Given that there are sufficient number of cases for the 
regression analysis. As my dependent variable has five levels (coded 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4), and it is 
difficult to treat outcomes measuring sanction effectiveness, such as (1) capitulation, (2) stalemate, 
(3) partial acquiescence, (4) negotiated settlement, and (5) complete acquiesce with clear-cut equal 
differences, a multivariate ordinal (ordered) logit was used.  
For example, the distance between capitulation and stalemate could be shorter than the 
distance between complete acquiesce and negotiated settlement. Conversely, the distance between 
complete acquiesce might be larger than the distance between partial acquiescence and vice versa. 
Thus, there is no strong argument or evidence that the distances between the ordered levels of the 
dependent variable (sanctions effectiveness) are the same. Thus, the use of ordered logit regression 
is the appropriate method to use. In addition, this method provides robust estimates when variables 
have skewed distributions, as seen in the LPA variables. As MLE models already provide robust 
estimates for skewed variable distributions, there is no need to use robust standard errors for 
calculating significance levels for the independent variables.  
Ordinal logistic regression belongs to the logistic regression family. Logistic regression 
usually is used for two possible outcomes or binary outcomes. However, when the dependent 
variable is an ordinal variable and has more than two categories, then ordinal (ordered) logistic 
regression is the most suitable regression model. The main disadvantage of choosing logit or 
ordinal logit models is they are they are more difficult to interpret when compared with other 
regression methods. Ordered logistic regression predicts what the likely outcome of each economic 
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sanction is by using independent variables and applying a process called proportional odds 
assumption as illustrated in Table 4.10.  
 
Table 4.10 
Proportional Odds Assumption for the Ordered Logit Regression  
Dependent Variable (Sanction Effectiveness) Outcomes  Orders (levels)  Probability 
Capitulation by sender in threat stage or after economic 
sanctions imposition 
0 P0 
Stalemate in the threat stage or after imposition of economic 
sanctions 
1 P1 
Partial acquiescence by the target to economic sanctions threat 
or following sanctions imposition 
2 P2 
Negotiated Settlement at the threat stage or following 
economic sanctions imposition 
3 P3 
Complete or total acquiescence by target at the threat stage or 
following economic sanctions imposition 
4 P4 
Meaning 
Formula (Log of odds 
ratio) 
Value (e.g.) Sequence 
Complete compliance or worse 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃4
𝑃0 + 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃3
)  X 1 
Negotiated settlement or worse 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃3 + 𝑃4
𝑃0 + 𝑃1 + 𝑃2
) X+Y 2 
Partial acquiescence or worse 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃2 + 𝑃3 + 𝑃4
𝑃0 + 𝑃1
) X+2Y 3 
Capitulation by sender or worse 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃3 + 𝑃4
𝑃0
) X+3Y 4 
 
This prediction process performed by taking the logarithm of odds, which form arithmetic 
series in sequence. In the end, ordinal logistic regression provides the estimates (coefficients) for 
the highest level of the ordinal variable (complete acquiesce by the target to the sender, in this 
study). As we have five categories of sanction effectiveness variable, ordinal logistic regression 
produces four intercepts (constants) because of log likelihood sequence iterations in Table 4.10 
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above. For this study, when a target state completely acquiesces an economic sanction, it is 
assumed to be an effective sanction, which is the highest level of dependent variable (i.e., sanction 
effectiveness). 
If the dependent variable has five ranked levels, as in this study, there will be five likelihood 
values; however, ordinal regression only predicts the logarithm of the odds for the highest level. 
A complete compliance is the highest level for sanctions effectiveness to attach meaning to the 
value of the coefficients for each independent variable, it is necessary to calculate the odds ratio 
for each of them.  
It is important to point out that probability and odds both designate the chances that an 
event will occur and are interrelated concepts. Odds, such as odds in favor, basically mean the 
ratio of the incidence of a favored outcome (a) to the incidence of one that is not favored (b). On 
the other hand, probability refers directly to the chance that the favored outcome will occur 
(a/[a+b]) and varies from .00 to 1.00 To illustrate these concepts, assume that a sample space is 
formed by white and grey circles in as Figure 4.4. As seen, probabilities are usually represented 
by a number between zero and one or by percentages, whereas odds can be represented by any 
number between zero and positive infinity. 
 
Probability of a person choosing 
a white colored circle is 67% 
Odds in favor of choosing a 
white colored circle is 2 to 1 
Odds and probability concepts 
are interrelated with each other 
𝑃(𝑊) =  
𝑁(𝑊)
𝑁(𝑊) + 𝑁(𝐵)
 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑊) =  
𝑁(𝑊)
𝑁(𝐵)
 𝑃 (𝑊) =  
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑊)
1 + 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑊)
 
𝑃 (𝑊) =  
6
6 + 3











Figure 4.4: The relation between probability and odds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 2 1 3 
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All logit regression types (e.g., ordinal [ordered] when the dependent variable is ordinal, 
multinominal logit regression when the dependent variable is categorical but with more than two 
levels, and standard logit regression used for dichotomous dependent variables) estimate the effect 
that each independent variable has on the odds or probability of the dependent variable. 
Coefficients for independent variables in the standard logistic regression are the effects on the 
logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable caused by a one-unit increase in the independent 
variable holding all other independent variables fixed (partial effects). Conversely, coefficients in 
the ordered regression indicate how much change in the logarithm of the odds is caused by one 
unit increase in an independent variable, ceteris paribus.  
Therefore, coefficients in ordinal logit regression do not represent odds, but the change in 
the logarithm of the odds caused by partial effects of each independent variable. To interpret the 
effects of each independent variable there's need to take the exponent of each coefficient. Thus, 
for each ordinal regression, a table shows the coefficients or the change in the logarithm of the 
odds of the dependent variable caused by one-unit increase in the independent variable, followed 
by another table showing the odds ratio. The odds ratio can be understood as a multiplier of the 
odds of the dependent variable resulting from a unit increase in the independent variable. If its 
value is greater than one, the odds are greater; if less than one, the odds are lesser.   
The goodness-of-fit measure, R2, shows the amount of variance explained in OLS models. 
The goodness-of-fit statistic for logit models where coefficients are estimated using  log-likelihood 
functions have a somewhat similar meaning to the R2 statistic in OLS regression but is a called 
pseudo-R2 McFadden (1979) compared R2 and pseudo-R2 as follows: 
While the R2 index is a more familiar concept to planner who are experienced in OLS, it 
is not as well behaved as the 𝜌2 [rho-squared] measure, for ML [maximum likelihood] 
estimation. Those unfamiliar with 𝜌2  should be forewarned that its values tend to be 
considerably lower than those of the R2 index...For example, values of 0.2 to 0.4 for 𝜌2 
80 
 
represent ‘excellent’ fit.” However, when the model is ordinal logistic regression and 
independent variables are only predicting the highest level out of five level of the sanction 
effectiveness variable, we should not get surprised to see lower values of goodness-of-fit 
measures especially for the ordered logistic regression models. (p. 26) 
 
However, when the model is ordinal logistic regression and independent variables are only 
predicting the highest level out of five levels of sanctions effectiveness, it would not be surprising 
to see lower values of goodness-of-fit measures especially for an ordered logistic regression model.  
Although a pseudo-R2 nay not be an ideal statistic to describe the overall goodness of fit 
of a logistic regression model, and there are different pseudo-R2s, it does help in comparing the 
relative fit of models using different specifications. Pseudo-R2 also gives an idea regarding the 
percentage of variance that likelihood ratio (LR) regressions can explain (Long and Freese, 2006). 
The likelihood ratio chi-square (𝑥2) statistic is an indication of whether an overall model 
is statistically significant or not. Therefore, LR chi-square statistic has an interpretation similar to 
the F statistic in OLS regression (Wooldridge, 2009). An LR chi-square score with a p-value that 
is less than 0.05 indicates that the independent variables in the aggregate help to better explain the 
odds of the dependent variable in comparison to a null model with no independent variables. 
The Regression Models for the Political Agreement Level in Sender State (Model Group 1) 
This model examines the influence of a sender state’s level of political agreement (LPA1) 
on sanction effectiveness. Table 4.11 presents the regression results of two restricted and one 
unrestricted model. The first restricted model (model 1.a) includes the level of political agreement 
in the sender state variable (LPA1) and the other independent variables, but excludes the cost 
variables, (i.e., sender cost and target cost variables). The second restricted model (model 1.b) 
includes the cost variables and other independent variables, but does not include the LPA1 variable. 
The unrestricted model (model 1.c) includes all of the independent variables. For the models in 






























































































Observations 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2  25.76*** 27.70*** 31.61*** 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Coefficients in ordered logit regression indicate the change in the logarithm of the odds in 
favor of the target state completely acquiescing to economic sanctions. The actual odds ratio or 
multiplier of the odds are presented in Table 4.12. It shows the odds ratio in favor of the target 
state completely acquiescing to the sanctions episode versus the combination other four outcomes, 
which are: negotiated settlement (the fourth level), partial acquiescence (the third level), stalemate 
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(the second level), and capitulation (the first level).  
Table 4.12 
Odds Ratio Values for the Coefficients of Model 1.c 






LPA1 1.43* 4.16 
Sender Cost 0.23 1.26 
Target Cost 0.53** 1.70 
Signaling 0.27 1.31 
Alliance Scale -0.32 0.72 
Collaboration Scale 0.02 1.02 
The U.S. Involvement -0.43* 0.64 
Relative Power 0.31*** 1.37 
Inducements -0.23 0.79 
Sender Regime Type 0.09** 1.10 
Target Regime Type 0.06** 1.06 
Sanction Bluntness -0.10 0.89 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
To compare the effects of LPA1 and the cost variables’ upon sanctions effectiveness in the 
restricted models to the unrestricted model, I use two steps. First, I compare model 1.a with model 
1.c, and then, compared model 1.b with model 1.c. For the first comparison (model 1.a—model 
1.c), adding sender cost and target cost variables increases the P-R2 (pseudo- R2) value from .0653 
to .0801, indicating that the unrestricted model had a better fit by about 23% ([.0801-.0653]/.0653) 
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by adding these variables, one of which is statistically significant (the target cost variable). Adding 
cost variables does not eliminate statistical significance of LPA1, relative power, and regime type 
variables. The U.S. Involvement variable is statistically significant in the model without 
restrictions—Model 1.c—so that the U.S. involvement and target cost variables should be included 
together in the model. 
For the second comparison (Model 1.b—Model 1.c), adding the LPA1 variable to the model 
increases P-R2 from .0702 to .0801, an improvement in goodness of fit of about 14%. This result 
makes sense because in the previous comparison, two variables were added, but one of them was 
significant. In the present comparison, one variable that also is significant was added to the model. 
With the addition of the LPA1 variable, the magnitude of the target cost variable increases slightly 
and remains statistically significant. Introducing the LPA1 variable suggests that the level of 
political agreement in the sender state may strengthen the effects of the target cost variable on 
sanctions effectiveness.  This is explored in detail when testing the second hypothesis. The addition 
of the LPA1 variable does not result in large changes in the effects of relative power, regime type, 
and U.S. involvement on sanctions effectiveness.  
In both the restricted and unrestricted models, the coefficients for LPA1 are statistically 
significant (the probability values for both < .10). All three models are a better fit than the null 
model, as indicated by the statistically significant likelihood ratio chi-square values.  
The first hypothesis was as follows: the higher the level of political agreement on the 
sender’s side, the more effective the economic sanctions. This hypothesis is supported. The 
coefficients on the LPA1 variable are positive and statistically significant. For a one unit increase 
in the LPA1, there is a 1.43 times increase in the log odds of target state choosing complete 
acquiescence to the sender state(s) after an economic sanctions episode, with  all other independent 
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variables being fixed. The odds of the target state acquiescing completely after sanctions are 
imposed compared to the combined odds of all the other outcomes (negotiated settlement, partial 
acquiescence, stalemate, and capitulation) are multiplied by 4.167, when LPA1 increases by one 
unit, holding all other factors fixed. 
Statistical significance (95%) is higher for the target cost variable than the LPA1 variable. 
There is a positive relationship between sanction effectiveness and target cost variables. For 
sanction effectiveness, a one unit increase in the target cost variable is expected to result in a 0.53 
times increase in the log odds of target state choosing complete acquiescence to the sender state(s) 
after an economic sanctions episode, ceteris paribus. The value of log odds in favor of target state 
acquiescing completely after sanction imposition to the combined other outcomes (negotiated 
settlement, partial acquiescence, stalemate, and capitulation) is 1.268 to 1 when target cost variable 
increases one unit, ceteris paribus. 
The following is the second hypothesis: the higher the level of political agreement on the 
sender’s side and the greater costs experienced by the target, the more effective the economic 
sanctions. The regression results (Table 4.11) show that both LPA1 and target state cost variables 
are positive and statistically significant. The level of political agreement in the sender state’s 
(LPA1), target cost, signaling, the US involvement, relative power, and regime type variables are 
all independent variables with statistically significant effects upon sanctions effectiveness in all 
three models.  
The Regression Models for the Political Agreement Level in Target State (Model Group 2) 
This model tests the influence of target state’s level of political agreement (LPA2) on 
sanctions effectiveness. Table 4.13 presents the regression results of two restricted and one 
unrestricted model. Table 4.14 presents the odds ratio scores for the model 2.c. First restricted 
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model (model 2.a) includes the level of political agreement in target state variable (LPA2) and the 
other independent variables, but excludes the cost variables (i.e., sender cost and target cost 
variables). The second restricted model (model 2.b) includes the cost variables and other variables' 
it does not include the LPA2 variable. The unrestricted model (model 2.c), however, includes all 
independent variables. For this analysis, the unrestricted model 2.c is the main model.  
Table 4.13 



























































































Observations 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2  39.67*** 27.70*** 46.06*** 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.07 0.11 
Standard errors in parenthesis 




Odds ratio values for the coefficients of Model 2.c 





LPA2  -1.72*** 0.17 
Sender Cost 0.34 1.41 
Target Cost 0.53** 1.69 
Signaling 0.12 1.13 
Alliance Scale -0.53* 0.58 
Collaboration Scale 0.13 1.14 
The US Involvement -0.27 0.75 
Relative Power 0.12 1.13 
Inducements -0.20 0.81 
Sender Regime Type 0.12*** 1.13 
Target Regime Type 0.06** 1.06 
Sanction Bluntness -0.03 0.96 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
For the first comparison (model 2.a—model 2.c) as shown on Table 4.13, adding sender 
cost and target cost variables increased the P-R2 (pseudo-R2) score from .1005 to .1167, a small 
improvement in goodness of fit. The target cost variable was statistically significant (p < .05). 
Adding cost variables to model 2.a is associated with only small changes in the coefficients for 
LPA2, alliance scale and regime type variables. However, for two independent variables, 
collaboration scale and relative power, the coefficients were no longer statistically significant. For 
the second comparison (model 2.b—model 2.c), after adding LPA2 variable to model 2.b, the P-
R2 score increased from .0702 to .1167, a sizeable improvement in the goodness of fit. LPA2 in 




Adding the LPA2 variable was associated with a small increase in the coefficient of the 
target cost variable that remained statistically significant. There was only a small changes to the 
coefficients for sender and target regime type after adding LPA2, and they remained statistically 
significant. The change to the coefficient for US Involvement (from -0.45 to -0.27) after adding 
LPA2 indicates its lesser impact in the unrestricted model (i.e., smaller effect in reducing the odds 
of sanctions effectiveness).The relative power variable was not significant in Model 2.c, although 
it was significant in Model 2.a and Model 2.b, and was highly significant in Model 1.c as seen in 
Table 4.13. This result reflects what happens when a model is underspecified and the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the coefficients of one or more independent variables already in a 
model change due to the inclusion of a new, relevant variable with which the independent variables 
already in the model are correlated.  
Therefore, the level of significance of relative power is lower in Model 2.a, which included 
LPA2 and excluded costs variables; however, it remained significant at 10% level. For the other 
sub-model, which excluded LPA2, but included costs variable, the significance level for relative 
power variable increased to 99% level. The significant level was lower for relative power in Model 
2.a than in Model 2.b because of the possible multicollinearity issue, which indicated that some of 
the significance level of relative power was absorbed into the LPA2 variable in Model 2.a. 
However, in model 2.c, the relative power variable was not statistically significant, but adds a 
caveat to the nonsignificant interpretation of the relative power variable. We can ascribe this 
situation to the significance level of relative power variable was absorbed into the LPA2 and the 
target cost variables because of possible multicollinearity issues. However, the correlation between 
LPA2 and target cost should not have a high level of multicollinearity because relative power 
variable was still marginally significant with a very close score to 90% levels. As a result, we 
88 
 
should be skeptical about statistical nonsignificance of the relative power variable in the third 
model. 
The restricted and unrestricted regression results of Model 2 in Table 4.13 indicated that 
LPA2 has a sizeable and negative effect upon sanctions effectiveness. All three models show 
improved goodness of fit over the null model.  
The third hypothesis is as follows: the higher the level of political agreement on the target’s 
side, the less effective the economic sanctions. This hypothesis is supported. For the main model 
(model 2.c), the coefficient (-1.72) on LPA2 is negative and statistically significant (P< .01). A one 
unit increase in the LPA2 is associated with a -1.72 decrease in the log odds of the target state 
choosing complete acquiescence to the sender state(s) after an economic sanctions episode, given 
that all other independent variables were held constant. The higher the political agreement level 
on the target's side, the less effective the economic sanctions. The odds of target state acquiescing 
completely after sanction imposition compared to other sanctions outcomes (negotiated settlement, 
partial acquiescence, stalemate, and capitulation) is multiplied by 0.179 (i.e., is reduced) when 
LPA2 increases one unit, holding all other independent variables constant. 
The following is the fourth hypothesis: the higher the level of political agreement on the 
target's side and the less economic disutility, the less effective the economic sanctions. This 
hypothesis supported.  Model 2.c in Table 4.13 shows that both LPA2 and target cost variables 
help to explain sanctions effectiveness 
In summary, the level of political agreement in target state (LPA2), target cost, alliance 
scale, and regime type variables were statistically significant in all the three models. However, 
sender cost, signaling, inducements, and sanction bluntness variables were not statistically 
significant in any of the three models. The level of political agreement in target state (LPA2) 
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variable among the independent variables had the largest [negative] effect on sanctions 
effectiveness.  
The Regression Models for the International Level of Political Agreement (Model 3) 
This model examines the influence of international level of political agreement (LPA3) on 
sanctions effectiveness. Table 4.15 presents the regression results for the two restricted and one 
unrestricted models. Then, Table 4.16 presents the odds ratio for model 3.c. The first restricted 
model (model 3.a) includes the international level of political agreement variable (LPA3) and other 
independent variables, but excludes the cost variables (i.e., sender cost and target cost variables). 
The second restricted model (model 3.b) includes the cost variables and other variables, it does not 
include the LPA3 variable. The unrestricted model (model 3.c), however, includes all independent 
variables. For the regression analyses in this part, the unrestricted model specification (Model 3.c) 
is the main model representing the model 3 in general.  
Table 4.15 
Ordered Logit Regression Results for Model Group 3 
 
Model 3 





































































































Observations 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2 31.58*** 27.70*** 34.53*** 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 Standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.16 
Odds Ratio Values for the Coefficients of Model 3.c 






LPA3 0.93** 2.53 
Sender Cost 0.21 1.24 
Target Cost 0.37 1.44 
Signaling 0.26 1.30 
Alliance Scale -0.23 0.79 
Collaboration Scale -0.27 0.75 
The US Involvement -0.41* 0.66 
Relative Power 0.29*** 1.34 
Inducements -0.47 0.61 
Sender Regime Type 0.08** 1.09 
Target Regime Type 0.06** 1.06 
Sanction Bluntness -0.04 0.96 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Model 3.a was compared to model 3.c, then, model 3.b was compared to model 3.c. For 
the first comparison (Model 3.a—Model3.c), adding sender cost and target cost variables increased 
the P-R2 (pseudo- R2) from .0800 to .0875, a slight increase in the goodness of fit. Adding the cost 
variables to model 3.a reduced the magnitude of the coefficient of LPA2 slightly from 1.04 to 0.93. 
Adding the cost variables altered only slightly the coefficients on relative power, the regime type 
variables and the US involvement variable  
For the second comparison (Model 3.b—Model 3.c), adding LPA3 variable to the model 
3.b increases the P-R2 score from .0702 to .0875, a small improvement in the goodness of fit.  
Adding the LPA3 variable reduced slightly the magnitude of the target cost variable, and it 
is not significant in Model 3c. Again, the relative power and the regime type variables remained 
statistically significant.  
The restricted and unrestricted regression results in Table 4.15 shows that the LPA3 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in both Model 3a and Model 3c. The models both 
have similar goodness of fit, and very slightly better than Model 3b without LPA3.  
The following is the fifth hypothesis: the higher the level of political agreement on the 
international level, the more effectiveness of economic. This hypothesis is supported. For the main 
model, 3.c, the coefficient for LPA3 is positive and statistically significant. A higher level of 
political agreement on the international level is associated with economic sanctions that are more 
effective. A one unit increase in the LPA3 is expected to result in a 0.93 times increase in the log 
odds of the target state choosing complete acquiescence to the sender state(s) after an economic 
sanctions episode, given that all other predictor variables are held constant. For some sanction 
episodes, there are a few countries together with international institutions, such as the United 
Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) that are engaged in the implementation of economic 
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sanctions. However, in other episodes, a coalition of countries without involvement of any 
international institutions are implementing sanctions. This study assumed that the international 
level of political agreement is a function of both international coalitions and/or involvement of 
international institutions. Thus, LPA3 variable incorporated all kinds of international cooperation 
in economic sanction episodes. 
The following is the sixth hypothesis: the higher the level of political agreement on the 
international level and the greater the costs to the target, the more effective the economic sanctions. 
Regression results for the unrestricted model (Model 3.c) show that the coefficient for LPA3 (0.93) 
is positive and statistically significant (p < .05). However, the coefficient for the target cost 
variable, although positive (0.37), is not statistically significant. Thus, this hypothesis is not 
supported, although the positive coefficient for the target cost variable is larger than its standard 
error.  
In summary, international level of political agreement (LPA3), US involvement, relative 
power, and regime type variables have sizable and statistically significant effects upon sanctions 
effectiveness.  
The Regression Models for the Aggregated Level of Political Agreement (Model Group 4) 
This model explains the influence of aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4) on 
sanction effectiveness. The LPA4 variable is a composite or index variable of levels of political 
agreement variables: (a) LPA in sender state, (b) LPA in target state, and (c) international LPA. 
The values for the LPA4 variable are obtained using this formula:  
𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 + 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 
This study did not regress LPA1, LPA2, LPA3, and LPA4 together in any model because 
this would result in a problem of perfect collinearity due to their linear dependence. Besides, 
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standardized statistical computing packages will not estimate coefficients when there is perfect 
collinearity. By regressing the aggregated variable (LPA4), representing the effects of sender, 
target, and international LPA variables together, with other controlling variables on sanction 
effectiveness, the collinearity problem is avoided. 
Using an index variable has advantages and disadvantages. As argued above, using an 
index variable can help to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. LPA4 should be very strong in 
terms of statistical significance and influential in model specifications. Therefore, one caveat 
should be that significance indicators, such as variable statistical significance levels and LR chi-
squares, could be higher than ones in other models. Looking at the joint distribution of these 
variables, sanctions are not seen where higher LPA1 coincides with lower levels of LPA2 and 
higher levels of LPA3. However, in terms of theoretical interpretation, using LPA4 to explain 
sanction effectiveness might provide insights regarding the interaction between these variables. 
Therefore, partial effects of the combination of three variables (LPA1, 2, and 3) are more indicative 
in terms of being meaningful and statistically useful. 
Table 4.17 presents the regression results of two restricted models (Models 4a and 4b) and 
one unrestricted model (Model 4c) to assess the effects of aggregate agreement on sanction 
effectiveness. Table 4.18 presents the odds ratios for the model 4.c. The first restricted model 
(model 4.a) includes the aggregate level of political agreement variable (LPA4) and other 
independent variables, but excludes the cost variables (sender cost and target cost variables). The 
second restricted model (model 4.b) includes the cost variables and other independent variables, 
but does not include the LPA4 variable. The unrestricted model (model 4.c), however, includes all 
independent variables. The unrestricted model specification (i.e., Model 4.c) is the main model 
representing the model 4 in general.  
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Table 4.17  
Ordered logit regression results for Model Group 4 
Model 4 






  Model 4.c: 
Effectiveness 
(0-4) 















































































Observations 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2 47.06*** 27.70*** 51.32*** 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.07 0.13 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.18 
Odds ratio values for the coefficients of Model 4.c 
















The US Involvement -0.28 0.75 
Relative Power 0.22** 1.25 
Inducements -0.03 0.96 
Sender Regime Type 0.09** 1.10 
Target Regime Type 0.08*** 1.08 
Sanction Bluntness 0.04 0.95 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
I compare Model 4.a with Model 4.c; then, I compare model 4.b with model 4.c. For the 
first comparison (Model 4.a—Model 4.c), adding sender cost and target cost variables increases 
the goodness of fit somewhat. Adding cost variables to model 4.a has little effects upon the 
magnitude of the coefficient for LPA4 and only modest effects upon the magnitudes of coefficients 
for the other independent variables with coefficients that are also statistically significant.  
For the second comparison (Model 4.b—Model 4.c), adding the LPA4 variable to model 
4.b increased the goodness of fit substantially, with the P-R2 score increasing from .07 to .13. Both 
restricted and unrestricted regression results in Table 4.17 indicate that LPA4 has a positive and 
statistically significant effect upon sanctions effectiveness.   
The following is the seventh hypothesis: The higher the level of aggregate political 
agreement, the more effective are the economic. This hypothesis is supported. From model 3.c 
results on Table 4.14, the coefficient for the LPA4 variable was positive and statistically 
significant. For sanction effectiveness, a one unit increase in the LPA4, is associated with a 3.06 
increase in the log odds of the target state choosing complete acquiescence to the sender state(s) 
after an economic sanctions episode, given that all other predictor variables are held constant. 
Higher levels of aggregate political agreement are associated with more effective sanctions. The 
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odds in favor of target state acquiescing completely after sanction imposition to the combined 
other outcomes (negotiated settlement, partial acquiescence, stalemate, and capitulation) is 21.27 
to 1 when LPA4 increases one unit, holding all other independent variables constant (Table 4.18). 
The target cost variable was significant at the 95% level, with a positive relationship found 
between sanction effectiveness and target cost variables. For sanction effectiveness, a one unit 
increase in the target cost variable was expected to result in a 0.49 times increase in the log odds 
of target state, choosing complete acquiescence to the sender state(s) after economic sanctions 
episode, ceteris paribus. The value of log odds in favor of target state acquiescing completely after 
sanction imposition to the combined other outcomes (negotiated settlement, partial acquiescence, 
stalemate, and capitulation) is 1.632 to 1, when the target cost variable increases one unit, holding 
all other factors constant. 
In summary, the aggregate level of political agreement (LPA4), target cost, alliance scale, 
collaboration scale, relative power, and regime type variables all have effects on sanctions 
effectiveness. However, sender cost, signaling, inducements, and sanction bluntness variables do 
not have effects that are statistically significant. Aggregate level of political agreement variable, 
LPA4 has the largest odds ratio and thus arguably the largest positive effect on sanctions 
effectiveness among the independent variables in Model Group 4.  
Regression Models Summary and Comparisons 
Four sets of independent variables have effects upon sanctions effectiveness as gauged by 
their coefficients' magnitudes, signs, and statistical significance across three groups of models : (a) 
the level of political agreement, (b) costs borne by the target, (c) relative power, and (d) regime 
type variables. Conversely, other independent variables, including sender cost, signaling, and 
inducements were not statistically significant across three groups of models. Other independent 
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variables (i.e., alliance scale, collaboration scale, and the US involvement) were significant in 
some models but not others. Table 4.19 is a summary of the significance levels for variable 
coefficients across all four models. As for robustness check, all models were analyzed by ordered 
probit regression.  
Table 4.19 
















































































































LPA (1, 2, 3, 4) 1.43 * -1.72 *** 0.93 ** 3.06 *** Strong 
Sender 
Cost  
0.23 n/a 0.34 n/a 0.21 n/a 0.04 n/a N/A 
Target  
Cost  
0.53 ** 0.53 ** 0.37 n/a 0.49 ** Moderate 
Signaling   0.27 n/a 0.12 n/a 0.26 n/a 0.13 n/a N/A 
Alliance  
Scale  
-0.32 n/a -0.53 * -0.23 n/a -0.55 * Moderate 
Collab.  
Scale  
0.023 n/a 0.13 n/a -0.27 n/a -0.24 * Weak 
The US 
Involvement  
-0.43 n/a -0.27 n/a -0.41 * -0.28 n/a Weak 
Relative 
Power  
0.31 *** 0.12 n/a 0.29 *** 0.22 ** Moderate 
Inducements  -0.23 n/a -0.20 n/a -0.47 n/a -0.03 n/a N/A 
Sender 
Regime Type  
0.09 ** 0.12 *** 0.08 ** 0.09 ** Strong 
Target 
Regime Type  
0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 *** Strong 
Sanction 
Bluntness  
-0.10 n/a -0.03 n/a -0.04 n/a -0.04 n/a N/A 
LR Chi-
Squared, χ2  




















































































































Pseudo R2 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.13 
Strong Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 4 models; 
Moderate Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 2 or 3 models; 
Weak Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 1 model; 
N/A (No Marginal Effects): a variable is not significant across all models. 
 
Both logit (logistic) and probit regressions belong to the maximum likelihood estimation 
models (MLE) family, and both are appropriate models for the analysis of binary and ordinal 
dependent variables. Although their applications are quite similar, they differ theoretically. As 
seen in log odds assumption before, ordered logit regressions use the cumulative likelihood 
function of logistic distribution, whereas probit regression uses a different function, which is the 
cumulative function of standard normal distribution.  
Interpretation of logistic regression is easier than probit regression models. For logistic 
regressions, coefficients are the change in the log odds with respect to a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable, ceteris paribus. However, for probit regressions, coefficients are the change 
in z-scores associated with a one-unit increase in the independent variable, ceteris paribus. Probit 
regression and logistic regression often lead to very similar results. As a result, scientists 
commonly use these two MLE models interchangeably. Therefore, I also estimated ordered probit 
regression models to assess the similarity of the results with logistic regression. Ordered probit 
regression results offered similar findings regarding effects upon sanctions effectiveness for nearly 
all of the same independent variables. Based on these findings, the regression results from ordered 
logit regressions are very similar to those from ordered probit regression. . For comparisons of the 
four models (model 1.c, 2.c, 3.c, and 4.c) see Table C.1 in Appendix C. Very similar significance 
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levels were obtained for the same independent variables using both ordered logistic and ordered 
probit regression.   
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests 
In this section, I use a dichotomized dependent variable for sanction effectiveness to 
measure the effects of the four LPA variables. Since effectiveness measure is an ordinal variable, 
this section will work with a sanctions effectiveness measure that is binary, dichotomized into 0 
and 1, where a score of 0 means unsuccessful outcome for an economic sanctions episode, and a 
score of 1 means a successful one. There are advantages and disadvantages for using dummy 
variables as dependent variable. For instance, logistic regression results for a binary dependent 
variable are easier to interpret, but at the cost of lost information.  
Since the objective for the sender state for imposing economic sanctions is to change the 
target state’s behavior, sanctions success variable was coded as “0” when the sanction outcome is 
either capitulation by the sender or a stalemate. However, when the outcome is either partial 
acquiescence, negotiated settlement, or complete acquiescence, it is assumed to be a success, and 
the dependent variable is coded “1.”  
Table 4.20 presents the logit regression (not “ordered [ordinal] logistic regression”) 
coefficients across four models with the same independent variables. I also used probit regression 
reliability tests for all of the logit regressions. For reliability tests of the four logit models below, 
see the probit regression (not ordered probit regression) results presented in Table C.2 in Appendix 







Logit Regression Results across Four Models 













LPA4 - - - 
2.36*** 
(0.84) 



































































































Observations 125 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2  21.6** 26.8*** 20.7* 28.3*** 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.18 
Standard errors in parenthesis 




From the logit regression results in the table above, LPA1 and LPA3 are not statistically 
significant variables. However, LPA2 and LPA4 hold statistical significance in both ordered logit 
and logit regression analyses as seen in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. In the ordered logit regression results 
(from Table 4.19); however, the LPA1 variable is weakly significant at the 90% level and LPA2 is 
negatively but highly significant at the 99% level. In the logit regression results (from Table 4.20); 
LPA2 is significant at the 95% level with a negative relationship and LPA4 with a 99% significance 
level. In model 2.c (from Table 4.20), a one unit increase in the level of political agreement in 
target state, LPA2 is expected to result in a 1.41 decrease in the log odds of a successful economic 
sanctions outcome, holding all other factors constant. In model 4.c, a one unit increase in the 
aggregated level of political agreement, LPA4 is expected to result in a 2.36 increase in the log 
odds of successful economic sanctions outcome holding all other factors constant. 
 In ordinal logistic regression results (from Table 4.19), coefficients for the target cost 
variables were significant at different levels, but they were all statistically significant. In the 
logistic regression results, the target cost variable across four models is statistically significant, 
although the significance pattern is weaker than the ordinal logistic regression analyses. In 
addition, the coefficients for target cost variables are similar across all models. Consequently, in 
model 1.c, 2.c, 3.c, and 4.c, a one unit increase in the cost incurred by the target state because of 
sanctions episode was expected to result in about 0.6 increase in the log odds of successful 
economic sanctions outcome, holding all other factors constant. 
 In logit regression, a coefficient that is positive is associated with an increase in the log 
odds of the dependent variable with a unit increase in the independent variable; one that is negative 
is associated with a decrease in the log odds.  Taking the exponent of the coefficient yields a 
multiplier of the odds of the dependent variable resulting from a unit increase in the independent 
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variable. A log odds greater than one increases the odds (and probability). A log odds less than 
one decreases the odds (or probability).  
The predicted probability of the dependent variable (P(y) = 1) given specific values of the 
independent variables can be calculated by converting the odds to a probability.  In this study, I 
measured the predictive probability for sanction success for different values of the level of political 
agreement variables (LPA1, LPA2, LPA3, and LPA4). Since LPA variables are continuous, I used 
unique values for LPA variables. For example, although LPA1 has 12 unique values, I used 10 
values because 2 values were almost identical to other 2 values for calculating the predictive 
probabilities of LPA1 variable.  
Predictive probabilities also illustrate the marginal effects that each value of the LPA 
variables have upon sanctions success. For example, a one unit increase may be very increase for 
a continuous variable. Thus, the use of predictive probabilities makes the interpretation of an 
independent variable's effects much more meaningful.  I also calculate confidence intervals, called 
predictive margins. Predictive margins are calculated both at the 95% (confidence ranges are 
shown with whiskers) and 99% (confidence ranges are shown with covered area) levels, as shown 
in the figures for each LPA variable.  
When the confidence level gets larger (e.g., 95% to 99%), the confidence intervals become 
wider; and when the confidence level gets smaller (e.g., 99% to 95%), the confidence interval gets 
narrower. Consequently, the intervals with 99% confidence levels (with covered area in predictive 
margins Figures) are inevitably wider than the ones (with whiskers in Figures) at 95% confidence 
levels. Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 below show the predictive margins of each LPA variable on 






Figure 4.5: Predictive margins of LPA1 variable on sanctions success probability 
 
When the marginal effects for the sender state's level of political agreement is plotted, the 
probability of sanctions success increases as the LPA1 increases (Figure 4.5). According to the 
standard logistic regression results in Table 4.20; LPA1 is not a statistically significant variable. 
Therefore, I did not provide a detailed interpretation for this variable, but we can still have an idea 
about the probability of success rate of sanctions. The Table 4.21 shows the predictive probabilities 
and their 95% confidence intervals for each unique LPA1 values. 
Table 4.21 




95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.00 0.45 0.15 0.75 
3.08 0.47 0.20 0.75 
3.25 0.51 0.29 0.73 
3.33 0.53 0.34 0.73 
3.41 0.56 0.39 0.72 
3.50 0.58 0.44 0.72 







95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.75 0.64 0.56 0.72 
3.83 0.66 0.58 0.74 
4.00 0.70 0.61 0.79 
 
The LPA2 variable is statistically significant, and according to the logit regression results 
on Table 4.20, a negative relationship was found between sanctions success and the level of 
political agreement in the target state. This finding is illustrated in Figure 4.6 that the pattern of 
the predictive margins goes down as the values of LPA2 gets larger. 
 
Figure 4.6: Predictive margins of LPA2 variable on sanctions success probability 
 
From the results presented on Table 4.22 below, the predicted probability of a successful 
sanction outcome is 0.96 (0.961712) for the lowest value of the level of political agreement in the 
target state, and 0.51 (0.514425) for the highest value of the level of political agreement in the 
target state holding other variables at their means. This finding is very interesting because it means 
when LPA2 is at higher levels (i.e. there is lack of political agreement among the decision makers 
in the target state), it is almost certain that sanctions will be successful. Conversely, when LPA2 is 
at the highest values, there is about a 50% chance that sanctions will fail. However, it is important 
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to note that it is not a common situation for the target state to have low levels of political agreement. 
This result means that if a sender state wants a successful sanctions outcome, then it should be 
implemented in a way that reduces the target state’s level of political agreement. 
From Figure 4.6, when LPA2 is between 3.23 and 3.6, the confidence interval range 
narrows, but gets wider after 3.6. This is more noticeable when the confidence level is 99% (the 
covered area). This means that any LPA2 value higher than 3.6 might have more risks of 
unsuccessful outcome although the sanctions success probability increases. This means that we 
can see more variations in LPA2 scores at values higher than 3.6. Therefore, LPA2 is a two-edged 
sword for sanctions success probability. For lower level of risks, narrower confidence interval 
ranges are preferred; for higher risks with higher success rates, broader confidence interval ranges 
are preferred.  
Table 4.22 




95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.50 0.96 0.88 1.04 
1.80 0.94 0.84 1.04 
2.30 0.89 0.77 1.01 
2.50 0.87 0.74 0.99 
2.60 0.85 0.73 0.97 
2.80 0.82 0.70 0.93 
2.90 0.80 0.69 0.91 
3.00 0.78 0.67 0.88 
3.25 0.73 0.64 0.82 
3.30 0.71 0.62 0.79 







95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.50 0.65 0.57 0.73 
3.60 0.63 0.54 0.71 
3.80 0.57 0.46 0.68 
4.00 0.51 0.37 0.65 
 
For the LPA3 variable, the probability of sanctions success increases as the LPA3 increases 
as in Figure 4.7. However, this is LPA variable with a coefficient that is not significant, similar to 
the LPA1 variable. Hence, I did not analyze details for this variable, but we can nevertheless see 
that the probability of success rate of sanctions has a smooth pattern of increases. This means that 
as the international level of political agreement increases, the probability of successful sanctions 
increases with higher risks of ending up with unsuccessful sanctions, suggesting that cooperation 
is a risky endeavor in the international system. Table 4.23 shows the predictive probabilities and 
their 95% confidence intervals for the LPA3 variable in detail. 
 











95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.00 0.07 0.44 0.75 
3.00 0.04 0.60 0.78 
3.50 0.07 0.59 0.87 
4.00 0.09 0.58 0.96 
 
The LPA4 variable is statistically significant, and according to logit regression results on 
Table 4.20, a positive relationship exists between sanctions success and the aggregate level of 
political agreement. However, the overall pattern in both 95% and 99% confidence levels show S-
shaped (sigmoidal) pattern (Figure 4.8). As seen for predictive margins, the probability pattern 
gets higher as LPA4 values increase. I created predictive probabilities of aggregate level of political 













95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1.50 0.23 -0.00 0.48 
1.60 0.28 0.04 0.51 
1.70 0.32 0.09 0.55 
1.80 0.37 0.16 0.583 
1.90 0.42 0.23 0.60 
2.00 0.47 0.30 0.63 
2.10 0.52 0.38 0.65 
2.20 0.57 0.46 0.68 
2.30 0.62 0.53 0.71 
2.40 0.66 0.58 0.74 
2.50 0.71 0.62 0.79 
2.60 0.75 0.6 0.84 
2.70 0.78 0.694 0.88 
2.80 0.82 0.72 0.92 
2.90 0.85 0.74 0.95 
3.00 0.87 0.77 0.97 
3.10 0.89 0.79 0.99 
3.20 0.91 0.81 1.01 
 
From Table 4.24, as the aggregate level of political agreement variable value increases, the 
predicted probability of successful sanctions outcome being a one is also increasing from 0.23 to 
0.91. Even though LPA4 is a combination of other variables, we can say that LPA4 has a larger and 
more consistent effect on predicted probability of successful economic sanction outcomes than 




The level of political agreement (LPA) variables have sizable and statistically significant 
effects on  sanctions effectiveness, as presented in the regression results of 12 ordered logistic 
regression models. Since the LPA4 is an index variable that uses the information from LPA1, LPA2, 
and LPA3 variables, I first examined the three individual LPA variables in more detail to 
understand the inner dynamics that explains sanctions effectiveness. Among these three variables, 
level of political agreement in target state (LPA2) is the most important variable. For a detailed list 
of level of political agreement variables scores per each sanction case, see Appendix D. 
Supporting Galtung’s (1967) argument, findings from the present study suggest that 
domestic population may rally around the flag in reaction to sanctions because sanctions amount 
to target states meddling into their domestic affairs. When a leader of a target state can manipulate 
public opinion in this way, or when he or she can exploit this situation, it will solidify the state's 
ability to resist sanctions. The leader may be able to implement retaliatory policies against sender 
state that may lower the effectiveness of economic sanctions. This also shows that politically 
distressed targets are more likely to succumb to the sender because the leader cannot any longer 
use a narrative and rhetoric to rationalize his or her stand. Eventually, the leader will lose his or 
her popularity, his or her personal prestige internationally, as well as damage the state’s 
international reputation. The dynamics between important groups within the target state is the most 
important factor in determining the success of sanctions. A rational sender will calculate the future 
level of political agreement within the target state that will result from implementing economic 
sanction policies.  
This study also examined the relationships between LPA variables and target cost variables 
and their effects on sanction effectiveness by comparing restricted and unrestricted models. The 
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correlation between the international level of political agreement (LPA3) and the target cost 
variables is positive. Higher levels of political agreement in the international system are associated 
with greater costs for target states. For target states, there is need to consider political costs along 
with economic costs.  
When the political costs for target states are high, they cannot resist sanctions. Thus, there 
is incentive by the leaders of target states to engender higher levels of political agreement by 
exploiting the rally around the flag effect. Thus, while sanctions are more costly for target states, 
their leaders have the option of obtaining higher levels of agreement.  
While regime type variables are statistically have effects that are statistically significant 
across models, sanctions are imposed mostly by democratic countries with higher Polity IV scores 
(µsender_polity = 16.45) and more decision makers against autocratic and anocratic countries with 
lower Polity IV scores (µtarget_polity = 8.16 and fewer decision makers. Thus, target states with fewer 
decision makers are better able to resist sanctions since there are fewer veto players. This might 
be one of the reasons why, in the international political economy literature, sanctions are 
considered to be inefficient foreign policy tools. 
I used logit regression by transforming the dependent variable (sanction effectiveness) into 
a dichotomized outcome variable (success or failure). This was done for the purpose of 
determining whether the findings from the ordered logistic regression models were robust in the 
sense that similar finding would result from simple logistic regression with a dichotomous 




CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDIES 
Three case studies are examined including: The United States v. Turkey (1974 to 1976), 
the United States and Canada v. South Korea (1975 to 1976), and the United States v. Brazil (1977 
to 1984). These cases were selected in order to add narratives to theory set out in this study. Such 
narratives reinforce the validity of quantitative tests of theoretical arguments (Lijphart, 1971). 
Table 5.1 compares these cases with respect to sender, target, international level of political 
agreement variables, and sanctions effectiveness. 
Table 5.1 
List of the Case Studies  
 Case Studies LPA1 LPA2 LPA3 Effectiveness 
1) 
The United States v. Turkey  
(1974-1976) 




The United States & Canada v. South Korea 
(1975-1976) 
High Moderate High Effective 
3) 
The United States v. Brazil,  
(1977-1984) 




Low, moderate, and high classifications in Table 5.1 have been derived from the summary 
statistics of each LPA variable’s distribution. In other words, low levels have smaller values in 
terms of central tendency measures (mean and median) of the related LPA variable’s distribution. 
Similarly, moderate levels have values close to the central tendency measure values. Finally, high 
levels have higher values than those of the central tendency measures belonging to the distribution 
of the related LPA variable. It is important to note that sender, target, and international LPA 
variables (LPA1, 2, 3) have skewed distributions. Fortunately, the use of maximum likelihood 
estimation models (MLE) can provide robust regression estimates. However, one still needs to 
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account for skewness when interpreting the distribution. This caveat considered when interpreting 
case studies. 
First, the level of political agreement in sender state (LPA1) has a left-skewed (left-tailed) 
distribution. This means that LPA1 values are accumulated to the right side of the distribution. 
Skewness index score is -1.543 for the LPA1 variable. Since it is a negatively skewed pattern, the 
median score must have a greater value than the mean score. As a result, the mean score is 3.83, 
and the median score is 4.00 for the LPA1 variable. Similarly, the level of political agreement in 
the target state (LPA2) has a left-skewed distribution. The skewness index score is -0.814 for this 
variable. The mean score is 3.41, and the median score is 3.5 for the LPA2 variable.  
The international level of political agreement (LPA3) variable has a distribution whose 
shape includes that is both right-skewed and bimodal. Skewness index score for the LPA3 variable 
is 0.473 with a mean score of 2.74 and a median score of 2.0. The aggregated level of political 
agreement (LPA4) variable has an almost normal distribution. This means that LPA4 values are 
accumulated in the middle of the frequency distribution. The skewness index score is a very small 
value of -0.229. Since the distribution has a normal shape, the central tendency measures (such as 
the mean and median) should have very close values. For the LPA4 variable, the mean score is 2.43 
and the median score is 2.5. Note that the three LPA variable distributions are explored in more 
detail in my analysis of each case. 
As regression results from Chapter 4 indicated, the level of political agreement in the target 
state variable (LPA2) has the highest level of statistical significance on explaining economic 
sanction effectiveness. Higher LPA2 scores on the target state are inversely related with sanctions 
effectiveness. International level of political agreement (LPA3) has the second largest effect among 
the LPA variables (with a moderate statistical significance level of 95%) upon sanctions 
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effectiveness. Higher LPA3 scores on international level are associated with greater sanctions 
effectiveness. Lastly, the level of political agreement in the sender state (LPA1) has only a small 
effect upon sanctions effectiveness. Higher scores of LPA1 are associated with greater sanctions 
effectiveness. 
LPA4 is an index measure of the aggregate level of political agreement for a specific case.   
It is not very useful for developing a narrative for specific sanctions episodes.   Thus, the case 
studies will be refer to values on the first three LPA variables (i.e. sender, target, and international 
system level of political agreement variables—LPA1, 2, 3). The three case studies are explored 
below in further detail. For each case, there’s a discussion of descriptive statistics and explanations 
of the coding of LPA variables. Following, for each case, is a narrative describing the historical 
progression of the sanctions episode and assessment of each episode in terms of the level of 
political agreement variables and sanctions effectiveness. 
 
Case Study 1: The United States v. Turkey (1974-1976) 
Calculations of the LPA scores for The United States v. Turkey case 
Identification number for this case from the overall dataset used in this study is 
104407401001974091901 (see the 44th case in Table D.2, D.3, D.4, and D.5 in Appendix D). For 
this case, the level of political agreement in sender state (the United States) will be assessed first. 
Then, the LPA score in target state (Turkey) will be determined. Next, the level of political 
agreement in international system will be considered. Finally, an aggregate level of political 
agreement will be calculated given LPA1, LPA2, and LPA3 scores. 
The sender state (i.e. the United States) had a regime type of democracy. Main decision 
makers for this sanction period, on the sender side, were the president and the Congress. The first 
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researcher (R1) coded sender state LPA scores as follows: for American government (the president) 
a score of 1 and for Congress a score of 2 was assigned between -2 and 2. The researcher then 
calculated the raw and overall scores for the LPA1 of the first case. Raw scores are simply the 
average score of the values assigned to each actor (the president and Congress). Overall score was 
the concluding score of LPA1 for the first researcher on this case. Note that since the range at first 
was from -2 to 2, the researcher had to sum the raw score with a score of 2 to get rid of negative 
values, if any. Raw and overall scores of the first researcher for the sender state were as follows: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (1 + 2)/2 = 1.50  (First researcher) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 1.5 + 2 = 3.50   (1) 
Similar measurement rules were followed by the other researcher (R2). This researcher 
assigned a score of 2 between -2 and 2 for the president, and a score of 2 from -2 to 2 for Congress. 
Therefore, the raw and overall scores of the first researcher for the LPA1 variable for this case were 
the following: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00  (Second researcher) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 2 + 2 = 4.00   (2) 
This study used LPA scores in general interpretations and for empirical analyses after 
taking the average score of the two researchers’ overall assessments as shown in (1) and (2). 
Consequently, for this case, the final score of the LPA1 was 3.75. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (3.5 + 4)/2 = 3.75 
Figure 5.1 shows the LPA1 score with an orange line, the mean score with a purple line, 
and the median score with a green line superimposed onto the LPA1 variable distribution. As seen, 
the LPA1 score of 3.75 is close in value to the mean score of 3.83. Thus, the LPA1 score for this 




Figure 5.1: LPA1 score of the first case study on the LPA1 distribution 
The mean score for the LPA1 variable is 3.83 from all of the sanctions episodes. For this 
sanction episode, however, the LPA for the sender (LPA1) is a score of 3.75. Note that the LPA 
scores range from 3 to 4 with a left-skewed distribution. Thus, the LPA1 score, with a value of 
3.75 for this case, is a score even lower than the mean score of the level of political agreement for 
a sender state 
Target state (i.e. Turkey), also has a democratic regime type with a parliamentary system. 
Given the nature of the regime, two main actors are crucial for this episode: government and the 
main opposition party. Therefore, the first researcher (R1) coded target state LPA1 scores as 
follows: for the government a score of 2 was assigned and for the main opposition party a score of 
2 was also assigned between -2 and 2.  
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00  (First researcher) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (3) 
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As a result, for the LPA1 variable, the overall score for the first researcher was a score of 
4.00. The second researcher (R2) assigned a score of 2 between -2 and 2 for the government and a 
score of 2 between -2 and 2 for the main opposition party in Turkey for this same period.  
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00  (Second researcher) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (4) 
Therefore, for the LPA2 variable, the overall score was 4.00 for the second researcher as 
well. The mean score of the two overall scores then constituted the final LPA2 score for this case. 
As seen below, the final score calculated from (3) and (4) for the LPA2 for this case is 4.00. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (4 + 4)/2 = 4.00 
Figure 5.2 shows the LPA2 score with an orange line, the mean score with a purple line, 
and the median score with a green line superimposed onto the LPA2 variable’s histogram 
distribution. As seen, LPA2 (with score of 4.00) is at the higher levels given the distribution pattern 
for this variable. 
 
Figure 5.2:  LPA2 score of the first case study on the LPA2 distribution 
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Target state level of political agreement (LPA2) for this case (Turkey) is high, with a score 
of 4.00 (from a range between 1.5 and 4), which is also left-skewed with the majority of the data 
points gathered toward to right side of the distribution.  
The international system was neutral to this economic sanction episode according to the 
both researchers. Therefore, as there is one sender state and one target state, this episode is a 
unilateral sanction case, which means that international level of political support is not available 
for the dyad. Both researchers equaled the LPA3 value to a value of zero between -2 and 2 for this 
sanction episode. Thus, the LPA3 regression score for this case becomes 2.00, the average of 
overall scores for both researchers.  
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 0  (For both researchers) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 0 + 2 = 2.00  (For both researchers) 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00 
In order to calculate the aggregated political agreement score (LPA4) score, the individual 
LPA variable scores needed to be plugged into the general LPA4 formula. Since international 
system is neutral for this case, only LPA1 and LPA2 were plugged.  The calculation for the 
aggregated LPA value for this case utilized in the regression analysis is shown below: 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1.50 − 2.00 = −0.50 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑠 = −0.50/2 = −0.25 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑃𝐴 4 = −0.25 + 2 = 1.75   (5) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2.00 − 2.00 = 0.00 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑠 = 0.00/2 = 0.00 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑃𝐴 4 = 0.00 + 2 = 2.00   (6) 
 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = (1.75 + 2.00)/2 = 1.87 
118 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the LPA4 score with an orange line, the mean score with a purple line, 
and the median score with a green line superimposed onto the LPA4 variable histogram 




Figure 5.3: LPA4 score of the first case study on the LPA4 distribution 
 
Historical progression and the assessment of the United States v. Turkey case 
Longstanding Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus erupted in 1974 when Turkish troops 
wrested control of over 40% of the island, generating discontent that culminated in the ushering 
of partially effective sanctions on Turkey by the United States (Legg, 1981). The story of the 
historic struggle between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is rooted in the 16th century when the 
Ottoman Empire in 1571 annexed the island as one of its territories. Over time, the ascendency of 
the Ottomans gradually decayed with the simultaneous rise of Western powers (chiefly the British 
Empire) that leased the island from the Sultan in 1878. These events occurred during the Tanzimat 
Ottoman era, ushering in colossal legal, social, and political transformations. This lease was short-
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lived once the Ottomans joined with the Germans and Austro-Hungarian Empire during the Great 
War fought against Britain and its allies. In London, no question existed about the Ottoman lands 
that enjoyed special dominance by Britain (like Egypt or Cyprus). The British simply claimed 
control over them after ousting the Turks who were forced to retreat to their heartland in Anatolia 
and thus putting an end to their protectorate status on November 5, 1914. The British Empire 
eventually weakened after the Second World War and relinquished control of the island to its 
inhabitants (mostly Greeks and Turks).  
 The inhabitants in Cyprus reached an agreement where the newly freed island became the 
new Republic of Cyprus. Resistance groups within each community thrived, however, and gained 
popular support from their respective communities. On the Greek side the Organization for the 
Greek Fighters (EOKA— Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών in Greek) and on the Turkish 
side The Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT— Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı in Turkish) both 
engaged in violence against one another and initiated fierce political campaigns to gain more 
control over the island’s government and politics (French, 2015). Both groups and their zealous 
advocates were supported by the military junta in Greece and the Republican government in 
Turkey respectively. In 1974, the Greek government stationed around 600 military officers in 
Cyprus as part of a plan to facilitate a coup d’etat against the Cypriot government at the time 
(Borowiec, 1983).  
 On July 15th, 1974, the Greek supported groups overthrew the government of Archbishop 
Makarios III who was the first president of Cyprus (“Cyprus: Big Troubles,” 1974). Under the 
pretense that peace and stability should be restored if violence erupted in the island, as specified 
in a treaty signed in 1960, Turkish troops responded by landed to the north of Cyprus on July 20th. 
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Two days later, once the Turkish military established control over 40% of the island, a cease-fire 
between the Greeks and the Turks was signed bringing an end to active hostilities.  
At the time, the United States was dealing with one of its worst political scandals in modern 
history, the Watergate scandal, resulting in President Nixon resigning on August 8th, 1974. 
Nevertheless, the US political establishment was unhappy with the Turkish involvement, and 
Indiana Representative John D. Brademan proposed in Congress a ban on military aid for Turkey. 
Two bills for ceasing aid were passed in Congress only to be vetoed by newly elected President 
Ford who sought to stabilize his domestic and foreign rule by avoiding controversial deals and 
decisions. Ultimately, however, Ford agreed to delay signing of the cut-off bill until 
December1974. Prior to the end of the year, the president awarded Turkey additional aid and 
postponed the cutoff to the following February (Legg, 1981). An additional $230 million worth of 
military equipment was sold by the US Department of Defense to the Turkish government before 
the deadline for the postponement in February of 1975. The State Departments’ efforts, 
orchestrated by Henry Kissinger, failed to convince the Turks to change their position on the 
Cyprus issue and resulted in the cut-off going into effect.  
In Turkey, the new government led by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in a coalition with Mr. 
Necmettin Erbakan rallied the populace in support of the invasion. Further, the main opposition 
headed by the Justice Party and its leader Suleyman Demirel joined forces with the government to 
advocate for Turkish dominance. The Turkish public at large vocalized their allegiance to the 
government in defending Turkish interests in Cyprus. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
Turkish state and its people were united in their cause against the Greeks in Cyprus. Responding 
to the American sanctions, the Turkish government limited military activity of US troops in its 
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mainland. Further, the government closed American bases and terminated cooperation with the 
Department of Defense for a brief period following the sanctions being handed down by Congress.  
In May of 1975, the US Senate voted to lift the American military embargo on Turkey by 
issuing a new deal that allowed for military equipment sales to the Turkish government. A few 
months later, in August, the House of Representatives passed a new bill specifying further military 
sale agreements between the two governments. Shortly thereafter, President Ford unveiled a new 
four-year plan to grant Turkey $1 billion in military equipment as an exchange for the reopening 
of 26 bases utilized by American forces within the country. By 1978, this aid package was limited 
to a smaller amount and Turkey was deemed to act in good faith by the Carter Administration, 
ending the sanctions period.  
This sanctions episode was only partially effective as Turkey did not escalate its military 
operation because of the further American retaliation. Simultaneously, the Americans did not 
achieve their desires, namely a Turkish withdrawal from the island, rendering their sanctions to be 
deemed less effective than desired by the policy makers in Washington. Turkey and the United 
States came into agreement quickly after the incident, with both parties concluding that they were 
on good terms since each satisfied part of what the other party needed. Aid was received by Turkey 
while the US was able to continue operating their forces from bases within the country. In short, 
this episode was neither fully effective nor a complete failure, achieving results somewhere in the 
middle.  
The outcome of the US-Turkey sanctions supports the argument made by this study: since 
the level of political agreement within the senders’ state was not strong, the sanctions were less 
effective. Executive agencies (like the DoD and Whitehouse, alongside Congress) were not 
unanimous in their decision nor willingness to encroach on Turkish interests and prevent them 
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from placing their troops in Cyprus. The Watergate crisis further rendered level of agreement on 
foreign policy matters during this time.  
In addition, the level of political agreement within the target state (Turkey) was high, with 
all relevant political actors within the country rallying behind the decision of Mr. Ecevit’s 
government to use the military option for the island of Cyprus. As a result, the sanctions epoch 
was less effective. The absence of international support also played a role in diminishing the impact 
of the sanctions, with no decisive support being present for either the Turkish government or the 
American administration in their respective efforts.  
Overall, the level of political agreement on the sanctions was low, resulting in a less 
effective episode. One of the main factors why sanctions were moderately effective is that the 
military operations of US troops within a strategic ally like Turkey was in question. Going in 
heavily with sanctions, or incentives such as attractive military aid deals, carried significant 
leverage for the United States in the decision-making of the Turkish government.  
 
Case Study 2: The United States and Canada v. South Korea (1975-1976) 
Calculations of the LPA scores for the United States and Canada v. South Korea case 
Coding number for this case was 104707501001975069901 (see the 47th case in Table D.2, 
D.3, D.4, and D.5 in Appendix D). Because the main sender (The United States) state has a regime 
type of consolidated democracy, at least two important veto players are involved in decision-
making processes. For this case, main decision makers on the sender side (the US) are, yet again, 
the government (the presidency) and the Congress. Sender state LPA scores were recorded by the 
first recorder as follows: for American government, a score of 2 was assigned and for Congress a 
score of 2 was assigned between -2 and 2. Therefore, the first researcher’s (R1) raw LPA1 score is 
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the average of the two. Summation of 2 with the resulting raw score eliminates any possible 
negative value from -2 to 2. As a result, raw and overall scores by the first researcher for the LPA1 
variable in this case was calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (7) 
A score of 2 between -2 and 2 was assigned by the second researcher (R1) for the first actor 
(presidency), and a score of 2 between -2 and 2 was assigned for the role of Congress of the sender 
state in this episode. Therefore, raw and overall scores for the second researcher were: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (2 + 2)/2 = 2.00 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (8) 
The mean score of both researchers’ overall LPA scores as seen in (7) and (8) constituted 
the final LPA1 score used in the analysis for this specific sanction episode. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (4 + 4)/2 = 4.00 
Figure 5.4 shows the LPA1 score with an orange vertical line, the mean score of this 
variable’s distribution is represented by a vertical purple line, and the median score is shown with 
a vertical green line superimposed onto the LPA1 variable’s density histogram distribution. As 





Figure 5.4: LPA1 score of the second case study for the LPA1 distribution 
Target state (South Korea) has a non-democratic regime type, therefore only one important 
actor—the government—is included for this sanction episode. The first researcher (R1) coded 
target state LPA scores as follows: for the government a score of 2 was assigned between -2 and 
2, thus the overall score for LPA2 became 4.00. 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2.00 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (9) 
Note that since there is only one important actor in the target state, there is no need to 
average the score between different actors. A score of 1 between -2 and 2 was assigned by the 
second researcher (R2) for the government in target state.  
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1 + 2 = 3.00  (10) 
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After calculations, the overall LPA2 score for the second researcher was 4.00. The 
regression score then became the mean of the overall scores, as seen in (9) and (10), from both 
researchers. Consequently, a final score for LPA2 for this case (3.50) was identified. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (4 + 3)/2 = 3.50 
Figure 5.5 shows the LPA2 score with an orange line, the mean score with a purple line, 
and the median score with a green line superimposed on the LPA2 variable distribution. As seen, 




Figure 5.5: LPA2 score of the second case study on the LPA2 distribution 
 
 
The mean score for LPA2 was 3.41 across 125 economic sanction episodes. For this case, 
however, LPA for the target state (LPA2) is a score of 3.50. Although the range for the LPA2 scores 
ranged between 1.5 and 4 in a left-skewed distribution, the resulting LPA2 score with a value of 
3.50 is very close in value to both the median and mean scores. 
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This sanction episode was instigated by a coalition of countries (the United States and 
Canada), with the main sender being the US. Other countries also informally supported the 
sanctioning coalition. Therefore, international system is not assumed to be neutral against South 
Korea on the issue of nuclear reprocessing. As a result, the first researcher (R1) coded the 
international LPA value (LPA3) with a score of 2 between -2 and 2. Consequently, the LPA3 score 
for the first researcher was 4.00 as seen below: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2.00 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (11) 
The second researcher (R2) also assigned a score of 2 between -2 and 2 for the LPA3 
variable. Thus, the overall LPA3 score on this case for the second researcher was also 4.00, as seen 
from the calculation below: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2.00 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2 + 2 = 4.00  (12) 
Averaging of the overall scores, (11) and (12), from both researchers constituted the final 
LPA3 score, for a mean of 4.00. Figure 5.6 shows the LPA3 score for this case, the mean score of 
the LPA3, and the median score of the LPA3 variable. As seen, it is a high value given the general 
variable distribution and when compared with the central tendency measures of the distribution. 





Figure 5.6: LPA3 score of the second case study on the LPA3 distribution 
 
In order to calculate the aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4) score, the 
individual three LPA variable scores were plugged into the LPA4 formula. Raw scores for each 
researcher were used first, followed by scaled scores obtained for each researcher and overall 
scores finally being calculated for each. An average of the two overall scores, representing the 
resulting LPA4 score for this sanction episode, resulted. Calculation procedure was as seen below:  
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 + 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2 − 2 + 2 = 2 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 2 3⁄ = 0.66 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 0.66 + 2 = 2.66  (13) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 + 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2 − 1 + 2 = 3 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 3 3⁄ = 1 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 1 + 2 = 3.00   (14) 




Figure 5.7 shows the LPA4 score together with the mean and median scores of the LPA4 
variable distribution. As seen, LPA4, with a score of 2.83 in the variable distribution, is at higher 
levels given the variable distribution in general. 
 
Figure 5.7: LPA4 score of the second case study on the LPA4 distribution 
Historical progression and the assessment of the US and Canada v. South Korea case 
Western nuclear powers, namely the United States and Canada supported by France, 
successfully sanctioned South Korean General Park’s government to abandon its nuclear program 
in the mid-1970s (Wohistetter, 1976). A chief factor behind the effectiveness of these sanctions 
was the consensus among the Western powers on the need to immediately mitigate the 
destabilizing effects that South Korean nuclear capability would have in the region. Further, South 
Korea lacked global supporters able to supply them with nuclear reprocessing plants and materials. 
Dealing with the Soviet Union was not a consideration for the South Korean regime given the 
heavy militarization of the country by American troops and the colossal economic packages 
financing the country’s industries that were channeled through the Western powers. In addition, 
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the international community, spearheaded by major powers like the US, Canada, and France along 
with key organizations such as the United Nations, negatively viewed the South Korean attitude 
and behavior toward possession of nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the diplomatic campaign run 
by Henry Kissinger (along with key officials from France and Canada) was equipped with serious 
economic sanctions if necessary, and compelled Park’s government to abandon its decision to 
acquire nuclear capabilities.  
 While the reasons General Park wanted nuclear weaponry capability in the mid-1970s is 
unclear, recent research conducted by South Korean investigators revealed several concerns over 
American commitment to the security of South Korea. Park’s interest in nuclear weapons should 
not be surprising given the decisive outcome of the atomic bombs which brought the Japanese to 
peace toward the end of the Second World War; a welcome eventuality for the Koreans who 
suffered greatly under Japanese colonial rule at the time. Syngman Rhee, Park’s predecessor, 
invested in nuclear research as early as the 1950s in an attempt to solidify the country’s new 
position following the Korean War. Subsequent to the political turmoil of the early 1960s, Park 
Chung-he rose to power and declared himself president of the country. Throughout the Vietnam 
War, Park aided Washington’s troops with immediate logistical support in order to cultivate a close 
relationship with the Americans.  
 Park’s wish to obtain nuclear weapons originated with his goal of achieving an autonomous 
defense strategy in case of American inaction, limited intervention, or total abandonment. This 
motive was informed by the modest interventions by the United States in the late 1960s when there 
was political and military instability in the Korean peninsula and when the US stopped military 
aid to South Vietnam and its government collapsed due to the North's military invasion and 
conquest. Considered a wakeup call, Park was convinced that the United States may not be fully 
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committed to the safety of his nation despite its emerging industrial strength. Simultaneously, the 
Soviets were backing the North Korean nuclear project, and new tests were carried out in the Indian 
sub-continent. These concerns by Park were further reinforced when President Nixon authorized 
the withdrawal of 20,000 troops (decreasing the 63,000 troops stationed at that time in South 
Korea) in an attempt to stabilize the peninsula (Engel, 2016).  
 In 1974, Park’s government requested from France a nuclear reprocessing facility capable 
of generating plutonium from spent reactor fuel. This was an action contrary to American efforts 
at promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons around the World, and would have given 
South Korea the ability to develop nuclear weaponry in a few years (by 1980) according to 
declassified reports from the National Security Archive. The United States quickly realized that in 
order to successfully thwart the Korean attempt, they needed to act swiftly in garnering the support 
of global allies who supply nuclear machinery and goods. Officials in Washington quickly moved 
to convene with their French counterparts in an attempt to form a coalition that exercised leverage 
over the Koreans in order to change the course of their actions. Canada, who agreed to finance 
Korean enterprises related to nuclear capabilities, were also involved since they were concerned 
about an upcoming test similar to that carried out earlier in the decade in India.   
 Multiple visits by top American officials (such as the heads of the Department of State and 
Defense Department) were carried out in 1975 and 1976. Goals for these meetings were to reaffirm 
American promises on the security of South Korea and to persuade Park to abandon his desire for 
obtaining nuclear capability. Once the Americans secured the Canadian and French support by 
cancelling and changing the terms of their deals, Park realized that achieving a nuclear Korea was 
untenable. He also could not simply bluff his way through due to ties between the Western powers 
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and South Korea’s massive industrial complex. Prior to his assassination, Park publicly and 
reluctantly declared that South Korea would officially abandon its nuclear weaponry capability.  
 The diplomatic and economic threats to Park by the White House and its Western allies 
worked, effectively changing the attitude and behavior of the South Korean government. The chief 
reasons for this success were the unanimous agreement between all relevant political actors within 
the United States and its allies. Congress and President Ford held identical views regarding the 
issue. The administration quickly voiced their concerns and a desire to change South Korea's 
course of action. Congress gave the President freedom in dealing with the crisis since it did not 
desire a nuclear South Korea, especially after the Vietnam War. The level of political agreement 
in the senders’ state was thus at its highest. Similarly, the international community (represented by 
Western powers like France and Canada) reflected an agreement on the issue: no proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, the level of political agreement by the international community was 
also high. This exerted a significant amount of force on the South Korean government’s decision 
to change its course with regard to nuclear weapons.  
 While South Korea was run by Park (a General-led dictatorship that rendered other actors’ 
attitudes and behaviors less important) many South Korean domestic forces further pressured the 
decisions of his regime’s. South Korea in the 1970s was witnessing a massive industrialization 
campaign that eventually moved the country from a poor nation to one of the wealthiest in the 
world. Much uproar and uncertainty were thus generated within the business community over a 
possible fracture in Korean-Western relations, especially with the United States, due to the ongoing 
political crisis caused by Park. Stakeholders in the economy desired stronger ties with the West. 
They benefited from global economic integration where their goods and services would be sold 
and exported to markets far beyond South Korea’s borders. They also wanted access to global 
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capital for their individual projects. Understandably, they did not appreciate the way Park was 
running the nuclear campaign, generating a factor of disagreement within the target state. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the level of political agreement within South Korea was low at 
the time, facilitating the effectiveness of the sanctions episode initiated by the Americans.  
 
Case Study 3: The Unites States v. Brazil (1977 - 1984) 
Calculations of LPA scores for the Unites States v. Brazil case 
Coding number for this case was 106107707001977022404 (see the 61st case in Table D.2, 
D.3, D.4, and D.5 in Appendix D). This is another example of a unilateral sanction episode. For 
this dyad the US has a democratic regime type, whereas the target state (Brazil) has a non-
democratic regime. Therefore, there are two significant actors in the sender state. Sender actors’ 
level of political agreement (LPA1) scores were recorded by the first researcher (R1) as follows: 
for the president a score of 2 was assigned between -2 and 2, and for Congress a score of 1 was 
assigned between -2 and 2. 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (2 + 1)/2 = 1.50 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 1.5 + 2 = 3.50  (13) 
The second researcher (R2) assigned a score of 1 from -2 to 2 for the presidency and 
assigned a score of 1 between -2 and 2 for the role of Congress during this episode. Thus, the raw 
and overall scores for the second researcher results in one and three, as seen below: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (1 + 1)/2 = 1.00 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = 1 + 2 = 3.00  (14) 
The mean score of both researchers’ overall LPA scores ([13] and [14]) then constitute the 
final LPA1 score that was used in the regression analyses for this sanction episode. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 = (3 + 3.5)/2 = 3.25 
Figure 5.8 shows the LPA1 score for this case with an orange vertical line, the mean score 
of this variable’s distribution with a purple line, and the median score with a green line 
superimposed onto the LPA1 variable’s density histogram distribution. As seen, the LPA1 score of 




Figure 5.8:  LPA1 score of the second case study on the LPA1 distribution 
 
Target has a non-democratic regime type, therefore there are two important actors (the 
government and factions) for the first researcher of this sanction episode. The researcher (R1) 
coded target state LPA scores as follows: for the government a score of 2 was assigned between -
2 and 2, and for the factions a score of 0 was assigned between -2 and 2. Thus, the overall score 
for LPA2 was 3.00 after calculations as shown below: 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (2 + 0)/2 = 1.00 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1 + 2 = 3.00 
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For the second researcher (R2), there was only one important actor, namely the government 
in target state. A score of 2 between -2 and 2 was therefore assigned for the government in Brazil. 
Since there is only one important actor in target state, there was no need to average the score of 
the different actors. 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2.00 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 2 + 2 = 4.00 
After calculations, the overall LPA2 score for the second researcher was 4.00. The final 
score then becomes the average of the overall scores from both researchers. Consequently, the 
final score for the LPA2 variable of the US v. Brazil case is 3.50. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = (3 + 4)/2 = 3.50 
Figure 5.9 shows the LPA2 score with an orange line, the mean score with a purple line, 
and the median score with a green line superimposed on the LPA2 variable distribution. As seen, 
the LPA2 score of 3.50 is a moderate value given the LPA2 variable’s histogram distribution. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: LPA2 score of the second case study on the LPA2 distribution 
135 
 
This is a unilateral economic sanction episode without international influence, so 
international system has been assumed to be neutral. As a result, the raw score for the international 
level of political agreement (LPA3) value equals zero in this case. The average value for both 
researchers’ overall score same, the regression score becomes 2.00. 
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 0  (For both researchers) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 0 + 2 = 2  (For both researchers) 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴3 = 2.00 
The aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4) score was 1.87 (the average score of 
[15] and [16] in the step below) as shown in Figure 5.10. Calculation steps are shown in detail 
below: 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1.50 − 1.00 = 0.50 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑠 = 0.5/2 = 0.25 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑃𝐴 4 = 0.25 + 2 = 2.25  (15) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝐴4 = 𝐿𝑃𝐴1 − 𝐿𝑃𝐴2 = 1.00 − 2.00 = −1.00 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑠 = −1.00/2 = −0.50 
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑃𝐴 4 = −0.5 + 2 = 1.5  (16) 





Figure 5.10:  LPA4 score of the second case study on the LPA4 distribution 
 
 
Historical progression and the assessment of the United States v. Brazil case 
The economic sanctions that the United States under the Carter administration placed 
against the Brazilian government between 1977 and 1984 were not effective. This is due to the 
lack of heavy handedness by the sender state, with Congress and the president not joining ranks or 
exhibiting zeal in executing the sanctions. Further, the Brazilian government voluntarily refused 
American military aid in a gesture signaling retaliation against Washington’s behavior (Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, 1977). In addition, the international community did not exhibit robust 
support for the American government’s desire to curtail human rights abuses by the military 
regime in Brazil.  
 Tumultuous political events in the 1950s and 60s led to the establishment and consolidation 
of military run dictatorships in Brazil until the mid-1980s. With the rise of Soviet influence in the 
developing world, communist ideals regarding agricultural and industrial developments were 
rampant among the labor organizations and their supporters in Brazil. A 100% wage increase was 
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legislated by the Labor Minister in the late 1950s as a result, prompting more socialist policies that 
culminated in a heated conflict between the country’s conservative-industrialist communities and 
the working masses. The military, therefore, started to crack down on liberal politicians and 
consolidated its hold on political power to a point where the populist president, Getúlio Vargas, 
committed suicide.  
 This instability gave opportunity to the military to create a prime minister position that 
would assume most of the executive powers previously held by the president. This, however, failed 
to gain the support of the Brazilian public who subsequently voted in favor of dismantling the 
office and restoring presidential powers to João Goulart, a former labor minister who became 
Brazil’s most powerful president in 1964. The military, along with the landowning and industrialist 
classes, did not subscribe to the policies and attitudes of the new Brazilian regime and orchestrated 
a military coup that same year which installed a harsh reactionary government that cracked down 
on the leftist opposition.  
 This new regime in Brazil launched a political deterrence campaign utilizing tactics such 
as kidnapping, mass political imprisonment, elimination of constitutional protections for citizens, 
and a wide array of other human rights abuses in hopes of quelling political opposition. Many 
opponents were held in jail without due process for years, and many others simply disappeared 
and were never found. The situation in Brazil alarmed many governments around the world, 
chiefly the United States headed by President Carter. Carter’s administration sought to broker 
peace around the world and decrease human rights violations (culminating in the historic Camp-
David accords between Sadat’s Egypt and Israel in the Middle East for example), and began 
investigating the reported abuses in Brazil. Brazilian officials considered this as a direct 
interference into their domestic politics.  
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 With General Ernesto Giesel establishing his rule over Brazil in 1975, promises were made 
to democratize the country and shift away from the repression of those expressing opposition. 
Receiving assistance and security aid from the United States, Brazil was one of the 82 countries 
that the White House that needed to submit a report to Congress highlighting their human rights 
records. As a courtesy measure, the US embassy in Brazil sent copies of the report to the Brazilian 
government (Wesson, 1981). Disgruntled by the US move, the Brazilian government abrogated 
the military deal signed previously in 1952 specifying the terms and amounts of military aid given 
to Brazil from the United States. By 1978, the Brazilian government terminated the US naval 
mission and joint military commission which had existed between both countries since the end of 
World War II. This situation remained until President Ronald Reagan reauthorized the sale of 
weapons to Brazil in 1984.  
 In summary, the US sanctions failed to induce behavioral change on the part of the 
Brazilian government. This was due to high agreement levels present among Brazilians regarding 
opposition to US intervention in their domestic politics. It was also the result of a lack of consensus 
on the part of the US administration regarding the amount of pressure and degree of sanctions 
during the Brazilian agreement. An ancillary, yet important, factor was also the neutrality of the 
international community, where no legitimate support or advocacy for the sanctions was exhibited 
by other organizations or governments. 
An important observation concerning the US-Brazilian economic sanction episode is that 
the Brazilian government, unlike South Korea, did not desire nuclear weapons. While the issue of 
human rights abuses were of importance to strategic stakeholders in American foreign policy 
(namely the Department of Defense and the White House), human rights simply did not match the 
importance of the possibility of a South Korea with nuclear weapons. While Brazil did desire to 
139 
 
develop a nuclear capability during the 1970s, it simply lacked the infrastructure to develop an 
atomic bomb quickly in comparison to South Korea whose high rate of industrialization by the late 
1970s gave them such a capability. Further, the strategic importance of South Korea, located 
adjacent to North Korea (an intransigent autocratic regime that has continuously challenge US 
supremacy) added an important factor that made the US sanctions episode in South Korea more 
effective in comparison to those in Brazil or Turkey.  
 
Chapter Summary 
The US-Turkish sanctions case study indicates a moderate level of effectiveness because 
of the lower levels of political agreement in sender state (the U.S.) and the higher level of political 
agreement against sanctions in the target state (Turkey). This is due to relationship between issue 
type, security, and sender (the US) and the target (Turkey). For the United States, the level of 
political agreement among domestic actors was low given the non-essential nature of the Cyprus 
issue at hand. For the U.S., it was only indirectly related to the security interests of the U.S. On 
the other hand, Turkey had an inherent security interest in the matter given Cyprus' close proximity 
to the southern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. This made domestic actors within Turkey, 
including the government and opposition, unified against the sanctions, thereby signaling a high 
level of political agreement within the target state. 
The U.S.-Canadian coalition sanctions against South Korea were effective. This is due to 
the high level of political agreement within the sender state and low level of political agreement 
within the target state (South Korea) and high level of international political agreement supporting 
sanctions policy. The reason behind the unanimous agreement of the domestic actors within the 
US and Canada is due to the salient nature of nuclear proliferation, a highly security-related issue. 
140 
 
On the other hand, within South Korea, the U.S. with the support of Canada exploited domestic 
opposition and recruited it to oppose the ruler, thus leading to a low political agreement. 
The U.S.-Brazilian sanctions is an example of a failed sanctions episode. This is due to the 
non-security related issue at hand, human rights. Besides, within the United States, levels of 
political agreement was low among the White House and Congress. On the contrary, in Sao Paulo, 
the level of political agreement against the American sanctions was uniform. Therefore, the level 





CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
This study has demonstrated the difficulty of answering the question of whether economic 
sanctions are effective or not. Out of 125 cases analyzed in this study, 30 episodes (24%) were 
found to be effective using a restrictive definition of sanctions success. Once the effectiveness 
threshold is raised to any form of success (negotiated or non-negotiated), 59 cases (47%) were 
effective to some degree. The average of the two different definitions of sanctions success is about 
35% similar to the original findings by HSE in 1990. Similarly, the most recent update for the 
TIES dataset, including a total of 1412 cases, found that economic sanctions were effective using 
the restrictive definition for 27% of the cases and using the non-restrictive definition for 40% of 
the cases, , including the missing cases in their dataset. Such statistics are similar to the findings 
of this study, confirming that economic sanctions are effective only about a third of the time they 
are initiated.  
This study reinvigorates the debate on the utility and effectiveness of economic sanctions 
as foreign policy instruments. Pape (1997) has criticized HSE’s optimism by stating that 
"proponents of the new conventional wisdom are aware that sanctions have limits and do not 
always work, but, by and large, they believe that sanctions are often an efficient instrument for 
achieving important political goals." Pape (1997) believes that sanctions were only successful in a 
handful of episodes, disagreeing with the 30% statistic as claimed by the HSE. Therefore, Pape 
(1997) argues that economic sanctions are effective under a narrow set of conditions. These include 
high commitment (both economic and political) from the sender state, high political disagreement 
within the target state concerning the sanctions, and a high level of support for the sender state 
from the international community. This study has matched HSE cases with TIES effectiveness 
scores, finding that 59 cases out of 125 (about 47%) received a score of 3 or 4 (relative to absolute 
142 
 
effectiveness). Sanctions may not change policy positions, but they prevent eventual wars by 
decreasing the military spending and power of target countries (Rogers, 1996). 
Since estimates of sanctions success vary between 30 and 50 percent (like in the TIES 
dataset when missing data was excluded, thus yielding a 56% effective rate in the non-restrictive 
case), it is plain that there is sharp disagreement in the economic sanctions literature over the 
conceptualization and measurement of economic sanctions effectiveness. Conventional wisdom 
cited by many authors, like Pape (1998; 1997) and others (Preeg, 1999; Kunz 1997; Morgan & 
Schwebach, 1997), argues that economic sanctions should almost never be utilized because they 
are unsuccessful for yielding the coercer’s demands and thwarting the actions of the target. Further, 
such authors also argue that in many instances economic sanctions lead to disastrous unintended 
outcomes, such as in the case of Iraq in 1990 where around half a million innocent civilians 
perished.  
In spite of this conventional wisdom, a policy maker who reads the actual statistics showing 
that 35% of all sanctions studied were successful in the strict sense, and about 50% were successful 
with a modicum of diplomacy and negotiations, will realize that economic sanctions do work, at 
least in some settings. Such an understanding is not wrong or misleading. It seems that there is a 
bias in the literature and that it has generally sided with the negative view of economic sanctions, 
despite the evidence. Therefore, the general picture in world politics on the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions is contrary to the evidence. If a foreign policy tool works about half of the 
time it is utilized, that is sufficient evidence that it can work in particular and not necessarily 
uncommon circumstances.  
Political scientists have traditionally put too much emphasis on gauging the economic 
sanctions effectiveness in economic terms while largely ignoring their political effects. The 
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conventional economic theory suggests that if targets suffer enough, they will change their 
policies. This economic suffering has been measured in a number of ways, leading to the inevitable 
determination that the net welfare of the target is decreased. However, this study suggests that the 
political effects of economic sanctions are just as important and should be the focus of future 
research. If political agreement levels within the target are low, economic sanctions can be more 
effective due to the disagreement between key stakeholders within the target state. Nevertheless, 
as Galtung (1967) argued, once a sender initiates sanctions, the target’s leaders will try to rally the 
population, institutions, and key players behind opposition to the sanctions. If successful, there 
will be a heightened level of political agreement, and the sanctions will be less effective. 
This study also supports in part existing international relations scholarship that argues that 
economic sanctions are ineffective. The argument is based on the notion that sender states use 
economic sanctions primarily for symbolic purposes—that is, to just send a message that they are 
unhappy and want the target state to change its behavior. They are used more as a warning call 
than as a tool to compel an immediate change in behavior by the target state because the sanctions 
will inflict substantial harm on the target state. For a majority of sanctions, senders use them as a 
threat but do not follow through with by imposing substantial economic and political costs. Senders 
that use sanctions for symbolic purpose—to send a message—may not get what they want from 
the target state. If the target fails to get the message, and this is followed by harsher sanctions, 
sanctions may backfire. Target states will become increasingly unified in their opposition to the 
senders and their sanctions. Sanctions generate a mindset of survival (acquired not only by the 
governing regime but also subscribed to by a significant portion of the populace), and this results 
in a rally around the flag effect. For example, the harsh economic sanctions against Saddam 
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Hussein failed despite their grave human impacts. Saddam was able to mobilize sufficient internal 
support and remain in power until the Bush administration's unilateral military invasion in 2003. 
Previous studies of the intersection between world politics and economic sanctions have 
failed to highlight the role of domestic players within senders and targets. This has led not only to 
modeling misspecification but also to omitted variable biases. Such problems plague findings 
produced by statistical models using regression and other methods. Therefore, the introduction of 
additional independent variables that measure internal opposition, public opinion, and the views 
of other relevant domestic actors is essential. The existing literature on economic sanctions has 
included mainly international political variables, such as whether the episode is unilateral or 
multilateral and political economic interactions between states. While such variables are important 
in determining sanctions effectiveness, the level of domestic agreement or the role of opposition 
is equally important.  
The goal of this study has been to explore the factors that explain international economic 
sanctions effectiveness. To accomplish this, the focus was upon the effects of two important 
variables: the level of political agreement (LPA) and the costs to the target state of economic 
sanctions. This study is the first to look at the effects of political agreement within the senders’ 
state, target state, and the international community upon sanctions effectiveness. It is the first study 
to measure the level of political agreement among the relevant political actors within sender and 
target states. For instance, in the United States, the positions of both the president and the Congress 
were considered to develop an ordinal level measure for political agreement for US sanctions 
episodes.  
Levels of political agreement vary for both sender state and target state depending upon 
the sanctions episode. Their effects also vary based on the findings of this study. First, the level of 
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political agreement in the sender state (LPA1) has only a weak effect on economic sanctions 
effectiveness when compared with other LPA variables (LPA1, LPA2, and LPA3). The second LPA 
variable, the level of political agreement in the target state (LPA2), has the largest effect on 
sanctions effectiveness among the LPA variables. The third LPA variable, international level of 
political agreement (LPA3), has moderate effects on sanctions effectiveness. The aggregate level 
of political agreement (LPA4) has a large effect due to it being a combination of other LPA 
variables that have effects. This study mainly focused on the first three LPA variables. 
In order to test for the causal importance of these variables, seven hypotheses were 
proposed. From these tests, the study has shown that higher levels of LPA1 are associated with 
increased levels of sanctions effectiveness. Conversely, higher levels of LPA2 are associated with 
lower levels of sanctions effectiveness. Finally, higher levels of LPA3 are associated with higher 
levels of sanctions effectiveness. Out of these three political agreement variables, the effect size 
of the target state’s level of political agreement (LPA1) are larger than both the LPA2 and LPA3 
variables. Typically, high levels of LPA2 may explain why economic sanctions often are often not 
very effective foreign policy tools.  
While this study addresses the political explanation for the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions, it does not neglect Pape’s emphasis on the economic dimension. This study therefore 
agrees with the general economic argument that if sufficient losses are incurred by the target's 
economy, the target is more likely to concede to the demands of the sender. Target costs are 
important in most models, lending support to this overarching argument. This importance, 
however, decreases when a model includes political agreement within the target. This is due to the 
important effect of target political agreement on sanctions effectiveness.  
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A clear majority of the economic sanctions literature has emphasized the importance of 
economic variables (like target cost) as important determinants for effective sanctions (Allen, 
2008; Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Bonetti, 1998). While such economic variables are of utmost 
importance, political variables are of equal importance. This study shows that the level of political 
agreement within the sender and target states must be included in models analyzing the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. There is need for better measures of political agreement. For 
example, if there is domestic opposition to sanctions, such opposition can include multiple 
stakeholders with varying reasons for opposing sanctions. In democracies, the government is not 
the only important political actor when deciding to support or oppose sanctions, and both public 
opinion and domestic opposition should also be considered.  
This dissertation has also highlighted the limited influence of international organizations 
and actors upon sanctions effectiveness. Senders and targets typically do not incorporate the world 
community’s views or demands into their actions. Nevertheless, if the sender garner the support 
of international actors, organizations, and/or other powerful states, the target state is more likely 
to perceive that sanctions will really be imposed. In such sanctions episodes, sanctions are more 
likely to be effective. The United States has instigated about half of the total number of sanctions 
in the TIES dataset (48% out of 1,412 cases). However, most of these episodes did not involve the 
international community. Economic sanctions, like many other state actions in world politics, 
seldom involve the cooperative behavior of other states in the international arena.  
Findings from the ordered logistic models in Chapter 4 have been consistent with previous 
studies concerning target cost. All the models, excluding one (which included the level of political 
agreement on the international level), found target cost to have a positive and sizable effect upon 
sanctions effectiveness. Therefore, the more resources that a target state's economy suffers because 
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of economic sanctions, the more willing it is to concede to the demands of the sender in order to 
avoid further economic losses. This is particularly true in smaller economies when compared to 
the United States, the largest economic sanctions initiator in the world. These economies simply 
cannot withstand the economic power of the US, and therefore are more willing to change their 
positions or at least modify them. 
While the effect of target cost is not large in a model that includes a variable for the 
international level of political agreement, this finding may be misleading. First, the coefficient for 
target cost is positive and its size does approach statistical significance. Second, this study is the 
first to examine the level of political agreement at the international level. The measure is the extent 
to which the sender state garnered support from international actors participating in the sanctions 
episode. It is not a measure of support that the target state was able to get from international actors 
not participating in the sanctions episode.  
It is noteworthy, however, that most sanctions were issued by a unilateral actor (mostly the 
United States), thus making less important as an explanatory variable political agreement among 
sanctioning actors at the international level. Also, if political agreement among sanctioning actors 
at the international level is low, target states may be able to find support from non-participating 
international actors, buttressing their ability to withstand the sender's economic sanctions.  
Relative power is an important variable for explaining economic sanctions effectiveness. 
Senders, like the United States, have extensive control over many products such as advanced 
machinery, electronics equipment, and agricultural goods on the global market, allowing them to 
leverage this control to accentuate the effects of sanctions. Therefore, when considering the 
effectiveness of sanctions, researchers must also consider the degree to which senders hold a 
monopoly over essential goods or services provided to the target. The sender may also use such 
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control to exert influence over their international allies, encouraging them to approve and condone 
the sanctions. 
Relative power in this study was important in explaining economic sanctions effectiveness. 
The higher the power differential between the sender and the target, the more likely sanctions are 
to be effective. In one model, including the variable for target political agreement, relative power 
did not have large or statistically significant effects. This may be due to the heightened level of 
power within targets during a period of economic sanctions. It is likely that the target strengthens 
its political and economic strongholds in opposition to the episode, thus decreasing the power 
differential and at least nominally decreasing its potential effect. 
Relative power also influences the effectiveness of economic sanctions through the 
bargaining mechanism. When sender states are more powerful in comparison to target states, they 
can leverage their political and economic resources to compel the target to change its behavior. 
They can use their political alliances, economic blocs, and targeted pressure on important actors 
in order to strengthen their bargaining position(s) in an attempt to force a change in the target's 
behavior. Similarly, when target states are powerful, they can leverage their resources to weaken 
the sender's power by getting support from international organizations, other powerful states, or 
even by securing support within the sender states.  
This study has been one of the first systematic analyses to examine the effects of relative 
power upon the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Prior research, including studies using the 
HSE’s and TIES’s datasets and their subsequent assessments, tend not to include a variable for 
capability levels with other independent variables. A measure of relative power for this manuscript 
was extracted from the Correlates of War project dataset. This measure was calculated by dividing 
the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) of the sender by the CINC of the target. 
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Higher scores thus corresponded to a higher power differential between the sender and the target. 
Adrian, Ang, and Peksen (2007) tested the effect of relative power on sanctions effectiveness and 
found it to be insignificant. This may be due to the fact that they utilized the HSE measure which 
is different than the measure used in this study. 
Strong sender states like the United States, where power differentials are very large, signal 
a serious threat to target states. Weak targets, expect very bad outcomes if they do not concede to 
the request of the sender of economic sanctions. Sanctions are an action between diplomacy and 
war, and once they fail and stalemate occurs, a war can ensue. I would speculate that the descent 
into war can occur quickly in cases where relative power is high; therefore, sender states are more 
likely to engage in wars with states that are much weaker in comparison to them. For instance, 
Saddam Hussein’s regime refused to change its attitude and behaviors and stalemate occurred with 
the United States and its allies. Given that the gap in relative power was much higher between the 
two states, war resulted in 2003. 
This study’s findings differ from Bapat, et al. (2013) and the subsequent TIES empirical 
evaluations of sanctions’ effectiveness. First, capability ratio using the TIES’s analytical 
framework was found to be modestly important. This study, however, found capability ratio 
(measured in relative power) to be substantively, as well as statistically, significant. The 
contradictory results may be due to the different measures of relative power. Bapat, et al. (2013) 
searched the literature and constructed a measure based on earlier studies, a meta analytic 
approach, while this study simply used that of the Correlates of War project. 
Results of this study also are consistent with bargaining theory's expectations for economic 
sanctions. That is to say, sanctions amount to a sender's signal to the target that it has greater power 
than the target (Strandow, 2006). This use of sanctions is especially true when a sender state is 
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powerful economically and militarily, such as the US or Russia. Therefore, sanctions are more 
effective when the target perceives the sender to be powerful, as was the case in a majority of 
effective sanction episodes analyzed in this dissertation. Such perceptions can be inaccurate, 
however, if the information held by both parties on military and economic power is poor. 
Nevertheless, the bargaining power of the sender is greater if they have a record of economic and 
military power. 
Second, Bapat, et al. (2013) found instability and domestic discontent to be of little to no 
significance when determining the effectiveness of sanctions (most coefficients were close to 0 as 
reported in their diagrams). This study found that the level of target political agreement is a better 
concept than instability, and indeed is one of the most important independent variables affecting 
economic sanctions effectiveness. This study supported the argument made by Major (2012) that 
domestic discontent is of foremost importance for economic sanctions effectiveness. 
While this result is different, it may be due to the fact that instability was measured by the 
number of riots, strikes, and demonstrations in the TIES data while only political agreement 
explicitly voiced by the relevant actors within the target was considered here. Further, their study 
was based on many earlier findings while the current study only uses those cases included in both 
the TIES and HSE. This number of cases is much smaller in comparison to the original TIES 
dataset. 
This study also expands the black box proposed by Bapat, et al. (2013), which highlights 
the importance of the level of determination. It does so by enlarging these two concepts by 
proposing a three-level political agreement framework (sender, target, and international). For each 
variable, the level of agreement is taken into consideration. Voicing of support and opposition to 
economic sanctions is also taken into consideration. Therefore, this study presents an expansionist 
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view of Bapat, et al.’s (2013) original argument that the senders’ agreement, or any involved 
actors’ agreement for that matter, helps to explain economic sanctions effectiveness. 
While this dissertation accepts and adopts the coding scheme of TIES, it raises considerable 
debate on how to conceptualize and measure sanctions effectiveness. Pape (1998) critiqued HSE’s 
approach, as they included sanctions within a conglomerate of foreign policy tools that also 
included military force and diplomacy. Pape (1998) argued that many cases were erroneously 
coded “effective” by HSE since other explanations for the change of the target existed (namely, 
the threat of or actual military intervention). Originators of the TIES data set examined the success 
of sanctions as the change in target behavior due to the threatened or imposed sanctions. Other 
tools could be deployed by the sender, however, making it difficult to isolate the effect of economic 
sanctions on the target’s behavior while controlling for other foreign policy tools such as threats 
or actual force. 
This study regards expropriation cases as valid economic sanctions episodes, thereby 
diverging from Pape’s conceptualization. HSE has reasoned that economic pressure is used for 
economic gains as well as political victories in expropriation cases. For instance, nationalization 
of foreign-owned enterprises or firms falls under the category of expropriation cases, with HSE 
(1990) coding only a few cases of economic sanctions as successful while Pape (1997) disagrees 
and excludes them from the cases included. This study has matched HSE cases with the TIES 
dataset, however, thereby arguing that expropriations are sanctions. This has increased the number 
of effective sanctions episodes coded by this study. There is need for further theoretical work in 
developing and improving measures of the concept of economic sanctions effectiveness. This 
study also shared Pape’s policy recommendations for the use of sanctions. First, economic 
sanctions should only be deployed when there is high confidence that they will work. For instance, 
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if senders are using them symbolically to signal their power or facilitate a foreign policy objective, 
they should not be used. In many cases, economic sanctions have resulted in higher numbers of 
death than wars. The humanitarian crises generated by economic sanctions can be disastrous, such 
as seen in Iraq. Further, the sender should also seek support from the international community, 
commit actual economic and political resources toward backing its claim, promote disagreement 
within the target state, and inflict strong and short-term economic impacts on the target’s economic 
markets. 
This study also challenges political scientists to reassess the impact of sanctions on future 
relations among the world's nations. While many are of the opinion that sanctions thwart warfare, 
sanctions may actually lead to lengthy and entrenched warfare. This is especially true when 
autocratic leaders exercise a modicum of power or legitimacy within their states. For instance, 
Gaddafi’s regime in Libya resisted change even after strong opposition and public uprisings, and 
his regime was only deposed by a large scale NATO intervention on March 2011 after U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1973. Such a regime fits the resistant category for economic 
sanctions. Regimes that are wealthy can also be expected to resist sanctions until the end, as 
exhibited by the Arab Spring. Therefore, escalation with such regimes through economic sanctions 
will likely result in further destabilization and use of force rather than diplomacy or the changing 
of the target’s behavior. 
This study also supports the argument presented by McCormack and Pascoe (2017) for the 
effectiveness of sanctions in some situations for preventing wars. When relative power is high, the 
target states’ resources are expected to be depleted at a faster rate in comparison to those of the 
sender. Sanctions could be used to thwart military action by the target. Senders, like the United 
States, have often used this strategy against rival powers such as Russia over the past few decades 
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in a manner similar to the Ukraine episode of 2014. As a result of the sanctions, Russia's military 
spending decreased (Hille, 2018), thus limiting its commitment to initiating a prolonged conflict 
against the United States. The regression results support this argument, suggesting a higher level 
of ratio disparity in relative power is associated with more sanctions effectiveness. Further, the 
international agreement results suggest that a higher level of disagreement, meaning that resources 
of the target are replenished by other actors, decreases the sanctions effectiveness. 
Supporting the economic explanation for economic sanctions effectiveness, this study also 
found support for the importance of target costs, or the welfare argument. Conventional wisdom 
establishes that the net welfare effect experienced by the target or the more economic hardship a 
target experiences, the more effective are the sanctions. The larger and wider the reach of the 
target's economy, the less it suffers from sanctions. Therefore, when relative power differentials 
are large, the sender may leverage its political power to rally other parties in support of sanctions 
against a target.  
The findings of this study are also consistent with the argument by Lektzian and Patterson 
(2015) based upon the active role of economic circles of power. In countries where trade and 
marketplaces are open, the authors argue that the powerful economic actors affected within those 
circles will actively lobby for policy changes that will end the sanctions. Countries with large and 
open markets have a plethora of powerful economic actors, including the owners of multinational 
corporations, and key stakeholders in the target state's economy. Therefore, they, with the 
assistance of their surrogates, are expected to lobby extensively against the target in order to 
change their policies. Powerful actors, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Russia, 
have large markets that are fairly open and connected globally. Therefore, once they sanction a 




Chapter one presented the problems observable in existing sanctions literature and 
proposed that levels of political agreement are important factors for considering economic sanction 
outcomes. A comprehensive literature review on international economic sanctions was then 
presented in chapter two and provided discussion on the limited attempts that have been made to 
connect economic sanctions with political agreement.  
The focus of chapter three, therefore, was to introduce the variables, methods of data 
collection, and analyses used in this current study. This chapter also provided a detailed description 
of the regression models used in the following chapter. This chapter also presented a brief game 
theoretical approach on the influence of decision makers’ consensus on economic sanctions 
outcomes. It was shown that sanctions can bring out better outcomes when the opposition party in 
a sender state supports the government on its economic sanctions policy against a target state. 
Chapter four presented empirical results and discussions of ordered logit regression 
analyses with an ordinal level dependent variable, sanction effectiveness. Four main models were 
utilized for four LPA variables (i.e. LPA1, 2, 3, and 4) with each model having three additional sub-
models. Thus, a total of 12 regression models were used in this part. The last sub-model had an 
unrestricted specification that represented the whole model in question. Sub-model specifications 
were decided in accordance with the inclusion or exclusion of the LPA and target cost variables. 
The second part of the fourth chapter presented the same analysis, utilizing the same specifications 
with a dichotomized dependent variable (sanction success) as an alternative explanation. The 
results in chapter four confirmed previous studies and has provided evidence of the statistical 
significance of the target cost, regime type, and relative power variables. On the other hand, sender 
cost, signaling, inducements, and sanction bluntness variables have been shown to hold no 
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statistical significance across all models. Ordered logit models provided more information for 
explaining the effects of the three LPA variables on sanction effectiveness, while the logit models 
provided easier interpretation for LPA variables’ influence on sanction outcomes. 
In chapter five, three case studies were presented to explore these relationships, namely the 
United States v. Turkey, the United States and Canada v. South Korea, and the United States v. 
Brazil. The first case served as an example of low levels of sanction effectiveness while the second 
case exemplified effective sanctions. An example of ineffective economic sanction outcomes with 
regard to levels of political agreement in the sender, target, and international system variables was 
then presented in the third case. 
In chapter six, it was concluded that especially three variables are important for explaining 
economic sanctions outcomes; namely, level of political agreement, economic cost on target states, 
and relative power. It has been shown that political cost helps to explain economic sanction 
outcomes better than economic cost as politics matters more than economics (especially for 
unstable regimes). For example, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on the Iraqi 
regime after its invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. These sanctions lasted more than two 
decades and were very costly for the target regime. However, sanctions were not effective for 
changing the Iraqi regime’s behavior. In fact, Saddam Hussein’s regime actually gained power. 
Therefore, this study has focused on the effects of political agreement on economic sanction 
outcomes. 
Contribution to the Literature 
Often, studies of economic sanctions have overemphasized the effects of costs on the 
success of economic sanctions. This ignores many relevant variables, especially political factors. 
This study has provided insight on the significance of political agreement within three distinct 
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political units: the sender, the target, and the international system. Three groups of models were 
set out and tested, with the important finding that if relevant political actors within the sender state 
and the international community joined forces in support of the sanctions episode the sanctions 
were more likely to be effective. This study urges researchers in future studies to focus more on 
political factors when considering the dynamics of economic sanctions effectiveness.  
Further, the case studies presented here highlight the importance of issue type on the 
success of sanctions. For instance, nuclear proliferation fared better than human rights violations 
in terms of whether relevant actors (involved or not) supported the sanctions episode. This study 
has thus confirmed earlier findings on the salience of political issues. However, it goes further by 
highlighting the need for better conceptualization and measurement of issue types.  
In addition, the two datasets (TIES and HSE) have both been heavily criticized by earlier 
researchers despite their continued regular use by political scientists. According to some of these 
critics, a few of the observations cannot be counted as economic sanctions outcomes. This study, 
however, has matched 125 observations between these two sources and has thus contributed to the 
literature by focusing on the least controversial observations for conducting analyses.  
 This study contributes to theory by highlighting a gap in the literature on economic 
sanctions that has not a comprehensive theory to explain variations in sanctions effectiveness. Too 
often, researchers have emphasized only the effects of costs. This study, however, has 
demonstrated that cost is not the single decisive factor for determining the effectiveness of a 
sanctions episode. Political factors also account for sanctions effectiveness, notably differing types 
of political agreement.  
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Limitation of the study 
For the regression analyses, regression models belonging to the maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) family were used due to the ordinal level of measurement of the dependent 
variable. For MLE models R-square scores cannot be used; a different measure, pseudo-R-square, 
was utilized. However, there are several caveats when using pseudo-R-square. Pseudo-R-square 
scores typically tend to be low. However, they still help when comparing the goodness of fit of 
different model specifications 
Recommendations 
Findings from this study have shown that Galtung’s (1967) “rally around the flag” effect 
is relevant. Therefore, one of the best countermeasures a target state can utilize during an economic 
sanctions episode is to mobilize state institutions and the populace in opposition to the sanctions. 
This has a powerful effect in thwarting the success of economic sanctions, as seen in episodes such 
as Iraq during the 1990s and Iran for most of the early 2000s. Concurrently, for the international 
community or the sender's state, there's need to rally domestic supporters within the target state 
for their cause in order to break the “rally around the flag” phenomenon.  
This study has also shown and supported the arguments made by Major (2012) that 
politically distressed targets are more likely to succumb to the sender. The leader of the target state 
won't be able to use just rhetoric to justify his or her position. Eventually, speeches and words only 
will result not only in the loss of their personal prestige but also damage the state’s international 
reputation. Therefore, as a policy recommendation a sender needs to wait until the three are lower 
levels of political agreement in the target state. Alternatively, the sender can estimate future level 
of political agreement within the target state after the implementation of economic sanctions.  
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One of the most useful strategies for sender states to implement a successful sanctions 
episode is to recruit the support of international actors. Many sanctions episodes have exemplified 
this phenomenon, such as the Iranian nuclear episode. Once the United States obtained the support 
of the European Union, the Iranians were more likely to acquiesce to a deal and alter some of their 
behaviors. While the Iranian economic sanctions cannot be considered a complete success, they 
still achieved a modicum of behavioral change by the Iranian state. 
Future research 
The study of economic sanctions needs further improvement in conceptualization and 
measurement. Excessive use of binary and ordinal measures with limited variability has led to lost 
information and diminished explanatory power. Therefore, this study urges the construction of 
indexes or scales based on factors that have been widely cited as determinants of sanctions 
effectiveness.  
Further, there are limitations in the modeling of sanctions effectiveness. Researchers have 
not acknowledged the all of the limitations inherent in their methods. Future researchers need to 
be open and explicit about the limitations of their data, methods, and models. Logistic and ordered 
logistic regressions are not equivalent to ordinary least squares in their capacity for producing 
accurate predictions, especially when there are measurement errors due to researchers using binary 
or ordinal measures. 
Building on the findings of this study, future researchers should expand the number of 
relevant political actors and improve measurements. For instance, public opinion, civil society, 
and large economic stakeholders within a state all have political influence to varying degrees, and 






Game Theory Part 
The game trees in Figure A.1 below shows two formal bargaining models; one is without 
an opposition in sender state (S1), and one with a strategic opposition in the sender state, under 
imperfect information environment. Several assumptions are made for these games: (a) political 
parties value their payoffs with the probability of re-election, (b) opposition parties have better 
understanding of the real goals of the government on implementing a policy more than other actors, 
such as target or rival state. 
 
Figure A.1: Extensive form of the game theoretical models 
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The bargaining model presented here is based on deterrence and crisis bargaining games 
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow & Zorick 1997; Fearon 1994) in which a crisis happens when 
one state challenges another state. Then, each state has an opportunity to escalate or de-escalate 
the conflict based on their utility maximization.  
Payoffs: 
a. Assume that the cost of economic sanctions is ci. Here, c1 is a value from [0, C1] for the 
sender state (S1); and c2 is cost of sanctions, which is a value from [0, C2], for the target 
state (S2). 
b. Assume that the utility obtained from sanctions is ui. Here, u1 is for the sender state (S1), 
and u2 is for the target state (S2). 
c.   Probability of economic sanctions threatening and/or imposition is p. 
d. The ultimate payoffs for players are the difference between utility obtained from economic 
sanctions minus the cost of sanctions, ui x p – ci. For simplicity, the cost is assumed as a 
constant value, and the utility of sanctions is a function F(x). Again, for simplicity, u1 
F(u1) on [p-C1,p] for S1, and u2 G(u2) on [1-p-C2,1-p] for S2.  
e. Government and opposition in sender state know c1; target state, S2, knows c2. So, it is 
assumed that each player knows his or her own cost, but not the opponent’s cost. 
f. Credit that the opposition gets for supporting current policy is denoted as q. This also 
reduces Government (S1) payoff by factor of (1-q). 
g. Reputation loss for backing down, also known as audience cost, is coded as a for S1. 
First Model: the Model without Opposition in S1  
Model 1 in Figure A1 is the extensive form of the game. Two main actors are in this game: 
Government (S1) and target state (S2). Players update their beliefs according to Bayesian 
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probabilities because of the contingent nature of their strategies. For example, the probability of a 
Government that chooses the strategy of imposing economic sanctions (IS) given that sanctions 
were threatened (TH) is:  
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑆|𝑇𝐻) =  
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑆)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐼𝑆)
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑆)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐼𝑆) + 𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐵𝐷)
 
The equation above shows that the probability of a Government that chooses the strategy 
of imposing economic sanctions (IS) given that sanctions were threatened (TH) equals to the 
probability of Government imposing economic sanctions times the probability of Government 
threatening economic sanctions given sanctions are imposed divided with the summation of 
probabilities of all possible actions of Government (S1) given sanctions were threatened. These 
are: (a) the probability of sender state government (S1) imposing economic sanctions times 
probability of sender state government (S1) threatening economic sanctions given sanctions are 
imposed and (b) the probability of sender state government (S1) choosing the strategy of backing 
down times probability of sender state government (S1), threatening economic sanctions given 
choosing the action of backing down at first. 
To calculate this, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) is needed for this game, where 
there is no strategic opposition. Assuming, we have normal probability distribution for this type 
of game; Figure A2 is the hypothetical CDF for S1, (the distribution is not necessarily a smooth 





Figure A.2: CDF diagram for sanctions without opposition 
From Figure A.2 above, the probability of government choosing the option of imposing 
economic sanctions is equal to the difference between 1 and the corresponding probability value 





 For this study, sanctions are imposed after being threatened. The probability of government 
threatening economic sanctions given sanctions are imposed becomes 1.00. In other words,  
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐼𝑆) = 1 
The same reasoning is used when calculating the probability values of all other actions of 
S1. Therefore, the probability of a government that chooses the strategy of imposing economic 

















Again, the Bayesian probability needs to be calculated because of contingency of 
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷|𝑇𝐻),  which means the probability of government (S1) that chooses the strategy of 
backing down (BD) given that sanctions were threatened (TH): 
 
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷|𝑇𝐻) =  
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐵𝐷)
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐵𝐷) + 𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑆)𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑇𝐻|𝐼𝑆)
 
 
Again, similar reasoning is used when calculating probability values from Figure A.1. As 
















Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Probability Values: 
Now we need to calculate the actual probability values to plug them in the two Bayesian 
probability results above. Probabilities were calculated by using the number of the cases provided 
by the TIES dataset. For each sanction episode, the first three causes with different issue types 
(coded in 15 categories) were provided by the dataset. Table A.1 presents the numbers of the 
economic sanctions according to issue types and the probability scores with respect to escalation 








Table A.1  
 















1 38 0 38 21 17 
2 75 28 47 25 22 
3 49 22 27 8 19 
4 46 15 31 15 16 
5 26 14 12 6 6 
6 22 9 13 3 10 
7 126 27 99 58 41 
8 84 21 63 38 25 
9 29 6 23 14 9 
10 20 2 18 7 11 
11 14 5 9 7 2 
12 47 13 34 22 12 
13 681 180 501 255 246 
14 49 3 46 40 6 
15 106 8 98 51 47 
Second 
Cause 
1 10 3 7 4 3 
2 24 9 15 3 12 
3 4 1 3 0 3 
4 4 3 1 0 1 
5 15 7 8 1 7 
6 6 2 4 1 3 
7 16 3 13 3 10 
8 23 12 11 1 10 
9 9 3 6 4 2 
10 4 1 3 2 1 
11 4 2 2 1 1 
12 0 0 0 0 0 
13 22 7 15 8 7 
14 6 0 6 2 4 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
Third 
Cause  
1 1 0 1 0 1 
2 3 1 2 1 1 
3 1 0 1 0 0 
4 3 2 1 0 1 
5 4 0 4 1 3 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 5 2 3 0 3 
8 3 1 2 0 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 1 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 0 1 0 1 
14 1 1 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals N/A 1582 413 1169 602 565 
Probabilities N/A 1.00 0.26 0.74 0.38 0.36 
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From Table A.1, according to the TIES data (Bapat et. al., 2014), there are 1582 cases, with 
413 of them ending up with the status quo (no threats or imposition of sanctions); however, states 
threatened economic sanctions in 1169 cases. From this number, sender states backed down in 602 
cases and imposed sanctions in 565 cases (note that this data set does not give any information on 
2 cases where sanctions were threatened, escalated to imposition or backed down; these cases were 
ignored for simplicity). Note that cases sanctions were imposed without threatening at the first 
stage were not considered in this analysis. 
Given this distribution, the probability of a state choosing status quo is 26% because 
413/1582 = 0.261; whereas the probability of a state choosing backing down given sanctions 
were threatened 38% because 602/1582 = 0.380 , and the probability of a state imposing 
economic sanctions given that sanctions were threatened is 36% because 565/1582 = 0.357. An 
updated CDF diagram with probability scores was presented in Figure A.3.  
 
 
Figure A.3: Updated CDF diagram for the game model without opposition 
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Considering the game with no opposition power for sanctions is related to the 
political goals category and the normal probability distribution with given probabilities 
above, Government chooses the strategy of imposing economic sanctions when  
-a < u1     (1.1) 
This result is obtained from the extensive form of the first game (model 1) in Figure A1. 
 Similarly, from model 1 in Figure A1, S2 concedes only when: 
Let x be type of S1 which is indifferent between escalating the crisis (threatening sanctions) 
and deescalating the crisis (accepting the status quo, SQ). Let y be the type of S1, which is 
indifferent between escalating the crisis to the second level (imposing sanctions, IS) and de-
escalating the crisis from the second level (backing down, BD) that ends the game. Thus: 
0 ≥ 1 (
𝐹(𝑦) − 𝐹(𝑥)
1 − 𝐹(𝑥)




If S1 threatens economic sanctions to S2, S2 gets a payoff of 0 if it obeys, and u2 if it 
challenges given that the sanctions are imposed after threatening. Using the probabilities calculated 
by Bayesian updating beliefs in the game tree, the results are:  
(1) ∗ (
(0.26 + 0.38) − 0.26
1 − 0.26
) + (𝑢2) ∗ (
1 − (0.26 + 0.38)
1 − 0.26
) 
= (1) ∗ (
0.38
0.74
) + (𝑢2) ∗ (
0.36
0.74
) = 0.513 + (𝑢2) ∗ 0.486 > 0 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑢2 > −1.06                (1.2) 
Therefore, 
 S2 challenges only when 𝑢2 > −1.06 in the game with no domestic opposition. S1 also 
knows that S2 challenges only if 𝑢2 > −1.06. If S1 believes that 𝑢2 is small (𝑢2 < -1.06), 
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then S1 will always impose economic sanctions (no matter what u1 is equal to) because it 
knows S2 will obey.  
 If S1 believes that u2 is high enough (u2 > -1.06), S1 will impose economic sanctions only 
if u1 > -a. 
 Combining the obtained results from 1.1 and 1.2 above, we get the payoffs of u1 > -a for 
sender state (S1), and u2 > -1.06 for target state (S2). 
 
Second Model: The Model with Opposition in S1  
Given the payoffs from the extensive form of the game in Model 2 in Figure A1, if 
government plays status quo, the opposition party supports the government only when  
𝑞𝑢1 > 0    =>    u1 > 0   (2.1) 
Government imposes economic sanctions when opposition supports the policy of economic 
sanctions only if 
- (1-q) a < (1-q) u1   =>   -a < u1  (2.2) 
Thus, government chooses to impose when opposition is against the policy of imposition 
of economic sanctions only if (-a < u1). As a result, the opposition party has no effect when the 
government plays the strategy of imposing sanctions given that economic sanctions were 
threatened at the first place. 
So, the question becomes when does opposition support or not support the sanction policy? 
For this, we need to have an idea about the cut-point location of opposition’s strategies in the CDF 
distribution. Again, the only way that this can be calculated is through the use of Bayesian 
probabilities of strategies.  
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The opposition party typically has more information about government’s strategies on its 
implementation of economic sanctions policy than the target state, S2. Therefore, the strategies 
applied by the opposition will show the level of political agreement in sender state. Moreover, S2 
expects that when S1 threatens economic sanctions, it will be highly probable that government will 
impose these sanctions, if S2 does not obey.  
Having said that, the opposition party should only support the policy if economic sanctions 
have the potential to escalate from the threat stage to the imposition stage. As a result, the cut-
point (k) for opposition’s strategies, whether to support or does not support the sanctions policy, 
should be somewhere between y and p in as shown Figure A3. From the hypothetical CDF diagram 
in Figure A3, (a) the lowest value of k, the cut-point for opposition’s strategies, should be y, so 
any probability lower than this value, opposition can be expected to choose not to support. 
Similarly, (b) the highest value of k should be z. Any probability value higher than this value, 
opposition can be expected to choose to support the sanction. For simplicity, this study assumes 
the value for k is in the middle of y and z. Consequently, the cut-point (k) location in CDF diagram 
can be illustrated for opposition’s decision representing these two situations as: 
𝑘 =
(𝑦 + 𝑧 )
2
 
Assuming normal probability distribution and after introducing the cut-point for domestic 
opposition, updated CDF values for the model with opposition in sender state can be as shown 
after conditional probabilities were calculated from Table A.1 and plugged into the CDF diagram 




Figure A.4: Updated CDF diagram for the game model with opposition party 
 
Now, Bayesian probabilities of S1’s actions conditional on the opposition party’s choices 
can be calculated with the updated CDF diagram. Given the cumulative probability that results 
from the table above, probability of a state with a domestic opposition choosing the strategy of 
status quo for a political dispute is 0.26, the probability of choosing the strategy of backing down 
of a state with domestic opposition given sanctions were threatened is 0.38, and the probability of 
choosing the strategy of imposing sanctions of a state with domestic opposition given sanctions 
were threatened is 0.36. The probability of an opposition party choosing the strategy of supporting 
government’s sanction policy is 0.18. Given these probability values of players’ strategies, 
cumulative distribution frequency values become as follows: 
𝐹(𝑥) = 0.26 
𝐹(𝑦) = 0.26 + 0.38 = 0.64 
𝐹(𝑘) = 0.26 + 0.38 + 0.18 = 0.82 
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(1) Probabilities when opposition supports 
Probability of a government (Gov) backing down (BD) when opposition (Op) supports 
(SP): 


















0 + (1 − 𝐹(𝑦)) ∗ (1 − 𝐹(𝑘))
= 0 
Probability of government imposes sanctions when opposition supports: 
 




























These two results indicate that government does not back down when opposition supports, 
and government always imposes sanctions when opposition supports the economic sanctions 
policy. Then, S2 faces payoffs of 0, if it obeys and a combination of 1 and u2 if it challenges, where  
𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝐷|𝑂𝑝 𝑆𝑃) ∗ (1) +  𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑆 | 𝑂𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑃) ∗ (𝑢2) 
Now comparing payoffs of challenge and obey, we get: 
0*(1) + 1*(u2) > 0, then u2 > 0 
Therefore, S2 can be expected to challenge the sanctions only if  
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u2 > 0.    (2.3) 
Combining the obtained results from 2.2 and 2.3 above, we get the payoffs of u1 > -a for 
sender state government (S1), and u2 > 0 for target state (S2). 
(2) Probabilities when opposition does not support 
Probability of a government (Gov) backing down (BD) when opposition (Op) does not 
support sanctions (no support NS): 
 
























) = 0.68 
Probability of government imposes sanctions when opposition does not support sanctions: 






























Then, S2 faces payoffs of 0, if it obeys and a combination of 1 and u2 given Bayesian 
probabilities if it challenges. Comparing the two, then we get: 
0.68 * (1) + 0.32 * (u2) > 0     =>     u2 > -2.2 (2.4) 
Therefore, S2 will challenge only if u2 > -2.2. 
The results obtained in (2.3) and (2.4) show that S1 knows that S2 challenges when 
u2 > 0   and  u2 > -2.2 
  Opposition supports sanctions only if u2 > 0 and Opposition does not support economic 
sanctions only if u2 > -2.2. As a result, if S1 believes that u2 is really small (u2< -2.2), S1 can be 
expected to impose economic sanctions (no matter what u1 is equal to) because it recognizes that 
S2 will choose to play the strategy of Obeying the demands put forward by S1. Now, consider the 
situation where  
-2.2 < u2 < 0 
 If S1 believes that -2.2 < w2 < 0, S1 will impose economic sanctions only if  
u1 > -a 
Combining (2.2) and (2.4), we get the payoffs of u1 > -a for sender state (S1), and u2>-2.2 





LEVEL OF POLITICAL AGREEMENT VARIABLES SCORES 
This study uses level of political agreement (LPA) variables as the primary independent 
variable. There are four different types of LPA variable. The fourth LPA variable type, the 
aggregated LPA (LPA4), is calculated based on the sender state’s level of political agreement 
(LPA1), the target state’s level of political agreement (LPA2), and the international level of political 
agreement (LPA3). This study assumed that the LPA variable had a three-dimensional structure, 
comprised of the LPA1, LPA2, and LPA3 variables. Two researchers reviewed each sanction 
episode in terms of these dimensions, the first three LPA variables, and assessed a score between 
-2 and 2. Their assessment scores were mostly based on the questions below for each sanction 
episode:  
1. Are there retaliatory sanctions threatened or imposed against the sender state? 
2. Is there any actor in the target state welcoming the sanctions threat/imposition? 
3. Do other actors in the target state blame the target state’s ruler/government for the 
threat/imposition of sanctions? 
4. Are there any protest movements by social factions for or against the economic sanctions 
in the sender and/or target state? 
5. Can the target state’s leader/ruler/government use the “rally round the flag” effect? 
6. Are there any statements made by actors that can escalate or deescalate the conflict? 
7. Is there a significant change in public support for the leader(s)? 
8. Does the other country (or countries) in the sanction coalition implicitly follow along with 
the implementation of the economic sanctions? 
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9. Is there any country, or group of countries, acting against the sender state or sanctioning 
coalition? 
10. Are there any countries supporting or opposing the sanctioning coalition indirectly? 
11. Is the sending government dedicated in its economic sanction policy? 
12. Is the cause for economic sanction imposition related to security or non-security issues? 
13. Did any bureaucrats make a statement for or against the economic sanctioning regime? 
14. Do other veto players of decision-making mechanisms support or oppose the government’s 
sanction policy? 
15. Are there retaliatory sanctions threatened or imposed by the state? 
16. Is there any actor(s) in the target state welcoming the sanctions threat and imposition? 
17. Do other actors blame the target government for the threat and imposition of the sanctions? 
18. Can the government of the target state use the “rally round the flag” effect? 
19. Is there a significant change in public support for the leader(s)? 
When researchers analyzed each economic sanction episode, they considered the main 
actors in sender and target state dyads. A score from -2 to 2 was assigned for the main actors in 
these dyads. Table B.1 presents the average scores for actor(s) used when calculating the level of 
the political agreement variable’s final score for the sender state (LPA1). Table B.2 presents score 
averages for actor(s) used when calculating the level of the political agreement variable’s final 











Score meanings for LPA1 variable 
Level of Political Agreement in Sender State (LPA1)  
2 Strongly supporting sanctions policy 
1 Supporting sanctions policy 
0 Impartial to sanctions policy or not supporting as one might expect 
-1 Against sanctions policy 
-2 Strongly against sanctions policy 
 
Table B.2 
Score meanings for LPA2 variable 
Level of Political Agreement in Target State (LPA2) 
2 Strongly supporting sanctions policy of the target (strongly against sender’s sanction policy) 
1 Supporting sanctions policy of the target (against sender’s sanction policy) 
0 Impartial to sanctions policy of the target (impartial against sender’s sanction policy) 
-1 Against sanctions policy of the target (supporting sender’s sanction policy) 
-2 Strongly against sanctions policy of the target (strongly supporting sender’s sanction policy) 
 
In democracies, there are at least two main actors who are influential on economic sanction 
episodes. In parliamentary systems, there is at least the government and the main opposition party. 
For presidential systems, such as in the United States, the two main actors are the president and 
Congress. In addition, there may be third actors in addition, such as social factions, lobbyists, high-
level bureaucrats, etc. However, only up to three main actors have been selected per sanction 
episode.  
For other more restrictive forms of government, however, there is usually a single actor 
(consisting of the ruler or leader) who maintains influence on economic sanctions.  Sometimes, 
however, entities such as opposition groups, social factions, and similar organizations may also be 
seen supporting or opposing economic sanctions. This study has also, therefore, considered these 
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situations in its assessment for non-democracies. After a score was assigned to each actor, the 
mean score was calculated. The average score of both researchers was then calculated for both of 
the sender and target states’ final LPA scores.  
Researchers assigned a score, from -2 to 2, for the international level of political agreement 
variable based on their assessment of the international influence on the economic sanction episode 
in question. Usually, coalitional sanctions have been considered when assessing the international 
level of political agreement variable. If there is no international support or opposition, this study 
assumed that the international system is neutral toward the economic sanctions episode. Table B.3 
presents the score definitions used when calculating the final score for the international level of 
political agreement variable (LPA3).  
Table B.3 
Score meanings for LPA3 variable 
International Level of Political Agreement (LPA3) 
2 strongly supporting sanctions policy of the sender state 
1 supporting sanctions policy of the sender state 
0 impartial to sanctions policy of the sender state 
-1 Against sanctions policy of the target (supporting sender’s sanction policy) 
-2 Strongly against sanctions policy of the sender state 
 
LPA score calculation procedure with a hypothetical situation 
Let’s assume a situation where a sender state (S1) has a consolidated democracy with a 
presidential system and is contemplating imposing economic sanctions against another state which 
has a government with no opposition. The target state is acting against international security and 
in the interests of the sender state simultaneously. As a result, the president seeks to discourage 
the sender state’s aggressive behaviors (assuming the second actor in this state is Congress, and it 
also supports the president’s economic sanction policy). In addition, some advocacy groups also 
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support the president. After observing these developments, some countries in the international 
system also support the sender state’s sanction policy. On the target side, however, the government 
generally exploits the situation by pursuing “rally round the flag” policies. Therefore, the target 
state government also receives some support for its retaliatory measures against the sender state’s 
sanction policy.  
Table B.4 illustrates the calculation procedure for LPA1 and LPA2 variables, Table B.5 
illustrates the calculation procedure for LPA3 variable in this study. Table B.6 illustrates the 
calculation procedure for the LPA4 variable. When calculating LPA1, a score of 2 was assigned for 
the president, a score of 1 for the Congress, and a score of 2 for public support. When calculating 
LPA2, a score of 2 was given for the government of the target state and a score of 1 for public 
support of their retaliatory sanctions policy. After considering the international reaction to the 
sanction episode, a score of 1 was assigned for the international level of political agreement. These 
assigned scores, called raw scores. Total score (TS) is the summation of raw scores. Mean score 
(MS) is the average of total score. Finally, regression score (RS) is obtained when a score of two 
(2) added to the mean score. 
Table B.4 
Calculating LPA1 and LPA2 variables  
Calculating Level of Political Agreement in Sender and Target State (LPA1,2) Score: 
  LPA1 LPA2 
a. Raw score for the government (a score from -2 to 2): 2 2 
b. Raw score for the main opposition party (a score from -2 to 2): 1 n/a 
c. Raw score for the other actor, if any (a score from -2 to 2): 2 1 
d. Total Score, TS (summation of above, this score can be between -6 and 6): 5 3 
e. Mean Score, MS (mean of TS, resulting score is always between -2 and 2): 1.67 1.5 




Calculating LPA3 variable 
Calculating International Level of Political Agreement (LPA3) Score: 
 LPA3 
a. Raw score for international level of political agreement (a score from -2 to 2): 1 
b. Total Score, TS (same with raw score, this score can be between -2 and 2): 1 
c. Mean Score, MS (same with raw and total score, this score is always between -2 and 2): 1 
d. Regression Score, RS = MS+2 (always positive, a score from 0 to 4): 3 
 
Table B.6 
Calculating LPA4 variable 
Calculating Aggregated Level of Political Agreement (LPA4) Score 
Section 1 
a. LPA4 calculation formula: (LPA1 – LPA2) + (LPA3) 
b. Total Score (raw scores are obtained from LPA1,2,3) (1.67 - 1.5) + 1 = 1.17 
c. Mean Score of left and right sides shown in the formula above (resulting 
score is always between -2 and 2) 
1.17 / 3 = 0.39 
d. Regression Score, RS = MS+2 (always positive, a score from 0 to 4): 2.39 
Section 2 
a. LPA4 calculation formula if LPA3 score was not present (LPA3=0): LPA1 – LPA2 
b. Total Score (raw scores are obtained from total scores of LPA1,2) 1.67-1.5=0.17 
c. Mean Score of TS (note that denominator is 2, rather than 3) 0.17/2= 0.085 




Since there are multiple researchers assessing the LPA variables, the final score for each 
LPA variable became the average score of the two researchers. This is also explained in more 
detail in the case studies section (see Chapter 5) of this dissertation.  
Some notes on the dependent variable (HSE success equivalence score) 
Although sanction effectiveness scores are based on the final outcome scores obtained from 
the TIES dataset, sometimes a limited number of sanction episodes are presented without a final 
outcome score. For these cases, this study examined the HSE dataset’s success scores. If the cases 
matched exactly, then this study utilized the HSE dataset’s score after converting them into 
sanction effectiveness scores as seen in Table B.7. 
 
Table B.7 
TIES final outcome - HSE success score equivalence 
HSE success score and sanction effectiveness score    
HSE Dataset Sanctions Success Score =  
Policy Result X Sanction Contribution 
(Possible scores are 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and 16) 
1x1=1 1x2=2 1x3=3 1x4=4 
2x1=2 2x2=4 2x3=6 2x4=8 
3x1=3 3x2=6 3x3=9 3x4=12 
4x1=4 4x2=8 4x3=12 4x4=16 
HSE success score 1 2,3 4,6 8,9 12,16 
























































































































LPA1 0.76 * - - - - - - 
Strong 
LPA2 - - -0.94 *** - - - - 
LPA3 - - - - 0.57 ***   
LPA4 - - - - - - 1.74 *** 
Sender  
Cost  
0.14 n/a 0.15 n/a 0.10 n/a 0.007 n/a N/A 
Target  
Cost  
0.30 ** 0.30 ** 0.23 * 0.27 * Strong 
Signaling   0.15 n/a 0.09 n/a 0.15 n/a 0.08 n/a N/A 
Alliance 
Scale  
-0.17 n/a -0.27 n/a -0.11 n/a -0.29 * Weak 
Collaboration 
Scale  
0.03 n/a 0.08 n/a -0.14 n/a -0.12 * Weak 
The US 
Involvement  
-0.24 * -0.16 n/a -0.21 n/a -0.15 n/a Weak 
Relative 
Power  
0.18 *** 0.07 n/a 0.16 *** 0.12 ** Moderate 
Inducements  -0.23 n/a -0.17 n/a -0.39 n/a -0.09 n/a N/A 
Sender 
Regime Type  
0.05 ** 0.07 *** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** Strong 
Target 
Regime Type  
0.04 ** 0.03 * 0.03 ** 0.04 *** Strong 
Sanction 
Bluntness  
-0.03 n/a -0.009 n/a -0.04 n/a 0.01 n/a N/A 
LR Chi-
Squared, χ2  
31.7 44.5 35.7 50.4 125 
Observations 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.13 
Strong Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 4 models; 
Moderate Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 2 or 3 models; 
Weak Marginal Effects: a variable is significant in 1 model; 





Summary of Probit Regression Results (Binary Dependent Variable) 













LPA4 - - - 
1.36 
(0.48)*** 



































































































Observations 125 125 125 125 
LR Chi-Squared, χ2  21.6 27.0 21.1 28.2 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.18 
Standard errors in parenthesis 








LIST OF THE CASES 
There are 125 cases used in this study. These cases were matched between the HSE and 
TIES datasets. Then, matched cases were combined with LPA data. This is illustrated in the coding 
of each case (see Table D.1). Case identification system helps in locating each case with its TIES 
and HSE equivalent as well as other relevant information. There are four other lists presented in 
following pages to show the matched cases and LPA scores. Table D.2 presents the list of all cases 
used in this study for regression analyses and case studies. Table D.3 presents level of political 
agreement in sender state (LPA1) scores; Table D.4 presents level of political agreement in target 
state (LPA2) scores; Table D.5 presents the international level of political agreement (LPA3) 
scores; and Table D.6 presents aggregated level of political agreement (LPA4) scores. 
Table D.1 
Case coding system for each case used in this study 
 
Case Identification Number Explanation 
1) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
There are 22 characters that show the identification for 
each case used in this study. 
2) A BBB CCCCC DD EEEEEEEEEE 
Each identification system includes five different types of 
information as illustrated A, B, C, D, and E. 
3) 1XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
The first character means the version of LPA data created 
by the two researchers. Thus, all case identification 
numbers start with the number of one (1) in this study. 
4) X123XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
The next three characters show the order of a case used in 
this study. For example, “006” means the sixth case in the 
order of all other cases used in this study. 
5) XXXX12345XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
The next five characters show HSE case code numbers. 





Case Identification Number Explanation 
6) XXXXXXXXXX12XXXXXXXXXX 
The next two characters show the number of matches 
between HSE and TIES datasets. For example, 11 means 
there is one TIES case matched with the HSE case. In 
addition, 21 means that a case from HSE dataset was 
matched with two cases from TIES dataset, and it is the 
first of the two matches. Similarly, 22 means the second 
of the two matches. So, the first digit designates the 
number of the matches, and the second digit designates the 
order of the matches for a specific case used in this study. 
7) XXXXXXXXXXXX1234567891 
The next ten characters indicate the TIES dataset 
identification code. The first four characters designates the 
start year, fifth and sixth characters designates the start 
month, the seventh and eighth characters designated the 
start day of a case. Ninth and tenth characters designates 
the order for a case when there are more than one sanction 
episode at same date. For example, “1948070301” means 
that a specific sanction started on July 3rd, 1948, and it is 





This is an case identification number (CIN) for a case used 
in this study. It means (a) first version data used; (b) it is 
the 6th case in this study, see in Table D2; (c) HSE dataset 
case number is 48-4; (d) there are two cases matched from 
TIES dataset, and it is the second of them. The matched 













1) Arab League v. Israel 100104601001991042301 
2) US, Australia, Colombia, Syria v. Netherlands1 100204801001948122101 
3) USSR v. UK 100304803211948032502 
4) USSR v. US 100404803221948032501 
5) USSR v. Yugoslavia 100504804211948070102 
6) USSR v. Yugoslavia 100604804221948070301 
7) US, China Committee (ChinCom) v. China 100704901001950062901 
8) US, UN v. North Korea 100805001411950062501 
9) US, UK v. Iran 100905101001951062201 
10) USSR v. Australia 101005401001954042401 
11) India v. Portugal 101105402001953020301 
12) US v. North Vietnam 101205404001975043001 
13) US v. Israel 101305601311956103001 
14) US v. Israel 101405601321981061101 
15) US v. Israel 101505601331982062301 
16) UK, US, France v. Egypt 101605602001956072901 
17) US v. UK 101705603001956103102 
18) US v. Laos 101805604001962010501 
19) Indonesia v. Netherlands 101905701001957120301 
20) France v. Tunisia 102005702001957052301 
21) USSR v. Finland 102105801001958109901 
22) Venezuela, US v. Dom. Republic 102206001001960070101 
23) USSR v. China 102306002001960079901 
24) US, UK, and others v. Cuba2 102406003001959061101 
25) US v. Ceylon 102506101001962070701 
26) USSR v. Albania 102606102001960039901 
27) US v. Brazil 102706201001962022801 
28) UN v. South Africa 102806202001960032701 
29) US v. Egypt 102906301211963049901 
30) US v. Egypt 103006301221964122801 
31) US v. Indonesia 103106304001963089901 
32) US v. South Vietnam 103206304001963091201 
33) UN, OAU v. Portugal 103306305001962081101 
34) US v. India 103406502001965063101 
35) UK, UN v. Rhodesia 103506503001965111101 
36) Czechoslovakia v. Nigeria3 103606701001968050201 
37) US v. Peru 103706801001967100301 
38) US v. Peru 103806802001968100901 
39) US v. India4 103907101001971120101  
40) UK, US, and others v. Uganda 104007201001972080701 
41) S. Arabia (Arab League) v. US 104107301211972999901 










43) US v. South Korea 104307302001977090801 
44) US v. Turkey (i.e., First Case Study)  104407401001974091901 
45) US, Canada  v. India6 104507402001974051801 
46) US, Canada v. Pakistan7 104607403001974119901 
47) US, Canada v. S. Korea (i.e., Second Case St.) 104707501001975069901 
48) US v. USSR 104807502001972092201 
49) US v. South Africa 104907503001977122001 
50) US v. Chile 105007505001973100201 
51) US v. Uruguay 105107601001977022407 
52) US v. Taiwan 105207602001976019901 
53) US v. Paraguay 105307701001977022406 
54) US v. Guatemala 105407702211977022401 
55) US v. Guatemala 105507702221983111201 
56) US v. Argentina 105607703001977022403 
57) Canada v. European Economic Community8 105707704001977010101 
58) Canada v. Japan9 105807704001977010102 
59) US v. Nicaragua 105907705001977022402 
60) US v. El Salvador 106007706001977022405 
61) US v. Brazil (i.e., Third Case Study) 106107707001977022404 
62) US v. Ethiopia 106207708001977031201 
63) China v. Albania 106307801001977070801 
64) US v. India 106407804001978020701 
65) US v. USSR 106507805001978071801 
66) Arab League v. Egypt 106607806001978092401 
67) China v. Vietnam 106707807001978051201 
68) US and others v. Libya10 106807808001977050801 
69) US v. Iran 106907901001979111201 
70) US v. Pakistan 107007902221998051002 
71) Arab League v. Canada 107107903001979060701 
72) US v. Bolivia 107207904001979110201 
73) US v. USSR 107308001211980010401 
74) US v. Iraq 107408002001984073101 
75) US v. Nicaragua 107508101001981040101 
76) US and others v. Poland11 107608102001980121202 
77) US and others v. Russia12 107708103221980121201 
78) European Community (Germany) v. Turkey 107808104001981129901 
79) UK v. Argentina 107908201001982040301 
80) Australia v. France 108008301001995061401 
81) US v. Zimbabwe 108108303211983121901 
82) US v. Zimbabwe 108208303221986071001 
83) US v. Romania 108308305001985110101 
84) US v. Iran 108408401001984012301 
85) US v. Lebanon 108508402001995020801 
86) US v. Syria 108608601211986010901 
87) US v. Panama 108708701001987080701 










88) India, New Zealand, and Australia v. Fiji 108808704211987052401 
89) India, New Zealand, and Australia v. Fiji 108908704222000051901 
90) India v. Nepal 109008901001989030101 
91) US and others  v. China13 109108902001989060601 
92) Azerbaijan, Turkey v. Armenia 109208904001991043004 
93) US, UN v. Iraq 109309001311990080202 
94) US, UN v. Iraq 109409001321992031001 
95) US, UN v. Iraq 109509001331990080201 
96) USSR v. Lithuania 109609005001990040901 
97) US v. Jordan14 109709006001990081301 
98) US and others v. Yugoslavia 109809101311991062501 
99) US and others v. Yugoslavia 109909101321996052301 
100) US and others v. Yugoslavia 110009101331998032501 
101) US v. China 110109102211996022101 
102) US v. China 110203102222001012201 
103) US v. Indonesia15 110309104001992062601 
104) US and others v. Haiti 110409105001991100101 
105) US v. USSR (Russia)16 110509106001990050101 
106) US v. Peru 110609108411992040701 
107) US v. Peru 110709108421993092701 
108) US v. Peru 110809108431994021201 
109) US v. Peru 110909108441995020303 
110) US, UN, ECOWAS and others v. Liberia 111009201002000080102 
111) US and others v. Togo17 111109202001992011201 
112) US v. Azerbaijan 111209207001992061101 
113) Russia v. Estonia 111309209001992071701 
114) US v. Libya18 111409212211992053001 
115) US v. Libya19 111509212221995072501 
116) Russia v. Latvia 111609213001990050501 
117) US v. North Korea20 111709301322001020101 
118) US v. North Korea21 111809301331991052001 
119) US, European Union v. Guatemala 111909302001993052501 
120) Germany v. Turkey22 112009502001994032101 
121) East African members of OAU v. Brundi 112109601001996080101 
122) US v. Colombia 112209604001995020301 
123) US v. India 112309801001998051001 
124) Turkey v. Italy 112409803001998111701 
125) UN v. Afghanistan 112509901001997052201 
 
Some Notes on the Case List from Table D2: 
1The HSE dataset assumed this sanction episode as a unilateral case between the U.S. and the 
Netherlands. The TIES dataset assumed it as a multilateral case. When there is a discrepancy 
between HSE and TIES datasets in terms the formation of sender state(s) and/or target state(s), 




2According to the HSE dataset, this is a unilateral sanction case where the only sender was the 
United States. According to TIES dataset, this is a multilateral case. 
 
3For HSE dataset, this is a unilateral sanction case where the sender is Nigeria and the target is 
Biafra. For this case, this study used TIES sanction episode where the sender was Czechoslovakia 
and the target was Nigeria. Although there was no exact match for the HSE dataset case in TIES 
dataset, the HSE dataset still provided information about Czechoslovakia as a sender state against 
Nigeria and Biafra, which was formerly a part of Nigeria itself. 
 
4HSE dataset assumed that there were two targets (India and Pakistan) for this sanction case, 
conversely TIES dataset assumed that there were only one target (India). 
 
5The HSE dataset assumed that there were two targets (the U.S. and the Netherlands) for this 
episode, TIES assumed that there were only one, the Netherlands. 
 
6The HSE dataset assumed that there was one sender, Canada; the TIES dataset assumed that there 
were two senders the U.S. and Canada for this sanction episode. 
 
7The HSE dataset assumed that there were only one sender (Canada), the TIES dataset assumed 
that there were two senders US and Canada for this sanction episode. 
 
8The HSE dataset assumed that there were two target states (Japan and European Economic 
Community [ECC]), the TIES dataset assumed that there was one target, which was EEC. 
 
9The HSE dataset provided two targets (Japan and EEC), TIES provided that there is one target, 
Japan, for this specific case. 
 
10This is a unilateral sanction case for the HSE dataset where the sender is the U.S., the TIES 
dataset assumed this case as a multilateral episode where sender states included the U.S., the U.K., 
Canada, France, and Italy. 
 
11There is only one sender (the U.S.) for this episode provided by the HSE dataset. TIES dataset 
assumed that it is a multilateral case where sender states are the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, 
and Belgium. 
 
12There is only one sender (U.S.) for this episode for the HSE dataset. TIES dataset assumes that 
it is a multilateral case including countries such as U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Belgium as 
senders. 
 
13There is only one sender (U.S.) for this episode according to the HSE dataset. The TIES dataset 
assumed that it is a multilateral case where sender states are the U.S., the U.K., Japan, France, and 
German Federal Republic. 
 
14According to the HSE dataset, this sanction case is a multilateral episode where senders are 
comprised of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and target states are Jordan and Yemen. According to the 




15There are two senders (U.S. and Netherlands) for this episode according to the HSE dataset. The 
TIES dataset assumed that it as a unilateral sanction case where the dyad is comprised of the U.S. 
as the sender state and Indonesia as the target state. 
 
16According to the HSE dataset, there are two sender states which are the U.S. and the European 
Community for this sanction episode. Conversely, the TIES dataset provided one sender state, the 
U.S., for this case. 
 
17Although the HSE dataset provided information about the U.S. as one of the sender states, the 
dataset assumed European Union member states under France and Germany leadership as senders 
for sanction episode. The TIES dataset included U.S. together with other European states as a 
coalition of sender states for this sanction case. 
 
18The HSE dataset provided information that the sanction was imposed by the U.N. under the U.S. 
influence against Libya. The TIES dataset assumed that it is a unilateral sanction episode where 
the dyad is comprised of the U.S. as the sole sender state and Libya as the target state. 
 
19The HSE dataset assumed that sanction was imposed by the U.N. against Libya. The TIES dataset 
provided information that there is one sender, the U.S., and one target, Libya for this sanction case. 
 
20The HSE dataset assumed that sanction was imposed by the U.N. as the main sender. The TIES 
dataset assumed that this is a unilateral sanction where the dyad is comprised of the U.S. and North 
Korea. 
 
21The HSE dataset accepted sender as the U.N. for this sanction episode. The TIES dataset 
acknowledged the case as a unilateral where the U.S. is the only sender state. 
 
22 For this sanction episode, The HSE dataset assumed that the sanctions sender is the European 
Union in general. The TIES dataset assumed that it is a unilateral sanction episode where Germany 
is the sender state and Turkey is the target state. 
 





List of Level of Political Agreement in Sender State (LPA1) 

























































































































1) 100104601001991042301 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
2) 100204801001948122101 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
3) 100304803211948032502 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
4) 100404803221948032501 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
5) 100504804211948070102 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
6) 100604804221948070301 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
7) 100704901001950062901 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
8) 100805001411950062501 1 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
9) 100905101001951062201 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
10) 101005401001954042401 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
11) 101105402001953020301 4 1 1 n/a 3.00 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.00 
12) 101205404001975043001 3 2 1 1 3.33 2 1 1 3.33 3.33 
13) 101305601311956103001 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
14) 101405601321981061101 0 2 1 0 3.00 2 1 0 3.50 3.25 
15) 101505601331982062301 3 2 1 -1 2.67 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.08 
16) 101605602001956072901 3 2 1 1 3.33 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.41 
17) 101705603001956103102 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 1 0 3.50 3.75 
18) 101805604001962010501 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
19) 101905701001957120301 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
20) 102005702001957052301 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
21) 102105801001958109901 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
22) 102206001001960070101 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 1 1 3.33 3.65 
23) 102306002001960079901 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
24) 102406003001959061101 2 2 2 1 3.67 2 2 1 3.67 3.67 
25) 102506101001962070701 3 1 1 n/a 3.00 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.00 
26) 102606102001960039901 1 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
27) 102706201001962022801 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
28) 102806202001960032701 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
29) 102906301211963049901 0 2. 1 1 3.33 2 2 1 3.67 3.50 
30) 103006301221964122801 2 2 2 0 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
31) 103106304001963089901 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
32) 103206304001963091201 3 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
33) 103306305001962081101 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
34) 103406502001965063101 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 





























































































































35) 103506503001965111101 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
36) 103606701001968050201 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
37) 103706801001967100301 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
38) 103806802001968100901 3 2 2 1 3.67 2 2 1 3.67 3.66 
39) 103907101001971120101  1 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
40) 104007201001972080701 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
41) 104107301211972999901 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
42) 104207301221973101703 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
43) 104307302001977090801 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
44) 104407401001974091901 3 1 2 n/a 3.50 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.75 
45) 104507402001974051801 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
46) 104607403001974119901 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
47) 104707501001975069901 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
48) 104807502001972092201 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
49) 104907503001977122001 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
50) 105007505001973100201 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.75 
51) 105107601001977022407 0 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 1 3.67 3.83 
52) 105207602001976019901 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
53) 105307701001977022406 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
54) 105407702211977022401 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
55) 105507702221983111201 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
56) 105607703001977022403 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
57) 105707704001977010101 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
58) 105807704001977010102 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
59) 105907705001977022402 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
60) 106007706001977022405 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
61) 106107707001977022404 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.25 
62) 106207708001977031201 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
63) 106307801001977070801 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
64) 106407804001978020701 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
65) 106507805001978071801 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
66) 106607806001978092401 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
67) 106707807001978051201 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
68) 106807808001977050801 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
69) 106907901001979111201 3 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
70) 107007902221998051002 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
71) 107107903001979060701 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
72) 107207904001979110201 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 





























































































































73) 107308001211980010401 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
74) 107408002001984073101 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
75) 107508101001981040101 3 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.75 
76) 107608102001980121202 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
77) 107708103221980121201 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
78) 107808104001981129901 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
79) 107908201001982040301 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
80) 108008301001995061401 0 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
81) 108108303211983121901 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
82) 108208303221986071001 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
83) 108308305001985110101 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
84) 108408401001984012301 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
85) 108508402001995020801 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
86) 108608601211986010901 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
87) 108708701001987080701 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
88) 108808704211987052401 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
89) 108908704222000051901 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
90) 109008901001989030101 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
91) 109108902001989060601 0 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
92) 109208904001991043004 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
93) 109309001311990080202 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
94) 109409001321992031001 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
95) 109509001331990080201 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
96) 109609005001990040901 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
97) 109709006001990081301 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
98) 109809101311991062501 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
99) 109909101321996052301 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
100) 110009101331998032501 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 2 2 4.00 3.75 
101) 110109102211996022101 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
102) 110203102222001012201 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
103) 110309101001992062601 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
104) 110409105001991100101 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
105) 110509106001990050101 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
106) 110609108411992040701 2 1 2 n/a 3.50 1 2 n/a 3.50 3.50 
107) 110709108421993092701 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
108) 110809108431994021201 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
109) 110909108441995020303 0 1 2 n/a 3.50 1 2 n/a 3.50 3.50 
110) 111009201002000080102 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 





























































































































111) 111109202001992011201 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
112) 111209207001992061101 2 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
113) 111309209001992071701 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
114) 111409212211992053001 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
115) 111509212221995072501 0 1 2 n/a 3.50 1 2 n/a 3.50 3.50 
116) 111609213001990050501 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
117) 111709301322001020101 1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
118) 111809301331991052001 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
119) 111909302001993052501 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
120) 112009502001994032101 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 1 2 n/a 3.50 3.50 
121) 112109601001996080101 2 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
122) 112209604001995020301 4 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
123) 112309801001998051001 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
124) 112409803001998111701 1 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
125) 112509901001997052201 2 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
 






List of Level of Political Agreement in Target State (LPA2) Scores 


























































































































1) 100104601001991042301 1 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
2) 100204801001948122101 4 2 1 0 3.00 2 1 0 3.00 3.00 
3) 100304803211948032502 0 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
4) 100404803221948032501 0 2 2 2 4.00 2 2 2 4.00 4.00 
5) 100504804211948070102 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
6) 100604804221948070301 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
7) 100704901001950062901 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.75 
8) 100805001411950062501 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
9) 100905101001951062201 3 2 0 -1 2.33 2 1 n/a 3.50 2.91 
10) 101005401001954042401 0 2 -2 n/a 2.00 2 -1 n/a 2.50 2.25 
11) 101105402001953020301 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
12) 101205404001975043001 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
13) 101305601311956103001 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.75 
14) 101405601321981061101 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.75 
15) 101505601331982062301 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
16) 101605602001956072901 3 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.75 
17) 101705603001956103102 4 1 -1 1 2.33 2 1 0 3.00 2.66 
18) 101805604001962010501 4 1 -2 n/a 1.50 1 -2 n/a 1.50 1.50 
19) 101905701001957120301 4 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.75 
20) 102005702001957052301 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
21) 102105801001958109901 4 1 -2 n/a 1.50 1 -1 n/a 2.00 1.75 
22) 102206001001960070101 4 2 n/a -1 2.50 2 n/a -1 2.50 2.50 
23) 102306002001960079901 0 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.50 
24) 102406003001959061101 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
25) 102506101001962070701 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.75 
26) 102606102001960039901 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.50 
27) 102706201001962022801 2 1 1 n/a 3.00 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.00 
28) 102806202001960032701 4 2 0 -1 2.33 2 1 0 3.00 2.66 
29) 102906301211963049901 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.75 
30) 103006301221964122801 2 1 n/a n/a 2.50 1 n/a n/a 2.50 2.50 
31) 103106304001963089901 4 1 n/a n/a 2.50 1 n/a n/a 2.50 2.50 
32) 103206304001963091201 3 2 n/a 0 3.00 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.00 
33) 103306305001962081101 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
34) 103406502001965063101 4 1 1 n/a 3.00 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.00 






























































































































35) 103506503001965111101 3 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.50 
36) 103606701001968050201 0 2 n/a 0 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
37) 103706801001967100301 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
38) 103806802001968100901 3 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.50 
39) 103907101001971120101  1 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
40) 104007201001972080701 4 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.25 
41) 104107301211972999901 2 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 1 3.33 3.41 
42) 104207301221973101703 2 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
43) 104307302001977090801 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.50 
44) 104407401001974091901 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
45) 104507402001974051801 1 1 2 n/a 3.50 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.75 
46) 104607403001974119901 0 1 2 n/a 3.50 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.75 
47) 104707501001975069901 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
48) 104807502001972092201 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
49) 104907503001977122001 4 2 1 n/a 3.50 1 1 0 3.00 3.25 
50) 105007505001973100201 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
51) 105107601001977022407 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
52) 105207602001976019901 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
53) 105307701001977022406 1 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
54) 105407702211977022401 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.00 
55) 105507702221983111201 3 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.50 
56) 105607703001977022403 3 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a 0 3.00 3.25 
57) 105707704001977010101 3 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
58) 105807704001977010102 3 2 0 n/a 3.00 2 0 n/a 3.00 3.00 
59) 105907705001977022402 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
60) 106007706001977022405 3 2 n/a 0 3.00 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.25 
61) 106107707001977022404 0 2 n/a 0 3.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.50 
62) 106207708001977031201 1 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
63) 106307801001977070801 3 1 n/a n/a 3.00 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.25 
64) 106407804001978020701 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.50 
65) 106507805001978071801 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
66) 106607806001978092401 0 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
67) 106707807001978051201 3 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
68) 106807808001977050801 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
69) 106907901001979111201 3 2 n/a 2 4.00 2 n/a 2 4.00 4.00 
70) 107007902221998051002 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
71) 107107903001979060701 4 1 1 n/a 3.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.25 
72) 107207904001979110201 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a 0 2.50 2.75 






























































































































73) 107308001211980010401 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
74) 107408002001984073101 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
75) 107508101001981040101 3 2 1 1 3.00 2 1 0 3.00 3.00 
76) 107608102001980121202 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
77) 107708103221980121201 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
78) 107808104001981129901 3 1 n/a 1 3.00 1 n/a 1 3.00 3.00 
79) 107908201001982040301 4 2 n/a 2 4.00 2 n/a 2 4.00 4.00 
80) 108008301001995061401 0 1 1 n/a 3.00 1 1 n/a 3.00 3.00 
81) 108108303211983121901 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 0 0 2.67 3.33 
82) 108208303221986071001 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
83) 108308305001985110101 3 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
84) 108408401001984012301 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
85) 108508402001995020801 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
86) 108608601211986010901 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
87) 108708701001987080701 4 2 n/a -1 2.50 2 n/a -1 2.50 2.50 
88) 108808704211987052401 3 1 n/a 1 3.00 1 n/a 1 3.00 3.00 
89) 108908704222000051901 4 2 1 1 3.33 2 1 1 3.33 3.33 
90) 109008901001989030101 4 1 1 n/a 3.00 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.25 
91) 109108902001989060601 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
92) 109208904001991043004 3 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
93) 109309001311990080202 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
94) 109409001321992031001 3 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
95) 109509001331990080201 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
96) 109609005001990040901 4 2 n/a 1 3.50 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.25 
97) 109709006001990081301 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
98) 109809101311991062501 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
99) 109909101321996052301 4 2 n/a n/a 4.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.50 
100) 110009101331998032501 4 1 n/a 0 2.50 1 n/a 1 3.00 2.75 
101) 110109102211996022101 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
102) 110203102222001012201 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
103) 110309101001992062601 2 2 n/a 0 4.00 2 n/a 1 3.50 3.75 
104) 110409105001991100101 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
105) 110509106001990050101 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
106) 110609108411992040701 2 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
107) 110709108421993092701 2 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
108) 110809108431994021201 0 2 0 n/a 3.00 1 0 n/a 2.50 2.75 
109) 110909108441995020303 0 2 2 n/a 4.00 2 2 n/a 4.00 4.00 
110) 111009201002000080102 4 2 0 n/a 3.00 2 0 n/a 3.00 3.00 






























































































































111) 111109202001992011201 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
112) 111209207001992061101 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
113) 111309209001992071701 4 1 0 n/a 2.50 1 0 n/a 2.50 2.50 
114) 111409212211992053001 2 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
115) 111509212221995072501 0 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
116) 111609213001990050501 0 2 n/a 2 4.00 2 n/a 2 4.00 4.00 
117) 111709301322001020101 1 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
118) 111809301331991052001 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
119) 111909302001993052501 4 2 1 0 3.00 1 0 n/a 2.50 2.75 
120) 112009502001994032101 0 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 2 n/a 4.00 3.75 
121) 112109601001996080101 2 2 n/a n/a 4.00 2 n/a n/a 4.00 4.00 
122) 112209604001995020301 4 1 n/a n/a 3.00 1 n/a n/a 3.00 3.00 
123) 112309801001998051001 3 2 1 n/a 3.50 2 1 n/a 3.50 3.50 
124) 112409803001998111701 1 1 2 n/a 3.50 1 2 2 3.67 3.58 
125) 112509901001997052201 2 2 n/a 1 3.50 2 n/a n/a 4.00 3.75 
 






List of International Level of Political Agreement (LPA3) Scores 











































































1) 100104601001991042301 1 2 2 4.00 
2) 100204801001948122101 4 2 2 4.00 
3) 100304803211948032502 0 0 0 2.00 
4) 100404803221948032501 0 0 0 2.00 
5) 100504804211948070102 0 1 2 3.50 
6) 100604804221948070301 0 1 2 3.50 
7) 100704901001950062901 1 2 2 4.00 
8) 100805001411950062501 1 2 2 4.00 
9) 100905101001951062201 3 1 1 3.00 
10) 101005401001954042401 0 0 0 2.00 
11) 101105402001953020301 4 0 0 2.00 
12) 101205404001975043001 3 0 0 2.00 
13) 101305601311956103001 4 0 0 2.00 
14) 101405601321981061101 0 0 0 2.00 
15) 101505601331982062301 3 2 0 3.00 
16) 101605602001956072901 3 1 1 3.00 
17) 101705603001956103102 4 0 0 2.00 
18) 101805604001962010501 4 1 1 3.00 
19) 101905701001957120301 4 0 0 2.00 
20) 102005702001957052301 0 0 0 2.00 
21) 102105801001958109901 4 0 0 2.00 
22) 102206001001960070101 4 2 2 4.00 
23) 102306002001960079901 0 0 0 2.00 
24) 102406003001959061101 2 1 1 3.00 
25) 102506101001962070701 3 0 0 2.00 
26) 102606102001960039901 1 2 2 4.00 
27) 102706201001962022801 2 0 0 2.00 
28) 102806202001960032701 4 2 2 4.00 
29) 102906301211963049901 0 0 0 2.00 
30) 103006301221964122801 2 0 0 2.00 
31) 103106304001963089901 4 2 2 4.00 
32) 103206304001963091201 3 0 0 2.00 
33) 103306305001962081101 4 2 2 4.00 
34) 103406502001965063101 4 0 0 2.00 
35) 103506503001965111101 3 2 1 3.50 















































































36) 103606701001968050201 0 1 1 3.00 
37) 103706801001967100301 0 0 0 2.00 
38) 103806802001968100901 3 0 0 2.00 
39) 103907101001971120101  1 0 0 2.00 
40) 104007201001972080701 4 2 2 4.00 
41) 104107301211972999901 2 2 2 4.00 
42) 104207301221973101703 2 2 2 4.00 
43) 104307302001977090801 0 0 0 2.00 
44) 104407401001974091901 3 0 0 2.00 
45) 104507402001974051801 1 1 1 3.00 
46) 104607403001974119901 0 1 1 3.00 
47) 104707501001975069901 4 2 2 4.00 
48) 104807502001972092201 3 0 0 2.00 
49) 104907503001977122001 4 2 2 4.00 
50) 105007505001973100201 0 0 0 2.00 
51) 105107601001977022407 0 0 0 2.00 
52) 105207602001976019901 1 0 0 2.00 
53) 105307701001977022406 1 0 0 2.00 
54) 105407702211977022401 2 0 0 2.00 
55) 105507702221983111201 3 0 0 2.00 
56) 105607703001977022403 3 0 0 2.00 
57) 105707704001977010101 3 0 0 2.00 
58) 105807704001977010102 3 0 0 2.00 
59) 105907705001977022402 2 0 0 2.00 
60) 106007706001977022405 3 0 0 2.00 
61) 106107707001977022404 0 0 0 2.00 
62) 106207708001977031201 1 0 0 2.00 
63) 106307801001977070801 3 0 0 2.00 
64) 106407804001978020701 3 0 0 2.00 
65) 106507805001978071801 3 0 0 2.00 
66) 106607806001978092401 0 1 2 3.50 
67) 106707807001978051201 3 0 0 2.00 
68) 106807808001977050801 3 2 1 3.50 
69) 106907901001979111201 3 2 2 4.00 
70) 107007902221998051002 3 2 2 4.00 
71) 107107903001979060701 4 1 1 3.00 
72) 107207904001979110201 2 0 0 2.00 
73) 107308001211980010401 1 2 2 4.00 
74) 107408002001984073101 2 0 0 2.00 
75) 107508101001981040101 3 0 0 2.00 















































































76) 107608102001980121202 2 1 2 3.50 
77) 107708103221980121201 2 1 1 3.00 
78) 107808104001981129901 3 2 2 4.00 
79) 107908201001982040301 4 2 1 3.50 
80) 108008301001995061401 0 1 1 3.00 
81) 108108303211983121901 0 0 0 2.00 
82) 108208303221986071001 0 0 0 2.00 
83) 108308305001985110101 3 0 0 2.00 
84) 108408401001984012301 2 0 0 2.00 
85) 108508402001995020801 0 0 0 2.00 
86) 108608601211986010901 2 2 2 4.00 
87) 108708701001987080701 4 0 0 2.00 
88) 108808704211987052401 3 1 1 3.00 
89) 108908704222000051901 4 1 1 3.00 
90) 109008901001989030101 4 0 0 2.00 
91) 109108902001989060601 0 2 2 4.00 
92) 109208904001991043004 3 2 1 3.50 
93) 109309001311990080202 1 2 2 4.00 
94) 109409001321992031001 3 2 2 4.00 
95) 109509001331990080201 2 2 2 4.00 
96) 109609005001990040901 4 2 1 3.50 
97) 109709006001990081301 2 0 0 2.00 
98) 109809101311991062501 4 1 1 3.00 
99) 109909101321996052301 4 1 2 3.50 
100) 110009101331998032501 4 1 1 3.00 
101) 110109102211996022101 0 0 0 2.00 
102) 110203102222001012201 1 0 0 2.00 
103) 110309101001992062601 2 0 0 2.00 
104) 110409105001991100101 4 2 2 4.00 
105) 110509106001990050101 2 0 0 2.00 
106) 110609108411992040701 2 2 1 3.50 
107) 110709108421993092701 2 0 0 2.00 
108) 110809108431994021201 0 0 0 2.00 
109) 110909108441995020303 0 0 0 2.00 
110) 111009201002000080102 4 2 2 4.00 
111) 111109202001992011201 4 1 1 3.00 
112) 111209207001992061101 2 0 0 2.00 
113) 111309209001992071701 4 0 0 2.00 
114) 111409212211992053001 2 0 0 2.00 
115) 111509212221995072501 0 0 0 2.00 















































































116) 111609213001990050501 0 0 0 2.00 
117) 111709301322001020101 1 0 0 2.00 
118) 111809301331991052001 2 2 2 4.00 
119) 111909302001993052501 4 2 2 4.00 
120) 112009502001994032101 0 0 0 2.00 
121) 112109601001996080101 2 2 2 4.00 
122) 112209604001995020301 4 0 0 2.00 
123) 112309801001998051001 3 2 2 4.00 
124) 112409803001998111701 1 0 0 2.00 
125) 112509901001997052201 2 2 2 4.00 
 






List of Aggregated Level of Political Agreement (LPA4) Scores 





1) 100104601001991042301 1.00 2.66 
2) 100204801001948122101 4.00 3.00 
3) 100304803211948032502 0.00 2.00 
4) 100404803221948032501 0.00 2.00 
5) 100504804211948070102 0.00 2.83 
6) 100604804221948070301 0.00 2.50 
7) 100704901001950062901 1.00 2.75 
8) 100805001411950062501 1.00 2.66 
9) 100905101001951062201 3.00 2.69 
10) 101005401001954042401 0.00 2.87 
11) 101105402001953020301 4.00 2.00 
12) 101205404001975043001 3.00 1.66 
13) 101305601311956103001 4.00 1.87 
14) 101405601321981061101 0.00 1.75 
15) 101505601331982062301 3.00 1.98 
16) 101605602001956072901 3.00 2.21 
17) 101705603001956103102 4.00 2.54 
18) 101805604001962010501 4.00 3.00 
19) 101905701001957120301 4.00 1.87 
20) 102005702001957052301 0.00 2.50 
21) 102105801001958109901 4.00 3.12 
22) 102206001001960070101 4.00 3.05 
23) 102306002001960079901 0.00 2.25 
24) 102406003001959061101 2.00 2.22 
25) 102506101001962070701 3.00 1.62 
26) 102606102001960039901 1.00 2.66 
27) 102706201001962022801 2.00 2.50 
28) 102806202001960032701 4.00 3.11 
29) 102906301211963049901 0.00 1.87 
30) 103006301221964122801 2.00 2.75 
31) 103106304001963089901 4.00 3.16 
32) 103206304001963091201 3.00 2.25 
33) 103306305001962081101 4.00 2.83 
34) 103406502001965063101 4.00 2.25 
35) 103506503001965111101 3.00 2.66 
36) 103606701001968050201 0.00 2.33 
37) 103706801001967100301 0.00 2.25 
38) 103806802001968100901 3.00 2.08 
39) 103907101001971120101  1.00 1.75 









40) 104007201001972080701 4.00 2.91 
41) 104107301211972999901 2.00 2.86 
42) 104207301221973101703 2.00 2.83 
43) 104307302001977090801 0.00 2.25 
44) 104407401001974091901 3.00 1.87 
45) 104507402001974051801 1.00 2.41 
46) 104607403001974119901 0.00 2.41 
47) 104707501001975069901 4.00 2.83 
48) 104807502001972092201 3.00 2.00 
49) 104907503001977122001 4.00 2.91 
50) 105007505001973100201 0.00 2.12 
51) 105107601001977022407 0.00 2.16 
52) 105207602001976019901 1.00 2.00 
53) 105307701001977022406 1.00 2.25 
54) 105407702211977022401 2.00 2.50 
55) 105507702221983111201 3.00 2.25 
56) 105607703001977022403 3.00 2.37 
57) 105707704001977010101 3.00 2.25 
58) 105807704001977010102 3.00 2.50 
59) 105907705001977022402 2.00 2.50 
60) 106007706001977022405 3.00 2.37 
61) 106107707001977022404 0.00 1.87 
62) 106207708001977031201 1.00 2.50 
63) 106307801001977070801 3.00 2.12 
64) 106407804001978020701 3.00 2.25 
65) 106507805001978071801 3.00 2.00 
66) 106607806001978092401 0.00 2.83 
67) 106707807001978051201 3.00 2.50 
68) 106807808001977050801 3.00 2.66 
69) 106907901001979111201 3.00 2.66 
70) 107007902221998051002 3.00 2.66 
71) 107107903001979060701 4.00 2.58 
72) 107207904001979110201 2.00 2.62 
73) 107308001211980010401 1.00 2.66 
74) 107408002001984073101 2.00 2.50 
75) 107508101001981040101 3.00 2.37 
76) 107608102001980121202 2.00 2.33 
77) 107708103221980121201 2.00 2.33 
78) 107808104001981129901 3.00 3.00 
79) 107908201001982040301 4.00 2.49 
80) 108008301001995061401 0.00 2.66 
81) 108108303211983121901 0.00 2.08 
82) 108208303221986071001 0.00 2.00 









83) 108308305001985110101 3.00 2.50 
84) 108408401001984012301 2.00 2.00 
85) 108508402001995020801 0.00 2.25 
86) 108608601211986010901 2.00 2.66 
87) 108708701001987080701 4.00 2.75 
88) 108808704211987052401 3.00 2.66 
89) 108908704222000051901 4.00 2.55 
90) 109008901001989030101 4.00 2.37 
91) 109108902001989060601 0.00 2.66 
92) 109208904001991043004 3.00 2.66 
93) 109309001311990080202 1.00 2.66 
94) 109409001321992031001 3.00 2.66 
95) 109509001331990080201 2.00 2.66 
96) 109609005001990040901 4.00 2.75 
97) 109709006001990081301 2.00 2.50 
98) 109809101311991062501 4.00 2.66 
99) 109909101321996052301 4.00 2.66 
100) 110009101331998032501 4.00 2.91 
101) 110109102211996022101 0.00 2.00 
102) 110203102222001012201 1.00 2.00 
103) 110309101001992062601 2.00 2.12 
104) 110409105001991100101 4.00 3.00 
105) 110509106001990050101 2.00 2.00 
106) 110609108411992040701 2.00 2.33 
107) 110709108421993092701 2.00 2.25 
108) 110809108431994021201 0.00 2.37 
109) 110909108441995020303 0.00 1.75 
110) 111009201002000080102 4.00 3.00 
111) 111109202001992011201 4.00 2.83 
112) 111209207001992061101 2.00 2.00 
113) 111309209001992071701 4.00 2.75 
114) 111409212211992053001 2.00 2.50 
115) 111509212221995072501 0.00 1.75 
116) 111609213001990050501 0.00 1.50 
117) 111709301322001020101 1.00 2.00 
118) 111809301331991052001 2.00 2.66 
119) 111909302001993052501 4.00 3.08 
120) 112009502001994032101 0.00 1.87 
121) 112109601001996080101 2.00 2.50 
122) 112209604001995020301 4.00 2.50 
123) 112309801001998051001 3.00 2.83 
124) 112409803001998111701 1.00 2.20 
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set mem 500m 
 
*--------------------------Module 1.a (Combining data)------------------------; 
 




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\mehmetonder.dta" 
 
merge 1:1 case_code using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 





gen LPA1 = (LPA11 + LPA111) / 2 
gen LPA2 = (LPA22 + LPA222) / 2 
gen LPA3 = (LPA33 + LPA333) / 2 
gen LPA4 = (LPA44 + LPA444) / 2 
 
drop LPA11 LPA22 LPA33 LPA44 LPA222 LPA111 LPA333 LPA444 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-




*combining LPA variables with other variables and fixing data 
 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\lpas.dta" 
 
merge 1:1 case_code using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 
24)\4) STATA Input-Output (etc.) Data\other_vars.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\lpas+other.dta" 
 
merge 1:1 case_code using   "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 
24)\4) STATA Input-Output (etc.) Data\cinc_var.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
gen relpow = scinc/tcinc 
gen lrelpow=log(relpow) 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-
Output (etc.) Data\lpas+other+cinc", replace 
clear 
 





merge 1:1 case_code using   "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 
24)\4) STATA Input-Output (etc.) Data\alli_var.dta" 
drop _merge 
 
*--------------------------Module 1.b (Fixing data)--------------------------; 
 
gen relations = 1 
replace relations = 0  if rivalry == 1  
replace relations = 2  if alliance == 1  
 
*making dependent variable dichotomized  
 
gen ssuc=0  
replace ssuc=1 if eff == 2 
replace ssuc=1 if eff == 3 
replace ssuc=1 if eff == 4 
label var ssuc "Sanctions Success Probability" 
 
order case_code effectiveness LPA1 LPA2 /// 
LPA3 LPA4 scost tcost signaling collaboration /// 
usinvol Inducements srtype trtype bluntness /// 
















rename effectiveness eff 
rename LPA1 _1lpa1 
rename LPA2 _1lpa2 
rename LPA3 _1lpa3 
rename LPA4 _1lpa4 
rename scost _2scost 
rename tcost _2tcost 
rename signaling _3sign 
rename relations _4ascale 
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rename collaboration _4colla 
rename usinvol _4usinvl 
rename lrelpow _5lrelpow 
rename Inducements _6indcmt 
rename srtype _7stype 
rename trtype _7ttype 
rename bluntness _8blunt 
 
order caseno case_code eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 /// 
_1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt, first 
 
label variable eff "Effectiveness" 
label variable _1lpa1 "Sender Level of Political Agreement" 
label variable _1lpa2 "Target Level of Political Agreement" 
label variable _1lpa3 "International Level of Political Agreement" 
label variable _1lpa4 "Aggregated Level of Political Agreement" 
label variable _2scost "Sender Cost" 
label variable _2tcost "Target Cost" 
label variable _3sign "Signaling" 
label variable _4ascale "Relations Scale" 
label variable _4colla "Collaboration Scale" 
label variable _4usinvl "United States Involvement" 
label variable _5lrelpow "Relative Power" 
label variable _6indcmt "Inducements" 
label variable _7stype "Sender Regime Type" 
label variable _7ttype "Target Regime Type" 
label variable _8blunt "Sanction Bluntness" 
 
list case_code eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-
Output (etc.) Data\diss_data", replace 
clear  
 
*---------------------Module 2 (Descriptive Statistics)------------------------; 
 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
tab eff _1lpa1 
tab eff _1lpa2 
tab eff _1lpa3 
tab eff _1lpa4 
tab eff _2scost 
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tab eff _2tcost 
tab eff _3sign 
tab eff _4ascale 
tab eff _4colla 
tab eff _4usinvl 
tab eff _6indcmt 
tab eff _7stype 
tab eff _7ttype 
tab eff _8blunt 
 
sum _7stype _7ttype 
 
desc eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4 _2scost /// 
_2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow /// 
_6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
sum eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4 _2scost /// 
_2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl /// 
_5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
sum eff, detail 
sum _1lpa1, detail 
sum _1lpa2, detail 
sum _1lpa3, detail 
 
scatter eff _1lpa1 
scatter eff _1lpa2 
scatter eff _1lpa3 
 
pwcorr eff _1lpa1 
pwcorr eff _1lpa2 
pwcorr eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4 _2scost /// 
_2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl /// 
_5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
graph matrix eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4, half 
 
twoway scatter eff _1lpa1 || lfit eff _1lpa1 
twoway scatter eff _1lpa2 || lfit eff _1lpa2 
twoway scatter eff _1lpa3 || lfit eff _1lpa3 
twoway scatter eff _1lpa4 || lfit eff _1lpa4 
twoway scatter eff _2scost || lfit eff _2scost 
twoway scatter eff _2tcost || lfit eff _2tcost 
 
twoway scatter _1lpa1 _2tcost || lfit _1lpa1 _2tcost 
twoway scatter _1lpa2 _2tcost || lfit _1lpa2 _2tcost 
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twoway scatter _1lpa3 _2tcost || lfit _1lpa3 _2tcost 
 
twoway scatter eff _3sign || lfit eff _3sign 
twoway scatter eff _4ascale || lfit eff _4ascale 
twoway scatter eff _4colla || lfit eff _4colla 
twoway scatter eff _4usinvl || lfit eff _4usinvl 
twoway scatter eff _5lrelpow || lfit eff _5lrelpow 
twoway scatter eff _6indcmt || lfit eff _6indcmt 
twoway scatter eff _7stype || lfit eff _7stype 
twoway scatter eff _7ttype || lfit eff _7ttype 
twoway scatter eff _8blunt || lfit eff _8blunt 
 
hist eff, disc start (0) percent  
 
hist _1lpa1, bin (6) percent 
hist _1lpa2, bin (9) percent 
hist _1lpa3, bin (5) percent 








order case_code eff _1lpa1 _1lpa2 _1lpa3 _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla 













*Lower and higher levels categorization of LPA variables 
 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
*num1=0 (lower LPA1 values), num1=1 (higher values) 
gen num1=0 if _1lpa1 <= 3.8393290000 
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replace num1=1 if _1lpa1 > 3.8393290000 
 
*num2=0 (lower LPA2 values), num2=1 (higher values) 
gen num2=0 if _1lpa2 <= 3.419333 
replace num2=1 if _1lpa2 > 3.419333 
 
*num3=0 (lower LPA3 values), num3=1 (higher values) 
gen num3=0 if _1lpa3 < 2.74 
replace num3=1 if _1lpa3 >= 2.74 
 
*num4=0 (lower LPA4 values), num4=1 (higher values) 
gen num4=0 if _1lpa4 < 2.432587 
replace num4=1 if _1lpa4 >= 2.432587 
 
sum num1 num2 num3 
tab eff num1 
tab eff num2 
tab eff num3 
tab eff num4 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-
Output (etc.) Data\diss_data", replace 
 
*Summary Classification Table 
 
*box11=1 if num3 low, num2 low, num1 low, box11=0 all else 
clear 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box11=0 
replace box11=1 if (num3==0 & num2==0 & num1==0) 




*box12=1 if num3 low, num2 low, num1 high, box21=0 all else 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box12=0 
replace box12=1 if (num3==0 & num2==0 & num1==1) 
drop if box12==0 
sum eff 
clear 
*box13=1 if num3 low, num2 high, num1 low, box13=0 all else 





replace box13=1 if (num3==0 & num2==1 & num1==0) 




*box14=1 if num3 low, num2 high, num1 high, box14=0 all else 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box14=0 
replace box14=1 if (num3==0 & num2==1 & num1==1) 




*box21=1 if num3 high, num2 low, num1 low, box21=0 all else 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box21=0 
replace box21=1 if (num3==1 & num2==0 & num1==0) 




*box22=1 if num3 high, num2 low, num1 high, box22=0 all else 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box22=0 
replace box22=1 if (num3==1 & num2==0 & num1==1) 




*box23=1 if num3 high, num2 high, num1 low, box23=0 all else 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
gen box23=0 
replace box23=1 if (num3==1 & num2==1 & num1==0) 




*box24=1 if num3 high, num2 high, num1 high, box24=0 all else 





replace box24=1 if (num3==1 & num1==1 & num2==1) 




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
drop num1 num2 num3 num4 
 
save "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
hist _1lpa1, percent 
hist _1lpa2, percent 
hist _1lpa3, percent 
hist _1lpa4, percent 
 
*First case (mean || median(p50) || LPA score) 
 
hist _1lpa1, addplot(pci 0 3.83 8 3.83 || /// 
pci 0 4 8 4 || pci 0 3.75 8 3.75)  
 
hist _1lpa2, addplot(pci 0 3.41 1.5 3.41 || /// 
pci 0 3.5 1.5 3.5 || pci 0 4 1.5 4)  
 
hist _1lpa4, addplot(pci 0 2.43 1.5 2.43 || /// 




hist _1lpa1, addplot(pci 0 3.83 8 3.83 || /// 
pci 0 3.995 8 3.995 || pci 0 4 8 4)  
 
hist _1lpa2, addplot(pci 0 3.41 1.5 3.41 || /// 
pci 0 3.49 1.5 3.49 || pci 0 3.5 1.5 3.5)  
 
hist _1lpa3, addplot(pci 0 2.74 3 2.74 || /// 
pci 0 2.01 3 2.01 || pci 0 4 3 4)  
 
hist _1lpa4, addplot(pci 0 2.43 1.5 2.43 || /// 
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hist _1lpa1, addplot(pci 0 3.83 8 3.83 || /// 
pci 0 4 8 4 || pci 0 3.25 8 3.25)  
 
hist _1lpa2, addplot(pci 0 3.41 1.5 3.41 || /// 
pci 0 3.5 1.5 3.5 || pci 0 3.51 1.5 3.51)  
 
hist _1lpa4, addplot(pci 0 2.43 1.5 2.43 || /// 




*------------------------module 3 (Regression Analyses)------------------------------; 
 





use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
*model 1.a  
 
eststo: ologit eff _1lpa1 _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _1lpa1 _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl /// 
_5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_1_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 




outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_1_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label                                                                     /// 
title(Model 1: Level of Political Agreement within Sender State) /// 
nonumbers mtitles("Model 1.a" "Model 1.b" "Model 1.c" )                 
 
ologit eff _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_1_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
coefplot, drop(?cons) xline(0) 
 
*odds ration for model 1.c 
 
ologit eff _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
 _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 







use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
*model 2.a  
 
eststo: ologit eff _1lpa2 _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _1lpa2 _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl /// 
_5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
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outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_2_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_2_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label                                                                     /// 
     title(Model 1: Level of Political Agreement within Sender State)       /// 
     nonumbers mtitles("Model 2.a" "Model 2.b" "Model 2.c" )                 
 
ologit eff _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_2_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
coefplot, drop(?cons) xline(0) 
 
*model 2.c odds ration 
 
ologit eff _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 










use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
*model 3.a  
 
eststo: ologit eff _1lpa3 _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _1lpa3 _3sign _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl /// 
_5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_3_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_3_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-




eststo: ologit eff _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label                 /// 
title(Model 1: Level of Political Agreement within Sender State) /// 
nonumbers mtitles("Model 3.a" "Model 3.b" "Model 3.c" )                 
 
ologit eff _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
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outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_3_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
coefplot, drop(?cons) xline(0) 
 
*model 3.c odds ration 
 
ologit eff _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
 _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 






use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
*model 4.a  
eststo: ologit eff _1lpa4 _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _1lpa4 _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_4_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
*model 4.b 
eststo: ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
ologit eff _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_4_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
*model 4.c 
eststo: ologit eff _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
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_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label                                                                     /// 
title(Model 1: Level of Political Agreement within Sender State)       /// 
nonumbers mtitles("Model 3.a" "Model 3.b" "Model 3.c" )                 
 
ologit eff _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Model_4_Results.doc", se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels merge starlevels(10 5 
1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-
squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
coefplot, drop(?cons) xline(0) 
 
*Model 4.c odds ratio 
 
ologit eff _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 











eststo: oprobit eff _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
 _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
 _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
  
 oprobit eff _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
 _4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
 _7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
  
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_ordinal_m1.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) /// 
sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) /// 




 eststo: oprobit eff _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
oprobit eff _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_ordinal_m2.doc", /// 
 se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) /// 
 sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) /// 
 summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
*Model 3.c 
eststo: oprobit eff _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
 _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
 _8blunt 
  
 oprobit eff _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
 _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
 _8blunt 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_ordinal_m3.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) /// 
sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) /// 
summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-squared) summdec(1 2) 
 
*Model 4.c 
eststo: oprobit eff _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label          /// 
title(Ordinal Probit Regression Results for Sanctions Success, A Robustness Check)  /// 
nonumbers mtitles("Model 1.c" "Model 2c" "Model 3.c" "Model 4.c")                 
 
oprobit eff _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_ordinal_m4.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) /// 
sigsymbols(*,**,***) summstat(chi2\r2_p) /// 
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use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale _4colla /// 
_4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype _7ttype /// 
_8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Logit_lpa1_Results.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace ///  
starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) ///  
summstat(chi2\r2_p) ///  
summtitle(LR Chi-Squared statistic\Pseudo R-squared) ///  
summdec(1 2) 
 




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Logit_lpa2_Results.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace ///  
starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) ///  
summstat(chi2\r2_p) ///  









use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Logit_lpa3_Results.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace ///  
starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) ///  
summstat(chi2\r2_p) ///  







use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Logit_lpa4_Results.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace ///  
starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) ///  
summstat(chi2\r2_p) ///  














logit ssuc _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
margins, at( _1lpa1=(3.00, 3.08, 3.25, 3.33, 3.41, /// 
 3.50, 3.66, 3.75, 3.83, 4.00)) 
marginsplot, xdimension(at(_1lpa1)) level(95) 
marginsplot, recastci(rarea) level(99) 
 




use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
margins, at( _1lpa2=(1.5, 1.8, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8, /// 
2.9, 3.0, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, 4.0)) 
marginsplot, xdimension(at(_1lpa2)) level(95) 
marginsplot, recastci(rarea) level(99) 
 
*LPA3 margins plot 
 
clear all 
use "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA Input-Output 
(etc.) Data\diss_data" 
 
logit ssuc _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
margins, at( _1lpa3=(2.00, 3.00, 3.5, 4)) 
marginsplot, xdimension(at(_1lpa3)) level(95) 
marginsplot, recastci(rarea) level(99) 
 
*LPA4 margins plot 
 
clear all 





logit ssuc _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
margins, at( _1lpa4=(1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, /// 
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)) 
marginsplot, xdimension(at(_1lpa4)) level(95) 













eststo: probit ssuc _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
probit ssuc _1lpa1 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_standard_m1.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) /// 





eststo: probit ssuc _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
probit ssuc _1lpa2 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_standard_m2.doc", /// 
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se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) /// 





eststo: probit ssuc _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
probit ssuc _1lpa3 _2scost _2tcost _3sign _4ascale /// 
_4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt _7stype /// 
_7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_standard_m3.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) /// 





eststo: probit ssuc _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
esttab, se r2(4) label             /// 
title(Standard Probit Regression Results for Sanctions Success, A Robustness Check) /// 
nonumbers mtitles("Model 1.c" "Model 2c" "Model 3.c" "Model 4.c")                 
 
probit ssuc _1lpa4 _2scost _2tcost _3sign /// 
_4ascale _4colla _4usinvl _5lrelpow _6indcmt /// 
_7stype _7ttype _8blunt 
 
outreg using "C:\Users\MEHMET\Desktop\1) Dissertation\2) Diss Data (Feb 24)\4) STATA 
Input-Output (etc.) Data\Robustness_standard_m4.doc", /// 
se bdec(2 5 3) varlabels replace starlevels(10 5 1) sigsymbols(*,**,***) /// 
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Economic sanctions have been dubbed mainly as ineffective foreign policy tools by 
political scientists. Despite this, countries continue to use economic sanctions given their less 
intrusive and offensive nature compared to wars. Therefore, policy-makers have a high stake in 
learning the critical factors behind effective economic sanctions. Overall, it is understood that an 
effective sanctions episode compels one state to change its attitude or behavior on an issue, the 
target state, in line with what another state, sender state, desires. This has given rise to literature 
known as the determinants of economic sanctions in international political economy. This 
dissertation contributes to the ongoing study of economic sanctions by introducing a neglected 
factor, the level of political agreement. This construct refers to the extent to which relevant political 
actors in a state and international system supports or opposes the sanctions episode. This 
dissertation has identified three types of political agreements, the sender, the target and the 
international community. The dissertation sets forth several hypotheses testing the relationship 
between political agreement levels and economic sanctions outcomes. Utilizing empirical 
analyses, the dissertation found that higher levels of political agreement in the sender are 
associated with higher likelihoods for sanctions to be effective. Besides, higher levels of political 
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agreement on the opposition of sanctions in the target state are associated with less effective 
sanctions. Finally, higher levels of political agreement on the international level are associated 
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